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THE TREND OF HISTORY

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THE TREND OF HISTORY

Origins of Twentieth Century Problems

BY
WILLIAM KAY WALLACE

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TO

W. D. W.

I GRATEFULLY DEDICATE
THIS BOOK

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PREFACE

We are standing on the threshold of an unpolitical age. Politics has fallen from its high estate. Since the floodgates of political privilege have been opened, and participation in political affairs has been vouchsafed to all, we find everywhere a progressively increasing apathy in matters relating to politics. The preëminence of the State politically conceived, has been called into question. Its sovereignty has been shorn of many of its mystical characteristics. Other forms of corporate organisation are pressing for recognition. We may in turn see arising before our eyes a new, great social institution. Like feudalism it is in its essence unpolitical. As Lord Bryce has pointed out "feudalism was a social and legal system, only indirectly and by consequence a political one." We may to-day note that "industrialism," which may serve to denominate this new institution, is a social and economic system, only indirectly political. Such would appear to be the trend of history.

History is the book of life of mankind. Its function is primarily interpretative. Historical interpretation means the selection of those relevant factors out of the mass of past events which stand in significant relation to the present moment. Every age may thus be said to have historical ties which at first sight seem incongruous. In our own times the interest in guild organisation, the assertion that occupation or function rather than geographical distribution is destined to become the basis of more adequate social organisation, hark back to the Middle

Ages, and are closer thereto than to the theories of State and the political practice which were still more or less universally accepted before the World War. Thus history must ever be written afresh, for after a few years such writing inevitably becomes obsolete, except as of literary or antiquarian interest. But history itself is never obsolete. The historical present is the outcome of a past which it is the purpose of history to trace. In our own times the transformation which is taking place in the theory of social organisation requires that the method of historical writing be revised.

Hitherto history has generally been conceived in an exclusively political sense as a record of the *res gestae,* and of the men who brought them to pass. As long as politics remained dominant it was natural that history should have remained primarily political in character. But we can now perceive that political history or any other partial survey of events in their isolation, such as is embodied in a biography or even in a national history, is no longer adequate. History must henceforth be approached from an institutional, not from an individual or national standpoint. The theoretical background of social practice must be inquired into. In this brief survey I would point the way to this new method of history. To trace through the tangled maze we call the course of events the logical antecedents and coefficients thereof is to discover the trend of history, the process of social life. Such is the purpose of this volume.

The chaotic state of mind which exists so widely among all manner and condition of persons is in a great measure due to the fact that the relevant factors of history, the connective tissue between the past and the present, are obscure. The great obsolete mass of dead matter incorporated in the average historical survey illustrates

significantly the point I wish to make. I would not infer that political data have been omitted from this book. On the contrary as it reviews a predominantly political period, in fact traces in outline the rise, maturity and decay of modern political practice, politics has found a large place therein. But I have endeavoured in so far as possible to present the theory of the age and illustrate it by the practice of politics, and I trust that I may have succeeded in a measure in pointing beyond this theory and practice to the newer theory that was being developed.

Though politics can no longer be held to be pivotal, in history, we cannot disregard the fact that the aim of politics is to arrive at some workable functioning of what we term social life. But in this politics has no exclusive monopoly. Religion, politics and economics are the three great regulative factors of human intercourse subsumed under the term—Society. At various epochs the principal emphasis has been placed now on one, now on another of these elements, according to a certain historically relevant relationship which may be traced. It is a one-sided distortion of historical truth to attempt to claim absolute preëminence for any one of these factors, though the dominance first of one and then of another is confirmed by a perusal of history. As a consequence the manner and mode of the civilisation of a given epoch, the cultural life of a period is colored by the dominant characteristic of the age, be it religious, political or economic.

In this first volume I would present for your consideration the origins and background of present-day social phenomena. I would trace in this new historical spirit the course of relevant events which has led up to those of the epoch which we may conveniently call our own. It is sheer pedantry or an utter misunderstanding of the aim of history to declare that the events of his own times are

too vivid, too fresh for an historian to undertake to interpret them. In point of fact the only history that is adequate is contemporary history; that is, history that is related to the present. All the research of historians, all the delvings of students into texts and yellowed parchments to eke out the minutiæ of facts, which Macaulay nearly a century ago significantly termed the "mere dross of history," are in themselves worthless unless linked up with the current of events.

History reveals life in its manifoldness and complexity. In order to introduce some semblance of unity, to take history out of the realm of chronicles, to free it from a parity with fiction or a disparity with romance, we must assure ourselves that it is made understandable in terms of contemporary interest and usage. History in this sense is not merely the book of life, it may if read aright become the book of wisdom of mankind. I do not mean to imply that it should be looked upon as a collection of recipes to be followed in guiding individual action, or that it can serve, as it is so often held, as the *magister vitae* of a person calling himself a statesman. But presenting those events which are closely related to our own times and showing the relationship that exists between the past and the present, not only may we hope to arrive at an understanding of the significance of the course of events, but we may even discern a pattern of purpose in social life. This purposive element is in itself only discernible *a posteriori* and should not be taken as implying some rigid notion of historical causality. For history which recounts the story of the life process in its entirety admits of no such notion as an efficient or final cause. It is nevertheless with these causal factors that history is primarily concerned. It is by weaving them into a unity, by setting forth cogently whatever may serve to explain their mean-

ing, that the course of events, the trend of history is revealed.

In selecting the historical data used to illustrate this inquiry, much had perforce to be abridged, much omitted which might possibly have found a place in these pages. Thus, for example, in discussing the rise of the modern State, the influence of the Counter-Reformation, and the part played by the Jesuits in joining hands with the liberal movement in undermining the concept of the divine right of kings, and their struggle against monarchical absolutism, some might aver, should have been included. This very interesting episode has like others been omitted not only because of the need of limiting the scope of the narrative within reasonable bounds, but also because the Counter-Reformation and the work of its protagonists were historically negative. What the Jesuits sought was the restoration of papal supremacy in matters temporal, and not the positive progress of the new and more liberal political practice. Other omissions might be cited, but a careful study has led me to conclude that in the main their influence was negative, and had no preëminently positive influence on the course of history.

W. K. Wallace

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THE TREND OF HISTORY

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INTRODUCTION

I

In periods of historical transition, the stress of new ideas is greater than can be equably borne. The passing of the old order is attended by upheavals and disturbances which are in themselves manifestations of this overburdening, and must not be confounded with the positive progress of the new tenets. The natural conservative forces, latent in all living matter, render smooth transition difficult. Reactionary principles remain dominant, relatively intact, until the crumbling process is accelerated and new and more appropriate theories find spontaneous acceptance.

It no longer suffices that the political philosopher, the doctrinaire sociologist, or the ethically-minded economist should seek to discover and array in historically accurate, logically sound argument the factors which contribute to the ideal governance of society. It no longer suffices that the historian, after a minute inquiry into the episodes and events in the life of a people, should present those relevant details which may appear to have led to the rise, grandeur, and fall of empires, so that we may profit by the experiences of the civilisations which have preceded our own. The time is past when the mission of the historian is to arouse the patriotic fervor of his compatriots as a spur to national unity or

political independence, which influenced so much of the historical writing and the so-called philosophy of history during the 19th century. Theories of the *summum bonum,* politically arrived at, or panaceas based on worn-out political creeds into which the historian would seek to breathe a breath of new life can no longer be accepted.

Western civilisation, and in its train that of the rest of the world, has entered upon a new historical epoch. If we are to be in a position to interpret aright the significance of the course of events, to understand the meaning of the historical moment we call the present, we must be equipped to view dispassionately and without prejudice the origin and growth of the State as we know it, and trace the decay of its present constitutional form. To do this we must inquire with greater precision into the plan, investigate with clearer insight the principles upon which the social organisation of our epoch has been built. A new method of historical inquiry, a new historical viewpoint is required.

When, after the barbarian invasions, the political organisation of the Roman Empire was disrupted, men turned in disgust from the secular world and found what solace they could in the contemplation of the glories of the "City of God." In the West, politics in its proper sense disappeared and we have the period known as the Dark Ages, devoid of history. In the course of these centuries, roughly from the end of the 5th to the 10th, the Church entrenched itself firmly and filled the whole life of the individual.

During the long continuance of the domination of the cultural life of Europe by the Church, its control had become so absolute that in order to emancipate mankind from what had come to be recognised as an intolerable servitude, it was felt that a new theory of social organ-

isation was required. Whereas religion may assure a primitive stability to society and make possible a rudimentary form of social organisation, with the growing complexity of social life secularisation invariably ensues, which awakens a fresh interest in politics.

In contrast to the religious instinct common to mankind, we find among civilised peoples what we may term political consciousness. Religion has to do with the life and conduct of the individual; politics with the life and conduct of the State. Religion is primarily moral; politics primarily ethical. Religion demands conformity to creed; politics conformity to law. Religion is static; politics dynamic.

The social order of the Middle Ages which bore a religious imprint was essentially immobile. Society was established on a permanent, hereditary basis. Its hierarchy was fixed, apparently indissoluble. The interdependence of the various social orders was secondary only to their independence as a class. Each class, according to the measure of its strength, looked out for its own welfare, endeavored to safeguard its own interests; in some instances even maintained its own armed force, and provided and paid for its own representatives in the Diets. The gradual decay of this social system, in which the dominant position of the Church was everywhere recognised, was primarily due to the reawakening of political consciousness, and in a far less degree to the abuses and corruption of the Church. To overthrow the authority of the Church in secular affairs involved the displacing of religion as the focal factor in society and the introduction of a new pivotal interest. It meant that religion was to give way to politics; that the guidance of mankind by transcendental revelation was to be replaced by an empirical rationalism.

The substitution of the State politically conceived for the Church, which had in the past performed the dual function of spiritual and social supervision, meant not only the usurpation by the State of many of the functions formerly performed as religious rites but, what was to prove more important, the assertion of the preeminence of the secular world.

Whereas the Church had left a wide latitude to the individual in regard to his political beliefs, and had loosened the bonds of his allegiance to the State, that intolerable servitude of antiquity the tradition of which still survived, the Reformation, by wresting the control of the social order from the hands of the Papacy, introduced the concept of nationality in ecclesiastical affairs, raised the political status of the individual, and revived with renewed intensity his interest in his allegiance to a secular state. It must be acknowledged that these were merely incidental consequences of the process of rehabilitation of the Church, undertaken by the champions of the Reformation, and were not considered by them as the objectives which they strove to attain. One need but call to mind the inquiring attitude of Erasmus, the shrewd fearlessness of Luther, the uncompromising severity of Calvin, as they surveyed the world of their day. The ulcer of society as they clearly saw it was the decadence of the Church. The longings, the strivings of men were directed towards the planning of a new era, a new relation of man to his God and indirectly of man to man. The time was ripe for a new social order. The sun of theism still glowed in the West with effulgent splendor. The aim of those who were destined to bring about its eclipse was not to extinguish its beneficent rays, but rather to dissipate the clouds of superstition, vice, and ignorance which ob-

scured it. They were in the first instance solely concerned with the reform of the Church, its purification, its strengthening, and its reaffirmation as the dominant force in society. Nevertheless, the first fruit of the teaching of the Protestant reformers not merely resulted in undermining the doctrine and dogma of the Church, but at the same time awakened an unquenchable interest in the theory and practice of political affairs. The disciplined faith of Catholicism, which had bred a spirit of obedience and orderly acquiescence in the existing social structure, was to give way to private judgment, based on private conviction which was soon extended from religious to secular affairs.

II

It is in the nature of human affairs that the instruments man uses to attain his objects survive long after the objects themselves have been attained and disappear. The ideal is the goal towards which man's striving is directed. It is usually held, and sincerely so, as a bettering of the existing, its improvement, rather than a substitution by something radically different or new. Such was the case when religious interest gave way to political enthusiasm at the opening of the modern epoch.

Historical inquiry appears to confirm the fact that as religion was supplanted by politics as the pivotal interest of civilised man, almost by way of accident in so far as fixed motives were concerned, so politics will in turn be supplanted by the instruments made use of to regenerate it. It is by the clear-visioned acknowledgment of these probable consequences, by a careful examination thereinto, that it will be possible to discern with increasing accuracy the trend of historical development.

For the tome of social history must not be conceived, as it has been hitherto, as bound between its board covers, complete in its form and content—however admirable these may seem—to which a new volume is added from time to time; but rather like a loose-leaf ledger in which fresh pages are to be inserted as the new is uncovered, as the old is outworn. This does not mean continued compromise, or work half done; it does not mean that the negative will never be inserted where the positive held sway, owing to a passing change of mood. It means that the course of history need not be held to be in process of continuous disruption; nor yet that the growth of the newer forms of social organisation need be retarded by the apparent finality of its existing form. It means that there is a possibility for perpetual renovation, naturally and smoothly arrived at; the old no longer encumbering the new. It is on this economy that the polity of the future must be built.

By an acceptance of this view we can with more simplicity reach an understanding of what is meant by that perplexing term, "progress"; we can conceive the plausibility of perfectibility. We can understand progress in its essential nature, not as an end in itself, as it is so often held to be, but merely as an incidental factor in human affairs, to be made use of in the manner and with the ease with which an outworn page can be removed, and a new page can be inserted. The elemental principles have been determined, bound by the nature of man, but the infinite variations, progress and regress, stretch on before us.

I have given this brief outline in order that it may be clear that when, after the Reformation, religion came to be supplanted by politics as the pivotal factor in social life, the theistic concept, long held the fundamental

tenet in Western Europe, was introduced into political life. It need, therefore, excite no surprise, as it was a logical development, that we should find a Hobbes proclaiming the State the "Mortal God." We see here the transference of allegiance from the theistic to the political Godhead. Machiavelli in Italy and Bodin in France had, before Hobbes, exalted the supremacy of the State, and their political doctrines had found a ready acceptance among the very limited number of men in a position to comprehend the true nature of politics. Looked at from this standpoint, it is not difficult to trace the growth of monarchical absolutism in Europe, which led to the introduction of the concept of the divine right of kings.

From the 16th to the 18th century absolutism was the commonly accepted theory of government. The divinity of the will of the monarch, his direct responsibility to God, his irresponsibility towards man, was the common creed. The King was God's anointed. To his support rallied his subjects. Papal Rome was overshadowed by Paris, London, Madrid, and a number of German centres, each of which had set up a political Godhead. Religion was relegated to the sphere of speculation. Politics became the primal preoccupation, and with it rose the empirical mind, which tested and investigated the tangible. In an ever-widening circle the field of experimentation was extended, and brought within the realm of the human mind useful and practical solutions of all manner of problems, which had never hitherto been investigated. Civilisation had entered upon the path of perfectibility and progress. Such was the work of the Reformation. Who shall say that it was consonant with the aims of its initiators?

In a futile attempt to arrest the decay of religious

ascendancy the Papacy had sanctioned a system of persecution of the heretical adherents of the Reformation, more terrible than that suffered by the early Christians at the hands of the Romans. In the ferocity of the methods used, and in the number of victims resulting therefrom, it far distanced its earlier prototype. For a century and a half Europe was racked by internecine religious wars and persecutions, which spared no man, no land. Throughout the 17th century these convulsions continued. Civil wars in England, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the Dragonnades in France, the Inquisition in Portugal and Spain, the massacres in Holland—all had as their apparent motive the suppression of Protestant heresy. In reality they were phases of a bloody struggle for the supremacy of a new ideology. The latent forces of politics had pushed upward. Politics was about to supplant religion as the motive-force of social life.

From the positive worship of one immortal God the attention of men had been diverted. Religious worship was not abolished, but it became avocational. The vocation of men was henceforth political. Their energy was no longer engaged in religious strife. Finally, the Papacy itself realised the irrevocable character of the new trend, and sought to retain at least a loose-woven spiritual hegemony. It no longer excommunicated and fulminated, no longer insisted on asserting its temporal sovereignty on the field of battle, but associated itself with, and lent the sanction of its approval to, the rule of temporal sovereigns favorable to its religious creed, and thus assisted actively in the creation of a politico-theistic organisation of society.

The State as embodied in its sovereign had become the Mortal God. But in the eyes of the more educated

it could not fail to be a god divested of many of the sacred attributes which had awed past generations. Religion implies implicit obedience. Politics demands no more than explicit allegiance. Religion relies on the utilisation of the primitive psychic phenomena, faith, which readily accepts the prospect of infinite reward in the future, in return for the patient bearing of infinite hardship and toil in the present, coupled with the threat of eternal punishment in case its tenets are violated. Politics attempted to refashion this doctrine, in that it claimed to insure a more real present worth, without much regard for the remote future, and exacted no severe accounting for omissions. Furthermore, politics left as much of the religious doctrine intact as did not interfere with its fundamental requirement of allegiance. The Church remained, but it became in theory the subservient tool of the State. Such, in brief, was the basis of the new political ideology.

III

Two centuries had not elapsed since the day when Luther affixed his ninety-five theses to the gate of the church at Wittenberg (1517). Louis XIV, the exemplar of kingly divinity who had proclaimed *"L'Etat, c'est moi,"* and had coupled it as a maxim of government with that of the divine right of kings, was at the end of his long reign (1715). The divinity of kingship was already beginning to be called into question. Present worth, in its political aspects, was proving no more satisfactory, and actually more oppressive than it had under theistic overlordship. The sovereign and his court had absorbed all the benefits derived from the politico-theistic system of statehood. In the new

strongly compacted national states, such as France and Spain, the long arm of taxation reached out to the most remote confines, and drew to the coffers of the capital the funds needed for the support of royal expenditure. This system was carried to its greatest perfection most rapidly in France, and served to consolidate and unite the various provinces, already bound by linguistic and social bonds. The State—the Mortal God —was expanding into a system of political polytheism, wherein the national spirit was aroused, and national jealousies were fostered, based no longer on creed, but on political allegiance. The politico-theistic system had endowed the State with a divinely anointed sovereign. Now thoughtful men came to recognise for the first time that the State is in reality composed not merely of the governing, but also of the governed. Here we have the genesis of the social contract, which was the cause of fierce conflict in England between Parliament and the Crown during the greater part of the 17th century, and was to be so emphatically emphasised by Rousseau and his disciples a century later. It was this struggle to secure the recognition of the contractual relation between the governing and the governed which resulted in the violent overthrow of the principle of the divine essence of statehood.

The Bill of Rights of 1689, which limited the power of the sovereign in England, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 are complementary documents. Divinity implies hierarchy in governance, but it also recognises the equality of all before the throne of the Deity. As long as kingship was able to identify itself with, and mark off for itself, the exclusive control of sovereignty invested with supernatural attributes, its absolute authority was assured. But once the State was

divested of this theistic fiction, once it came to be believed that the State is composed, not alone of the sovereign, but also of the people, each individual sharing in the greatness, power, and pomp of the State, the sacrosanct, *noli me tangere* characteristic of kingship was destined to vanish.

The equality of men before the Deity, which politico-theistic society sought to imitate under monarchical absolutism, had been warped by prejudice of caste and privilege. The new political ideology of the 18th century proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, as a legal obligation. The relation of the individual to the State lost its theistic bias, and gained in breadth of conception. Henceforth it was to be declared with growing insistence that the State is made up of its citizens, who, in theory at least, should all have an equal share of rights and privileges. Political control was to rest on a juridical basis. The power to enact, or enforce arbitrarily, the sovereign will was to be withdrawn from the monarch. Parliaments, representative of the politically enlightened elements of the population, now came to be regarded as the proper repositories of political power; law-making and amending came to be held their principal function; the assent thereto the function of the sovereign or executive. The contractual relation between the governed and the governing, partnership in the government of the State, was to be established.

The smooth working of such a system was incompatible with the politico-theistic thesis of government. It meant the substitution of the juridical for the theistic relation. The new ideology made steady progress. Rational inquiry affirmed the absurdity of the older principles; over-emphasised the benefits to be derived from the new; adduced *a priori* an ideal social order which

required, it was alleged, only the sanction of the people to bring it into being. Peaceful adjustment was no longer possible. When the oppressed feel the hand of the oppressor growing unsteady; when the man in the saddle makes way for the man on foot; when the potentially strong gives way and concedes to the apparently weak, social leavening is inevitable.

The leavening of society seems to follow certain fixed laws; relatively as fixed as those of the physical world. "Leaven, the primitive ferment, is simply a portion of moistened flour or dough in which the putrefactive agencies have begun to work. When brought in contact with a new portion of flour and water, and incorporated therewith by kneading, it very quickly acts as a ferment, and develops partial fermentation in the whole. Hence it is that where leaven is used it is customary to retain a portion of leavened dough for the next baking." So runs the old explanation of the use of leaven in bread-making. I have reproduced it here for two reasons: one to point out that when putrefactive agencies, which have begun to work, are brought in contact with the healthy mass and incorporated therewith they act quickly as a ferment; the other, that a portion of this new, partially fermented mass, when set aside, acts as the future leaven. It is perhaps not unnecessary to add that fermentation is the change which occurs in one organic substance when influenced by another in a state of decay.

The social order is fundamentally organic: both physically and psychically subject to change. It is more than mere metaphor when we speak of social ferment; its processes are in many respects analogous to the action of ferments outlined. Every substance which putrefies becomes a ferment, and in this condition acquires the properties of setting a-going the processes of fermenta-

tion. What are the forces of social fermentation? What are the integral ingredients of social leavening? To examine their characteristic manifestations, to test their dynamic potency, to discover what elements have been kneaded into social life and what elements have been set aside for future leavening will render more intelligible the hitherto occult processes of social development and historical evolution.

The French Revolution eliminated theism from politics, and though politico-theism survived in form for a prolonged period, its substance had been sapped, and the "grace of God" was no longer held to be a vital political asset. Politics, clad in its new juridic dress, shorn of its theistic elements, rationalised, was to become the bearer of a new ideology—nationalism.

We must here pause to consider the elements of this politico-juridic concept of the State. We must trace its course of development and final flowering in the Nation-State.

I have hitherto sketched very briefly, with a few rough, broad strokes, the background of the historical changes which grew out of the Reformation. It now becomes necessary to inquire more minutely into the fundamental political principles which have influenced the growth of the new theories of State and of social organisation. We must at times retrace our steps, and go over the ground, using historical data not so much as guide as for illustration; drawing our conclusions synthetically, making use of theory and practice, which may serve to illumine our inquiry. It is by following such method that we may hope to arrive at a constructive understanding of the political history of our own times; neither confined to mere abstraction, nor subjected to too rigid and stilted empirical tests; neither disregard-

ing the ideal side of politics, nor exaggerating its realist manifestations. Pursuing our inquiry in a philosophical mood, without perverting history, or distorting theory, we can reasonably expect to be in a position to formulate conclusions which will approach nearest to truth as unfolded to us in our era.

Truth is the keystone of the arch of history, based on the two supporting pillars of accuracy and veracity. Truth is composite: veracity is its ideal, accuracy its real element. To determine truthfully implies a harmonious union of the real and the ideal. It is by patient inquiry, by slow-moving processes of investigation, by the refraction of the known factors into their elements, as light is refracted, and then by presenting the fruits of our research, as pictured objects seen through a stereoscope possessing but two dimensions are seen not as plane representations, but as possessing solidity and relief, that we may hope to arrive at a true understanding of the trend of history.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

The Politico-Theistic Concept of the State

MACHIAVELLI—BODIN—THE PRECURSORS OF THE NEW POLITICO-JURIDIC MOVEMENT—LOCKE—ALTHUSIUS—GROTIUS

I

WHILE the spiritual leaders of the Reformation were engaged upon the work of church reform, and by their active propaganda had brought about the overthrow of Papal supremacy, theories of State were being evolved upon which to build the new social structure. The theory advanced by Machiavelli early in the 16th century—influenced as he was by the anarchical condition of Italy so abhorrent to him, and familiar with the ways and means made use of so successfully by the Papacy to heighten the domination of theistic absolutism—vested in the Prince all authority in the State. His Prince was omnipotent and arbitrary, above all law, civil or canon. His State was non-moral; its head bound by no code. We see in this project the desire of its author to substitute not merely the authority of the State for that of the Church, but the omnipotence of the Prince for that of God.

It was left for a Frenchman, Jean Bodin, to formulate logically and legitimatise the doctrines of Machiavelli. In his well-known treatise, *Les Six livres de la République,* published in 1576, Bodin, after discussing the theory and essence of sovereignty, postulated it as the source of all

authority in the State, which he vested in the Prince, the vitalising factor and only real power in the State. He gave substance and form to the doctrine of absolutism, based on the admixture of political and theistic theories which he reconciled in a manner satisfactory to his times. It became the accepted basis upon which the governments of his day were modelled.

Though the politico-theistic concept of the State, as we would tersely denote the political theory underlying monarchical absolutism, which sanctioned the supreme authority of the Prince, was outwardly adhered to by the majority without question throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, already in the minds of some this ill-defined and irresponsible basis of sovereign power appeared to be monstrous. It was soon perceived that, though the King might by analogy be endowed with the attributes of divinity, in reality he was able to enforce his will towards his subjects only by threats of punishment, and that in his relations with other sovereigns he was powerless unless he had recourse to the use of armed force.

In this dilemma men sought for another basis of sovereignty consistent with the rapid spread of liberal views concerning the value and dignity of man. It is of interest to note that this new thesis was first formulated by a Dutchman at a time when the Dutch Provinces were still struggling for their independence against Spain, and stoutly maintained their adherence to the religious tenets of the Reformation.

The theory of State advanced by Althusius in his *Politica* issued in 1603, for the first time set forth that sovereignty is an attribute, not merely of the Prince, but of the State as a whole, which is held to be an indivisible unit made up of Prince and people. Furthermore Althusius maintained that the State is endowed with dis-

tinct moral attributes, and subject to moral law. Grotius, his younger contemporary, expanded this idea, and outlined a code which was to regulate the intercourse of States, both in peace and war, by the enforcement of certain rules of conduct, which, he maintained, States would willingly accept as binding. It was but a step forward when the first professor of what has since come to be known as International Law, Pufendorf, taught at the University of Heidelberg, during the closing years of the 17th century, that the State was possessed of ethical characteristics, similar to those of an high-minded individual who recognised his moral responsibility, and that under given circumstances, the State could be expected to act, and would act, just as an honorable man would act.

At about the same time Locke, in his *Treatise on Civil Government* (1689), propounded the opinion that the authority of the State rested primarily on the consent of the governed. The State, according to Locke, is not the arbitrary creation of some supreme authority, but an evolution arising out of the social needs of man, which require not merely the establishment of fixed rules, but that these rules or laws should be administered uniformly by an authority which men would willingly consent to recognise.

The State created in the image of God, the politico-theistic State, had led to the abuses of absolutism; the State fashioned in the image of man, the politico-juridic State, as the new theory may be called, was the doctrine which was to gain authority and acceptance.

We have thus traced in brief outline the early phases of the transition from the politico-theistic to the politico-juridic concept. The close correlation between the decay of the theistic concept of the State and the rise of

the juridic could be emphasised at great length. It suffices, however, to note that the growth had been logical, and followed the trend of spiritual speculation, lagging behind the more bold emancipators of the Church, but destined, when the fresh earnestness of the religious reformation had so rapidly spent itself, to usurp the field and make what appeared to be unprecedented progress.

In order to arrive at a rational understanding of this progress, and gain a proper insight into political organisation in our own times, it is essential to point out that the thesis of the unity of the national State, in its accepted form, is a result of an analogy, which was drawn by a few 17th century thinkers, between the body politic —the State—and that of man. This analogy, at first tentatively presented, was seized upon a century later, posited as fundamental, and led to the rampant individualism and its correlative, nationalism, of the 19th century.

II

It is characteristic of the human mind to seek to explain by analogy. In order to make an explanation lucid it is the practice to choose such subjects which, whether they fit exactly or not, can by the consonance of sound, phrase, and image, and the skilful use of emphasis, be rendered acceptable. An analogy in the first instance implies nothing more than partial agreement between things in other respects different. But, as some definition is essential to arrive at understanding, it is not difficult to perceive that in endeavoring to set forth the characteristics of so intangible a concept as the State, the most broad and simple analogy should be pressed into service.

In setting up the theistic concept of the State and establishing its absolutist principles, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes had dealt with analogies altogether comprehensible at the time. To understand clearly the coherence of the doctrines they set forth, a glance at the social organisation of the Middle Ages is necessary.

During the mediæval period the State was looked upon as an organisation of laymen altogether beneath the Church. "The basest and most corrupt clerk, in virtue of his order, stands high above the most eminent and virtuous layman, as gold is above iron, or spirit above the body." [1] Secular laws were not binding on the clergy. The priesthood had the right to inquire into their validity, and to determine in how far they saw fit to submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of these laws. The question of the obedience of the clergy to the legal restrictions established by secular authority was never raised. Whenever the interests of the clergy were infringed upon, whenever it appeared as though the privileges or immunities of the Church were about to be threatened, the clergy categorically refused to recognise any superior authority and disregarded, unmolested, all secular enactments. While refusing to submit to any restraints imposed by lay authority, the Church claimed implicit obedience to its edicts. As a natural consequence canon law was placed above civil law, and the right of secular courts to intervene, even in criminal matters in which the interests of the Church or its ministrants were concerned, was denied. Paying no taxes, exempt from bearing arms, the clergy insisted on levying heavy contributions for the support of their establishments, and required the secular authorities to lend armed assistance for the maintenance of the prestige, power, and author-

[1] J. K. Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State* (authorised English translation), p. 125.

ity of the Church, which in turn was accountable only to God.[1]

God, the sublime and absolute, was an active participant in the everyday life of the times, whose indulgences were peddled from door to door, whose penalties were suffered, and blessings praised. The omnipotence and omnipresence of God in secular as well as spiritual life were universally acknowledged. There was a constant intercourse between man and the Almighty, familiar and direct through the medium of the clergy; though the chasm which separated man from his God, a chasm which only the clergy might bridge, was insistently emphasised.

But soon the priesthood, no longer content with their purely spiritual dominion, under the pressure of increasing secular influence and nascent political consciousness, began to take an active part in worldly affairs. The Pope acquired the sovereignty of the territory immediately adjoining Rome, and by degrees increased the Patrimony of St. Peter. By wars, alliances, and intrigues, successive Popes throughout the 15th century and the early years of the 16th extended their possessions and played a chief rôle in the countless struggles which racked Italy. In Germany ecclesiastical princes received extensive domains and territorial sovereignty, and it was not long before the clergy became a separate, privileged political order in the new politico-social organisation throughout Western Europe. Thus the Church still combined spirit-

[1] The bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII (1302) sets this forth very clearly: "The Church possesses two swords, the spiritual and the temporal—one for its own use, the other to be employed in its service by the kings and warriors of the earth. The spiritual power as much surpasses in dignity and nobility every terrestrial power, as things spiritual excel things temporal; the spiritual power has the right to judge the temporal power, but the spiritual, at least in its highest expression which is the Pope, can be judged only by God."

ual and temporal authority, though now in distinctly separate spheres. We may trace the close connection between the assumption of secular dignities and honors by the clergy and the loss of their mediæval immunities. Their immiscence in secular affairs served to undermine their spiritual authority, and brought out clearly the corrupt practices which were to prove the outwardly manifest causes of the Reformation.

As we have seen, Machiavelli and his followers, in their eagerness to find a firm basis for the authority of the Prince in the newly created State emancipated from church control, laid hold upon so natural an analogy as the supreme authority of God. Here we have the genesis of the politico-theistic system: the State in the image of God—not the spiritual Godhead, worshipped by millions of devout persons with sincerity, but the God of whom an Alexander VI or a Julius II were typical representatives.

It is but a further example of this use of analogy in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the true nature of the State that when, as has already been pointed out, the active participation of God in worldly affairs was no longer given credence, when the Deity was relegated to a purely spiritual realm, when men came to take cognisance of their own strength, in their desire to outline a new and more satisfactory concept of the State, they should have looked to man. Man it was claimed is ruled by laws, is amenable to justice, has a moral sense, has his family, his relations, his friends, and, above all, his interests, his property. Man's whole life is made up of a series of compacts and contracts which to be valid without continuous warfare must have the sanction of a legal code. Thus man in society is a juridic animal bound by laws which make possible the smooth

working of social relations and prevent anarchy. It appeared a very rational use of analogy to present the State as patterned after the image of man. It seemed so self-evident that it immediately gained axiomatic acceptance among the more liberal-minded, throughout the Western World, and became the basis of all of the new theories of State. It thus becomes necessary for us to enter into a closer examination of this analogy; to trace its growth, its spread, perversion, and decay, as a useful theory of social relations.

CHAPTER II

The Genesis of Constitutional Government

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE STATE—THE RÔLE OF ENGLAND —THE DECLARATION AND BILL OF RIGHT—INFLUENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS—SPREAD OF LIBERALISM

I

THE politico-juridic concept of the State which endowed it with moral responsibility was a distinct cultural advance. Under the older politico-theistic doctrine the question of the government of the State was rarely if ever broached. The State as an entity independent of its sovereign was not conceived of, as the complete fusion of these two elements was the basis of that doctrine of Statehood. When, however, the thesis was presented that the State was in reality to be held the projection of the personality of the individual, and the action of the State manifestations of its will as an independent moral organism, the question arose how this will should be controlled; in short how the State was to be governed.

The political theorists of the 17th century found no difficulty in devising programmes of government and probing into the essence of Statehood. Man is moral, therefore the State created in the image of man, by man, for men, must be a moral organism. A compact is binding, a contract valid between two men, therefore not only contracts between the governed and the govern-

ing must be binding, but compacts between States must be valid.

It would be difficult to outline with any degree of exactness the limits of the moral responsibility of the State. Morality as such eludes precise definition. Its categories embrace all higher human aspirations or what may better be called sentiments. The transfer by analogy of the moral attributes of civilised man to civilised States raised questions which admitted of no satisfactory solution. It was an insufficient explanation to declare that the State was bound by certain implicit obligations to limit its action, or to assert that, as the primary natural object of the State was to provide a form of government to enforce law and order, the State —in itself a component of law and order—was functionally moral. It is difficult to perceive how such a sophistical explanation should have been deemed adequate, the more so as at the same time it was asserted that the State, being sovereign and independent, recognising no superior authority, bending to no law, amenable to no court, was responsible only to itself.

There is here a striking similarity of argument with that implied in the attitude of the clergy during the Middle Ages to insure their exemption from secular control. The social chaos which eventually resulted from this duality failed to serve as a warning to the framers of the new theories of State.

It was soon found that whereas the State, still unconscious of its national strength, might in its international relations be left to rely on a system of moral responsibilities in so far as its internal government was concerned, a labyrinth had been entered upon in the attempt to formulate a workable code applicable to the

growing complexity and vigor of political life. The rationalists of the 18th century sought a more satisfactory formula. By glossing over the moral attributes of the State, they fixed on the analogy between government and the constitution of man, which met with ready acceptance.

Constitutional government, the fine fruit of modern political theory, the basic manifestation of the politico-juridic organisation of the State, was a tangible analogy. The constitution of man implies in the first instance his health, manly vigor, possibilities of development. It implies inheritance from the past, source of activity in the present, promise of increase in the future. It implies birth, growth, vigor, decay, carried on through succeeding generations. It is the organic basis of mankind. So the constitution of the State became by analogy the organic law, the fundamental principle upon which the new political system was built.

The establishment of constitutional government[1] marks the enthronement of the politico-juridic theory of State. To be sure, Montesquieu, who labored so indefatigably to define and illustrate the juridic basis of society as expressed in constitutional government, goes so far as to point out that the first beginnings of constitutional monarchy are to be found as reported by Tacitus, among the ancient German tribes: *Ce beau*

[1] "The fundamental defect of the policy of antiquity," Mommsen tells us, "was that it never fully advanced from the urban form of constitution to that of a state or, which is the same thing, from a system of primary assemblies to a parliamentary system. The sovereign assembly of Rome was what Congress would be if, instead of sending representatives, all the electors should meet in a Parliament; a body neither able to take a comprehensive view nor form a resolution; a body which, save in a few cases, a couple of hundred or thousand individuals accidentally picked up from the streets of the capital, acted and voted in the name of the burgesses."—*History of Rome,* Vol. III, p. 332.

système a été trouvé dans les bois.[1] Bluntschli, writing a century later concerning the rise of constitutional monarchy, which he held to be the final and perfect form of government, declare: "It is the end of a history of more than a thousand years, the completion of the Romano-Germanic political life, the true political civilisation of Europe." [2] There is much truth in both these assertions, were we to confine ourselves to an inquiry into the evolutionary forms and stages of constitutional government. Nevertheless, we can with precision fix on the historical event which marks the establishment of constitutional government as a working political principle.

The Revolution of 1688, which resulted in the calling of William and Mary to the throne of England, was the outcome of the desire to put into practice this constitutional principle which was henceforth to become the guiding precept of government. The Declaration and Bill of Right was drawn up so as to secure the "liberties of the nation." It was a man-made document, and affirmed that man is the supreme arbiter. It rejected the concept of the divine right of kings, patterned the monarchy on the constitutional basis, as sanctioned by man-made laws, and recognised in Parliament the supreme authority, the expression of the ultimate will of the people. Monarchy was shorn of its vested privileges. The power of suspending, or dispensing with, law by regal authority was declared illegal, as was the levying of money for the use of the Crown by prerogative without grant of Parliament, and the raising and

[1] *De l'Esprit des Lois,* Book XI, Chap. VI. In the next paragraph Montesquieu pointedly adds: "As all human things have an end, the state we are speaking of will lose its liberty, will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt than the executive."

[2] *Op. cit.,* Chap. XIV, p. 396.

keeping of a standing army in time of peace, except with its consent. Parliament further asserted its right to grant taxes, regulate the royal household, control the executive authority, secure free speech and freedom of the press. These are the principal provisions of this epoch-making document. The Lords and Commons thereupon resolved that William and Mary should be King and Queen of England for their joint and separate lives.

We cannot fail to recognise the jubilant satisfaction with which this great experiment, the putting into operation of this new theory of State, must have been greeted. Men for the first time had deliberately created the State in their own image. They took fresh courage in their achievement. It opened what appeared to be the smooth path of indefinite development; it broadened and made plausible the arguments of legality; it widened and prepared the way for the emancipation of mankind from political oppression, and broke the last remaining shackles which held science enslaved. Man seemed to hold firmly in his hands the chart of his destiny. He dared examine it in the light of his own experience, test his conclusions by practical experimentation, satisfy himself of the tangible reality of his achievement. His reason guiding his strength had created the State, endowed its government with individuality and personality, stamped it as his own.

II

It was particularly fortunate that in Locke, England should have found a man able to express in lucid language the basis upon which this new political ideology

was founded. According to his doctrine, government is not primarily a contract entered into between the governed and the governing, for the protection of interests, but a contract made for the protection of rights. Man, according to Locke, is by nature endowed with certain rights: the right to live, the right to work, the right to enjoy in peace the fruits of his labor. Before governments were established each man had to defend these rights as best he could, and as so much time was taken up with their defence little was left to provide a more ample store than for his immediate needs. Conceiving that, by the establishment of some organisation which would provide for this defence, man would have more time to devote to the useful tasks of production, he promised to obey the government established as long as this government in return protected his inherent rights, but no longer. Man in society does not surrender any of his inherent rights, but confers on the government the sanction of authority similar to that which he had availed himself of in protecting his own rights. This authority is expressed in the constitution, which is the source of the legality of government. When the constitution is violated, men have the fundamental right to overthrow a government which purports to continue without their sanction, and establish a new government conforming to their needs. In other words, the government of the State rests on the consent of the governed. Locke did not have in mind a written constitution, but rather a verbal agreement. The propositions set forth in the Declaration of Right embody the tenets upon which such a constitutional government was to rest.

The Magna Carta (1215) had sought to establish the supremacy of the aristocracy over the King. The Declaration of Right proved that the sanction of con-

stituted authority was now vested in the Middle Class. The Magna Carta had been exacted of the sovereign by a powerful coterie of barons. The Declaration of Right was the work of the Commons, who conferred some of the attributes of sovereignty upon the prince whom they had selected, retaining the full power in their own hands.

Constitutional government in England was the creation of the dominantly puritanical Middle Class,[1] which had risen to power in the wake of a decaying aristocracy —a Middle Class, whose character had been hardened by a long series of civil wars and religious disturbances. It was made up of men who, in a single generation, had executed a king and raised a commoner to sovereign power, and in a reactionary moment had recalled to the throne a dissolute prince of the dynasty they had so dramatically deposed. They had tolerated his excesses, and finally in exasperation at the infringements of his successor, James II, upon the established rights of Parliament, had driven out the latter, and called in a prince from the Low Countries to be their sovereign. Such men were not in a mood to be influenced by irrational or extremist theories of State. Their principal concern was to establish a form of government planted on the solid foundation of toleration and moderation. It was the work of stern men, whose political zeal had in it all the elements of a religious fervor. Men, many of whom had fought in the field for their religious convictions, had defied the established Church and their king, and

[1] The term Middle Class when applied to England does not mean the same thing as the bourgeoisie as it is known on the Continent. In the first instance the Commons were made up of representatives of the lower nobility and of the municipalities. It was not until the early years of the 19th century that the term "Middle Class" in England can be considered to correspond more or less accurately with the continental bourgeoisie.

won a twofold battle, of religious toleration and political freedom. As Lord Morley has observed:[1] "Passion and logic are the two great working elements of revolutionary change." The passion had burned itself out during the innumerable disturbances of the half century preceding the establishment of constitutional government. Cold, calculating logic—in so far as an assembly of men may be said to act logically—seems to have inspired the framing of the new principles of government.

Modern constitutional government as first established in England was tempered by the fires of Puritanism. Its founders were guided by an intense realism, a materialist insight into what they conceived to be their rights. The form of government they wished to establish and did establish secured the recognition of the principle of representation as the basis of all authority in the State. This new theory of State was tolerant rather than liberal. It recognised the importance of man-made laws, but the tendency was soon manifest in Parliament to arrogate to itself many of the arbitrary powers formerly exercised under absolutism. Parliament made it plain that it would tolerate no check nor hindrance to its authority. It asserted for itself the right to change the constitution, alter the succession to the throne, confined "neither for persons or causes within any bounds."[2]

[1] *Life of Oliver Cromwell*, p. 48.

[2] As Blackstone has commented: "It (Parliament) hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations: ecclesiastical or temporal; civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is intrusted by the Constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. . . . It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible to be done; and, therefore, some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament."

These factors must be borne constantly in mind in considering the subsequent development of the constitutional system.

The creators of representative government desired not merely to safeguard the liberties, but to affirm the privileges and prerogatives of the Commons, the growing Middle Class. Their successors were intent on the one hand in extending the sway of parliamentary control as exemplified by the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), which brought that realm under the direct government of Westminster, and on the other in promoting peace and affording an opportunity for the development of their material wellbeing. They paid little heed to such novel theories as the "Rights of Man," the "Sovereignty of the People," or to the more liberal equalitarian political ideology which was rapidly growing up throughout continental Europe.

This liberal movement manifested itself markedly towards the second half of the 18th century. From England the example of the practical working of constitutional government had spread and inspired not merely political philosophers but statesmen and princes, to accept with enthusiasm various programmes and theories of political reformation. "There was scarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming Pope; the age of Frederick the Great, of Catherine II, of Joseph II, of Peter Leopold, of Benedict XIV, of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of Aranda; when the very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers." [1]

If we were to seek for the cause of this phenomenon we would find it in the ever-widening interest in political

[1] J. S. Mill, *Representative Government,* Chap. I.

affairs which had seized hold of mankind. The minds of men were in a ferment, intoxicated by their own newly revealed strength. It was the dawn of political enlightenment when the rising sun of political freedom illumined not only statesmen and philosophers, but even absolute sovereigns, who participated eagerly in furthering the new theories, unaware of the anomaly of their position. The liberalism which could arouse the enthusiasm of a Frederick the Great or a Catherine II was no doubt purely philosophical; yet the new ideas of political freedom, of progress, of equality and humanity ushered in in the wake of representative government, were spreading resistlessly.

CHAPTER III

The Rise of Public Opinion

FRANCE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY—HUMANITY—LIBERTY —PROGRESS—MONTESQUIEU—TURGOT—CONDORCET—ROUSSEAU

I

THROUGHOUT the 17th century, while in England Parliament was engaged in its successful struggle against the Crown, on the Continent absolutism still held undisputed sway. In France the State, guided by men of genius, served by soldiers and administrators of superior ability, exalted by poets and philosophers of rare talent, had under Louis XIV produced the most brilliant civilisation of modern times. The example of the French King was imitated throughout Europe. In England, when James II had wished to follow the general trend, it had led to his overthrow; while the petty princes of Germany were ruining themselves in their desire to follow the lead of the Great King.

It was not until the Regency (1715-1723) that a more liberal spirit began to make itself felt in France. Its first manifestation is to be noted in the gradual rise of what has since become known as "public opinion." This new social force was an outgrowth of the empirical temper which had come into the affairs of men upon the establishment of constitutional government in England. We no longer find merely factional interests, or opinion dominated by the sovereign, but a public opin-

ion on matters of general and social interest which reflected and expressed the thought of the general mind, as constitutional government in England, it was believed, expressed its rights. As the latter was representative government, so the former was representative opinion. An acute student of the philosophy of history has remarked that it is a mistake to suppose that the French philosophers produced the spirit which caused the Revolution; they were its products, its propagators. Already early in the 18th century a public opinion had grown up which reflected and expressed the general mind, and became the most potent factor in national life. "It disturbed the judgment, arrested the will, unnerved the arm of the ruler; rendered every speaker or writer formidable, and the collective influence of the intelligent and literary portion of society enormous. Never was the connection between philosophy and public opinion closer. The latter dominated, and made the former its handmaid." [1]

The philosophy of the 18th century was essentially empirical and rational; it despised metaphysical niceties, and was bent on expressing cogently the confused opinions nascent in the general mind. Its philosophers were eager to proselyte, and found ready to hand enthusiastic disciples willing to undertake to reform society, and suffer martyrdom in its behalf. They believed in progress, justice, toleration, liberty, fraternity, the sovereignty of the people, the rights of man, and humanity, not merely abstractly, but concretely as concepts which were to be realised in the immediate future by the introduction of political reforms. These were the topics which public opinion had seized upon. These were the doc-

[1] Cf. Robert Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, p. 240 *et seq.*

trines which the rationalist philosophers preached to a docile multitude. They reflected the opinions, voiced forcibly the arguments which had received the sanction of public opinion. In order to understand the real significance of the fervid enthusiasm of the epoch, to gain an insight into the causes of the energy displayed by political agitators, and the influence of doctrinaire philosophers, who were able to stir the minds of men to such depths that on the one hand peers like Lafayette and Rochambeau were induced to undertake the task of helping to free the American Colonies, and to establish a democratic government based on the theories of a Montesquieu, and on the other to account for the fanatical excesses of the French Revolution, it is essential to inquire briefly into the elements of which this public opinion was composed.

II

Since the earliest times there have been certain fundamental concepts such as humanity, liberty, unity, which are words used to express the desire of men to grasp at and secure for themselves the permanent benefits of social wellbeing. Every epoch in history has contributed its share in building up this ideology, which forms the groundwork of our social structure, and bounds social life.

The basic concept which has been held firmly by succeeding generations of men, with varying degrees of emphasis, is that the foundation of society is humanity. Humanity implies unity of all human beings; the belief that a bond of mutual relationship unites mankind. It is expressed in the doctrine of brotherly love of Christ,

as it was taught by Mih-Teih [1] in China five centuries before the Christian era.

In remote antiquity, in spite of the difficulty of communications and the fact that only a relatively limited category of individuals were held to be free men, the advantages and desirability of intercourse between the different races and peoples appear to have been recognised, and the unity of mankind may reasonably be supposed to have been understood, if not expressed. This would appear to be proved negatively by the pains taken by the Brahmins to deny the truth of the unity of mankind and establish the caste system. Buddhism, the natural reaction against the perversions of this system, taught a doctrine of charity embracing every living creature. In Persia under the Great Kings, and in the Empire established by Alexander, we find the first actual attempt made to realise a form of political unity under the sceptre of a single sovereign.

Few traces of a feeling of humanity, or even of a more limited notion thereof such as national unity, are to be met with in Greece. During the days of its greatness the prejudice against the foreigner persisted. It was shared by Plato and Aristotle. Whatever tendencies towards national union may have existed were based, not on elements directly political, but on games and art. "The contests at Olympia, the poems of Homer, the tragedies of Euripides were the only bonds that held Hellas together."

It was not until after the disintegration of the empire of Alexander and the subjugation of Greece by Rome,

[1] Cf. James Legge, *The Chinese Classics—The Opinions of Mih-Teih:* "It is the business of the sages to effect the good government of the empire. They must examine therefore into the cause of disorder and when they do so they will find that it arises from the want of mutual love."—Vol. II, p. 104.

that the idea of universal citizenship came to be recognised. The sense of the brotherhood of man which arose at this time was the result of despondency and disillusion, rather than of a hopeful, optimistic attitude. "The Greek ideal of unity was essentially negative, abstract, empty, unreal. Men took refuge in the thought of being citizens of the world because actual citizenship had everywhere lost its dignity." [1]

The Romans by the surrender of their individuality and of their personality gained a feeling of love of country and patriotism unknown to the Greeks. Nevertheless, in spite of the conquests of Roman arms, the unification of the known world under Roman laws, and the extension of Roman citizenship even beyond the confines of Italy, there is no evidence which would induce us to conclude that the Romans even during the late Empire possessed a deep feeling of the solidarity or of the fundamental unity of mankind. To be sure, the Stoics had taught that all men must be regarded as members of one great community who have need of each other, but there was no wide application of this point of view which may be held to have been of practical significance.

When Alexandria became the moral capital of the Empire, the more rigorous, brutal, and commonplace utilitarianism [2] of the Romans was moderated by the influence of the teachings of Hellenistic philosophy, more

[1] Cf. Flint, *op. cit.*

[2] "Every nation of antiquity which attained internal unity strove either directly to subdue its neighbors as did the Hellenic States, or at least render them innocuous as did Rome. . . . The policy of Rome was not projected by a single mighty intellect and bequeathed traditionally from generation to generation; it was the policy of a very able, but somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which had far too little power for grand combination, and far too much of a right instinct for the preservation of its own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a Cæsar, or a Napoleon."—Mommsen, *History of Rome,* Vol. II, pp. 521-522.

especially by Neo-Platonism, which combined the rationalism of the Greek with the mysticism of the Egyptian mind, a blending of Platonic ideals with the teachings of Oriental philosophies, in an effort to erect a more satisfying religious system. Neo-Platonism taught a striving after unity, intellectually understood, a mode of thought rather than of feeling, and as a result was unable to cope with the overpowering, emotional appeal of Christianity. The teachings of Christ emphasised the Stoic doctrine of universal brotherhood, though they also took into account the eclecticism of the Greeks, and the feeling of awe borrowed from the Oriental cults which had become familiar to the Western World. Christianity owed its success in a great measure to the fact that it was the happy fusion of all that was vital and viable in the Italo-Greek philosophic systems which had survived. Like all truly profound religions, it concerned itself more with "modes of feeling than modes of thought." This assured for it final triumph, and kept alive and gave renewed vigor to the concept of humanity.

After the official acknowledgment of Christianity by the Empire the idea of the unity of mankind was again vaguely apprehended. The barbarian invasions checked its growth, and introduced the new and aggressively restless elements of freedom and self-reliance: of diversity. Even after having embraced Christianity, the barbarian invaders tenaciously defended their national independence. The separation of the Church and State, which grew gradually, was only effected after a prolonged struggle between the Pope and Emperor. The Church gained a spiritual ascendancy which had in it elements of unity, while the world ruled over by the Emperor was composed of a heterogeneous number of states which only paid a nominal allegiance to him as their overlord,

and were to all intents and purposes independent. The establishment of feudalism seemed to prove conclusively that the barbarian concept of diversity, the Germanic ideals of self-dependence and self-determination, had triumphed over the Christian ideal of world unity.

It was not until the close of the 11th century that we find a fresh reawakening of the idea of humanity. The Crusades which continued through two centuries (1091-1295) brought the peoples of continental Europe in contact with each other; united priest and peasant, lord and serf in a common enterprise, and taught men to look beyond the narrow boundaries of their own interests, and give their lives for an ideal.

The subsequent development of the concept of humanity down to our own times has been slow, but continuous. It was first cogently set forth during the Renaissance, when the ideal of classical antiquity, of a World State, was grafted upon the concept of the Church Universal. The period of industrial and commercial expansion, the discovery of the New World, the opening up of new trade routes to the East, the invention of printing, the growth of political consciousness and social solidarity, contributed to strengthen and diffuse the feeling that all men are members of a common family. Though arrested in its growth, and held in abeyance at various periods, during the 18th century the idea of humanity, conceived as a broad cosmopolitanism, became the rational goal towards which, it was believed, mankind was striving.

Liberty has been an object of man's ceaseless preoccupation. Since the dawn of history, liberty in its various modes and interpretations has been recognised as the mainspring of moral, political, and social life, though the methods used to attain it and the value attached to its

benefits have varied greatly during succeeding epochs. It would lead too far afield to outline even in meagre form the ideological transitions of the concept of liberty which are so intimately bound up with the nature of man. It may be sufficient to note that the idea of liberty has never been entirely lost sight of, and the ideals of political liberty have always been rekindled whenever civilised mankind has allowed itself to sink to a level of servitude. Political history is a record of the striving of men to secure the liberty to express not merely their judgment, but their will; to safeguard their private interests, and insure their public welfare. Expressed in terms of liberty, equality, and fraternity, this new interpretation of the concept of humanity during the latter half of the 18th century came to dominate the general mind, and found its fullest expression and its deepest inspiration in the concept of perfectibility, in progress, as the motive-force of society.

III

The contribution of the Middle Class to political philosophy and social theory may be summed up in the word "progress." Though in our times progress is so often taken for granted, it is not generally recalled that it has only very recently come to be held a fundamental ideal of mankind. Yet when we look through the pages of world history down to the most recent times, or examine the philosophy and modes of thinking of Oriental peoples, we will find that progress was either unknown, discounted, or emphatically denied.

During classical antiquity the idea of progress played

no part, either in speculative philosophy or in practical life. On the contrary, its opposite, regress, was accepted as the fundamental law of life. A careful search throughout the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers and historians fails to reveal any passages which would indicate that progress was held to be an idea either of value or importance, or that perfectibility, which is implied in progress, was entertained. Empedocles makes an obscure reference to it, and Cicero alludes in passing to philosophy as progressive, but there are no indications that progress in itself was deemed of significance. The Roman world in general subscribed to Seneca's belief in the inevitable corruption and decay of humanity.

While Christianity developed the ideal of hope and expectation, which had been borrowed from the Jews, it contributed very little to the belief that progress was possible by man's own efforts. On the contrary, the Church discouraged every attempt which may have been made by man to apply to secular affairs the doctrine of man's capacity of perfection by grace.

It was not until the 13th century that we discover any traces of the conviction that development and growth are inherent in all living phenomena, and that history might afford a proof of progress. Roger Bacon (1214-1294) made a tentative effort to demonstrate the plausibility of progress in the life of man. He stands forth alone during this period as pointing the way to intellectual emancipation by experimental inquiry, which lent an atmosphere of progressiveness to his speculations rather than that he may be believed to have considered progress as an end in itself. However, the idea aroused little interest. More than three centuries were to elapse before Bodin, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Pascal

indirectly called attention to the idea of progress as a guiding principle in seeking solutions for the difficult problems which were harassing the minds of men.

Bodin (1530-1596) was the first to point to the progress made in science which had revolutionised man's relation to the universe. The mariner's compass, the invention of gunpowder, the discoveries in astronomy, he maintained, far surpassed the achievements of the peoples of classical antiquity and indicated the progressive tendency of the human mind. But he failed to draw therefrom the conclusion that in the future similar improvement would in all probability take place. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) sought the increase of the "happiness of mankind" in the progress of science. He, also, condemned the ancients for not "assisting mankind" to improve its status, and presented the thesis that the classical world was not in reality the ancient world, but must be held the youth of the world, which in his day was approaching old age, and therefore the world of his day was, he maintained, far wiser, and its teachings far more worthy of credence than those of antiquity. Though he entertained the idea that there might be improvement, progress as an end in itself was apparently never actually considered by Bacon. He was interested in the material wellbeing of man, and believed that the sole object of science was to assist in securing and increasing the store of this wellbeing. He prepared the soil in which the seed of progress was soon to be planted.

Descartes (1596-1650) had imbibed Baconian wisdom and completed the breakdown of the influence of antiquity which held man a slave to old outworn ideas, embarrassed his philosophical speculations, and arrested his scientific initiative. At the time when rationalism as a philosophical doctrine was growing vigorously, soon to

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burst forth, Descartes broke definitely with the past, and sought to build from the ground up a new philosophical and scientific system, the foundations of which were reason and the invariability of the laws of nature. It was Descartes, who by his searching analysis based on rational methods which he himself had devised, was to clear away the detritus of theistic influence, and, affirming the supremacy of reason over providence, emancipate man from the tryanny of traditionalism, thus paving the way for the acceptance of the idea of progress and its corollary, perfectibility. It is not, however, to be apprehended that Descartes himself or any of his immediate followers discovered in progress a distinctive characteristic of man as a rational being. They merely indicated the pathway of progressive development which the men of the 18th century were to assert was the ultimate incentive of the human mind.

The history of the rise of the idea of progress is in a large measure the history of the struggle of the Middle Class for ascendancy in the State. Progress, the outgrowth of a rational mode of thought, is inextricably linked with the historical development of the Middle Class, just as the concept of providence was the basis of the aristocratically organised society of the Middle Ages.[1]

The idea that man can improve himself by his own efforts, can realise his own destiny by his own strength, was an offshoot of the same spirit which induced men to establish constitutional government as the State

[1] It may be of interest to suggest that the idea of progress is alien to the proletarian mind. Has the idea of progress as a useful incentive for human development run its active course? Is it about to be placed alongside of providence as an avocational idea? Is it not probable that the idea which may serve to rally the new order will in the first instance be interpreted by a word less metaphysical than providence and more human than progress, possibly by prevoyance or foresight?

moulded in their own image. As a speculative idea, progress preceded the active political propaganda which led to the transformation of the State and the overthrow of the existing social order. Men believed that they had at last found the solution of the riddle of social organisation. Progress, whether consciously expressed, or subconsciously understood as the source of perfectibility, became the foundation of general opinion, the source of social optimism. "The human race," Pascal had declared, "is a man who never dies and always advances towards perfection." Now by a sort of philosophical alchemy the leaders of public opinion during the second half of the 18th century came to regard progress as an end in itself, as the source of the greatest good to mankind. The idea of progress included that of the gradual enlightenment of man's nature, the evolution of his intelligence, the expansion of his moral sense, the improvement of his physical wellbeing; in brief, the spread of what had come to be the recognised ideals of humanity.

To men such as Turgot (1727-1781) progress was the great First Cause. All the activities of man—morals, religion, science, art, government—were subject to the laws of progress based on the development of man. Turgot did not deny that progress was often interrupted and delayed; its aims violated by the moral debility of man, by his intellectual slothfulness, but in spite of these checks to growth, these impediments to progress, he expressed full confidence in the perfectibility of mankind. Other French writers advanced similar theories of indefinite perfectibility. Condorcet (1745-1794) applied the test of progress to current ideas of equality, and claimed that a recognition of the essence of progress

leads to the destruction of inequality, not merely between classes, but between nations. He maintained that man is capable of indefinite progress and improvement, not merely because of the fact that the accumulated labor, the wealth of the past remains in a large part for his enjoyment, but because intellectual acquisitions do not pass away, and are increased and improved during succeeding generations.

We can discover in this new doctrine of progress the elements which armed man with an intellectual and moral vigor that he had hitherto not possessed. His attention had been called to progress. Progress, which signified perfectibility in which man was not only the agent but the beneficiary, was illustrated and explained apparently with such incontrovertible authority and aptness that it became the basis of speculation, the mainspring of action, the groundwork of public opinion. Not content with viewing the successive stages of progress historically, or merely accepting the idea as worthy of consideration, in the alembic of public opinion it was transformed into an aggressive agency subject to the reason of man. Here we have the source of the exuberant energy which expressed itself in the humanitarian doctrines of the rights of man, the sovereignty of the people, and the watchword of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, and fraternity.

This brief historical survey will, I feel, suffice to show how the politico-juridic ideology which resulted in its first phase in the establishment of representative government in England, under the influence and domination of nationalism and its corollary, legality, spread to continental Europe, and by public opinion was to be spread from there throughout the world.

IV

It was inevitable that when the thoughts of men had for a long period been engaged upon theoretical speculation, they should desire to see the practical application of their theories. The assertive nature of the rationalism of the 18th century must be borne in mind if the logical sequence of events, the growth of the politico-juridic theory of the State fashioned in the image of man as a rational being, is to be apprehended. It was not the arbitrary taxation of the English Government, nor the denial of the right of representation, nor the alleged despotism of the rule of George III that brought about the revolt of the American Colonies. It was not the burdensome oppression of the poor, nor the profligacy of the aristocracy, nor the tyranny of the sovereign that were the causes of the French Revolution. A true explanation is to be found in the ferment aroused by the active inquiry of intelligent investigators into the nature and essence of political doctrine. It was in a large measure due to the conviction that man ought to be governed by laws of his own devising, that he could by his own efforts modify and improve these laws, and that it was his duty to do so. Men no longer believed in Providence as the first cause. They had lost faith in miracles, in effects without a cause. They sought for the interpretation of events, not in revelation but in the opinions of their fellow men, in public opinion. The attention of man had become rivetted on his political status, as a hundred years before it had been engrossed with his religious liberty, and as a century later it was to be concerned principally with his economic condition.

Liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, and other watch-

words of the times were the diverse expressions of the same aspiration, which it was believed could be realised by political liberty. As Montesquieu expressed it: "The political liberty of a citizen is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each has of his own safety. In order to have this liberty it is requisite that the government be so constituted that one citizen be not afraid of another." [1] Montesquieu had devoted twenty years of untiring labor to inquiring into the nature of laws and institutions. He had pursued his investigation in what was considered at the time a scientific manner, and he was careful not to advance *a priori* theories of government. In the main he followed Aristotle [2] though he developed and emphasised for the first time the importance of the necessity of separating the three major functions of constitutional government—the legislative, executive, and judicial.

"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

"Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative the life and liberty of the

[1] *De l'Esprit des Lois,* Book XI, Chap. VI.

[2] "Now there are three things in all States which a careful legislator ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which properly attended to, the State must necessarily be happy; and according to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first of these is the public assembly; the second the officers of the State, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the judicial department."—Aristotle, *A Treatise on Government,* Chap. XIV.

Or as Montesquieu has it: "In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law."—*Op. cit.,* Book XI, Chap. VI.

subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power the judge might behave with violence and oppression.

"There would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals." [1]

Montesquieu gives numerous reasons why he believes that the powers of government should be distinct and separate, and be given scope to develop by specialisation of function. He sets forth his observations in a logical manner, which he illustrates by ample and often recondite episodes drawn from history.

Rousseau adopted the opposite method. Impatient alike of the restraints of history, and of logical exposition, he contributed little that was sound to the political practice of his time.[2] However, by his forceful delineation of the sufferings of man, by his acute understanding of the mentality of the multitude, as well as by the vehemence of his language, he became the most influential mouthpiece of public opinion in that he gave body to its desires and voice to its longings:

[1] *Ibidem,* Book XI, Chap. VI.

[2] I can find no satisfactory evidence that his thesis of the actual predominance of the general will and its union with the will of all as the basis of sovereignty was adequately appreciated or had practical significance in his day, though his phraseology was widely copied. It is, however, of importance to note that Rousseau, with his characteristic vision, and suspicion of rationalism, rejected the accepted dogma of progress as having no part in a volitional scheme of social organisation of which he may be said to have been the precursor. Both Hobbes and Locke had insisted upon the importance of the will. As Bosanquet has pointed out: For Hobbes "political unity lies in a will which is actual but not general; while for Locke it lies in a will which is general but not actual." Rousseau conceived of a "will at once actual and general." —*Cf. Philosophical Theory of State,* Chap. V.

"Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains. A man believes himself the master of others, but is for all that more a slave than they. How is this brought about? I do not know. What could make it legitimate? I think I can answer this question.

"If I considered force alone and the effects derived from it I should say: As long as a people is compelled to obey and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does better: for, recovering its liberty by the same right by which it was taken away, either a people is justified in recovering its liberty, or there was no justification in taking it away." [1]

And further we may advisedly quote:

"The body politic like the body of man begins to die from its birth, and carries within itself the causes of its destruction. Both may have more or less robust constitutions which may preserve them for a longer or shorter period. The constitution of man is the work of nature; that of the State is the work of art." [2]

The simplicity of his arguments made them acceptable to the masses who were beginning to acquire political consciousness. It was coming to be felt that political liberty was a need not only of the more enlightened classes, but one in which the people (*"le peuple"*) were to have a full share.

Rousseau in his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality among Mankind,* declared:

"It follows from this survey that there is scare any inequality among men in a state of nature; all that we now behold owes its force and growth to the development of our faculties and the improvement of our understanding, until at last it becomes permanent and law-

[1] *Contrat Social,* Book I, Chap. I.
[2] *Ibidem,* Book III, Chap. XI.

ful by the establishment of property and laws. It likewise ensues that moral inequality, authorised by any merely positive right, clashes with natural right as often as it does not combine in the same proportion with physical inequality; a distinction which sufficiently determines what we must think in that respect of that kind of inequality which obtains in all civilised nations, since it is evidently against the law of nature that a child should give orders to an old man, folly conduct wisdom, and a handful of men should be gorged with superfluities, while the famished multitude want the commonest necessaries of life." [1]

The arguments he advances in behalf of the State organised on the basis of contract [2] show it to be a form of collective despotism, not unlike that which Hobbes advocated as monarchical despotism. Rousseau substituted the sovereignty of the people, the rule of the majority for the older arguments of the *Leviathan*.

Montesquieu and Rousseau summed up the French politico-juridic thesis of State, which was to have so deep an influence on its subsequent development. Their methods and modes of thought were radically different, yet they are so complementary that it would be impossible to gain an understanding of the Revolutionary period without a clear appreciation of the place which they occupied. This may be more precisely indicated by calling to mind that the Declaration of In-

[1] Concluding paragraph.

[2] "'To find a form of association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each member, and by means of which each, uniting with all, shall, however, obey only himself, and remain as free as before.' Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract offers a solution. The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act, that the least modification would render them vain and of no effect; so that, although they may perhaps never have been formally enunciated they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised until, the social compact being violated, each enters again into his first rights and resumes his natural liberty—thereby losing the conventional liberty for which he renounced it."—Rousseau, *op. cit.*, Book I, Chap. VI.

dependence of the American Colonists of July 4, 1776, reflects the grandiloquent generalities, the impassioned truisms of Rousseau, whereas the Constitution, adopted by the United States in 1789 after successive failures to form a "natural" confederation, bears the unmistakable stamp of the influence of Montesquieu.

CHAPTER IV

American Independence

CAUSES AND AIMS—TEMPER OF THE COLONISTS—INFLUENCE OF FRENCH POLITICAL THEORY—ENGLISH PRACTICE

THE political capacity of the various peoples of the West is difficult to appraise. The chauvinism of politico-philosophical inquirers during the 19th century has led many of them to claim for their countrymen a monopoly of those characteristics denoting political sagacity which were apparently deemed essential to lead a people to political preëminence. It would appear unnecessary to dwell upon such comparisons, the more so as every nation which has constituted itself into an independent State could no doubt find among its members a relatively equivalent number of men endowed with those moral and ethical qualities without which the good government of a community as it was currently understood would be unrealisable. Nor can it be admitted that any one people should possess a monopoly of these qualities.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the fact that in France political affairs should have exerted so great an influence on the intellectual life of the people would seem to indicate that the abstract philosophy of human rights, as expressed in terms of political liberty and constitutional government, had there a meaning altogether different from that given thereto by the theory and prac-

tice of Englishmen, Germans, Italians, or Americans. Political ideology has suffered greatly from defective translation, or rather from the reliance placed upon the faulty interpretation occasioned thereby. It is not our object to set forth here in detail this major defect of politics, in that while its terminology remains a constant its interpretation continues a variable, so that in reality the essential meaning of political terms can be arrived at only by association of ideas, and for that reason politics lacks a sound basis of universality.

For purposes of classification and in order to render understanding easier, it is habitual for man to permit the association of ideas to perform the function of searching inquiry, and thus to bridge the chasm between facts and ideas. The more complex the groundwork of facts, the more dogmatically association performs its function of representation. Whether the representation leads back logically to its source and can be so traced depends upon the intellectual capacity of the individual. The more acute his perception, the more difficult it will be for him to accept a representation which appears illogical or irrational. Political theory depends for its acceptance and spread primarily upon such association. Bearing this in mind, it may be noted that political ideology as it passed from people to people was destined to develop new forms, consonant with local characteristics, so that what is meant by constitutional government when speaking of England, means something very different from what is meant when this same terminology is applied to the States of continental Europe or even to the United States.

It is a good example of the apparent logical sequence of historical evolution which the philosopher of history, or those interested in formulating the laws of history,

would seize upon with avidity, that the men who first instituted and developed the two main branches of constitutional government—Constitutional Monarchy and Constitutional Democracy—should have belonged to the same race. The setting up of an independent and sovereign state in America, composed of former British colonies, was the outcome of a conviction that an independent state is to be regarded as that form of human society in which men are best fitted to work out problems of political liberty, and are destined to realise their highest cultural aims. The establishment of a constitutional democracy by the United States was, however, an entirely new experiment in statecraft, which must be signalised as a further development of the politico-juridic theory and therefore requires some analysis.

II

Constitutional government in England had been established as the result of an effort to reconcile government with social institutions: to substitute a comprehensible political system for an absolutist régime, which had become irreconcilable with an everyday life in which material prosperity, perfectibility, and progress were about to engross the full attention and best energies of a large class of society. Yet it must not be lost sight of that it is characteristic of the empirical temper of the English people to defend tradition against the encroachments of interested theory. They are inflexible in the maintenance of established right which practice has sanctioned against the most plausible arguments of theorists, however admirably they may be presented. Thus the

political rights for which Englishmen struggled, and upon which their constitutional system was founded, did not, as might have been expected, lead them to abolish the monarchical form of government, as in the past it had proved itself a strong arm of defence against the abuses of an arrogant aristocracy. On the contrary constitutional government in England made use of, and embodied in its system, those ancestral laws and customs and that machinery of government which had grown up with the people, had been modified by circumstance, tested by practice, and improved by experience.

As upon the rediscovery of the Justinian Code (1176) England did not imitate other European countries, and send her lawyers to Bologna to be trained in the method and practice of the codified Roman law, but undertook the reform of the administration of the law by the establishment of circuit courts of her own devising, and the introduction of trial by jury, thus affording a refuge from the oppression hitherto exercised by the caprice of the feudal lords, so in establishing constitutionalism, England maintained her characteristic attitude of insularity, and constructed her system of government out of the elements already at hand, revamped in consonance with the spirit of the age. It was men of this same race who had settled the American Colonies—Englishmen trained to trust to their own strength, who, transplanted to the bleak New England coast, had created for themselves a condition of relative wellbeing. These early settlers had cared little for citizenship in a secular State. They were trained by the Calvinist creed to an unworldly way of thinking. Their object in coming to America had been to be free to worship their God unmolested. Less tolerant, but no less fearless than those of their breed who remained behind to fight for

political freedom, and whose sons were to establish constitutional monarchy in England, these Puritan pilgrims in America had not neglected to educate their sons in the ways of freedom, and accustom them early to self-reliance as a first step towards self-government. When a century later the peoples of the American Colonies sought to establish a government conforming to the social institutions which had grown up in America, the constitutional system which they set up accommodated itself to the materials it found at hand.

For the American Colonists of 1776 were of a different stamp and character from their forefathers. The 18th century had witnessed a growth of material prosperity throughout the Western World. In this the American Colonies had had an ample share. The guidance of public affairs was no longer in the hands of the clergy, who had led the way to the New England shores and for the time being were able to maintain their ascendancy in secular as well as spiritual matters, by establishing an even more intolerant type of politico-theistic absolutism than had been possible in Europe. Towards the middle of the 18th century the current of liberalism had swept away the last vestiges of Puritan theocracy. The political life of the Colonies had come under the control of men who, more especially in New England, by their commercial skill and enterprise were responsible for the material prosperity which the Colonies enjoyed. Having few traditions, save those of self-reliance and self-government, the more radically-minded Americans had not been averse to absorbing the teachings of the French rationalists. Men such as Franklin typified the new materialist tendency of the age. Their minds were engrossed in furthering their economic wellbeing; in making use of

that fund of energy and common sense with which they had been endowed, to prosper in business and to regulate political questions so as to promote their personal prosperity. They were broad-minded enough to look about them and to turn to good account whatever came their way. Local self-government, inherited from their forefathers, was pursued with diligence, in this new spirit of alertness. At the same time the high-sounding phrases of French political philosophy did not fail to dazzle those among the colonial leaders who dared to look forward to the day when, by putting its precepts into practice, a political millennium might be reached.

However, the heady French political theories did not immediately affect the feelings of the Americans who still regarded France as their traditional enemy. It was not until after the battle of Quebec (1759) had assured the dominance of the English on the North American continent, that the American Colonists felt free to consider ways and means to be rid of their overseas suzerain, and declare their independence. The active armed assistance rendered by the French in furthering the plans of the Colonists, the presence of French officers in the field on the side of the Americans, no doubt contributed to increase the debt felt towards France; but more important than these the abstract political philosophy of human rights so characteristically French, combined with the English doctrine of the juridic relation as a basis of rational human intercourse, were to have a deep influence on American public opinion and public policy during this formative period.

Constitutional government, as established in America, was thus a compromise, in that it grafted French theory

upon English practice, and evolved American principles of government.[1]

The Americans borrowed from England awe of ancestral precedent and its legal system; from France, subservience to public opinion and a radical rationalism. Subsequent development was to show that while the elements contributed by French ideology were to grow stronger, and the rule of public opinion, as expressed in the sovereignty of the people and the tyranny of the majority, was to become more deeply rooted, the older fundamental principles of English constitutional practice, the belief that the record of experience is the test of true right, were never to be lost sight of.

III

English constitutional monarchy and American constitutional democracy were thus the work of men of similar temperament and historical tradition. Both belonged to the Middle Class,[2] both had a closely related religious

[1] Thus an English observer a century later could write with much complacent satisfaction: "No people except the choicest children of England, long trained by the practice of local self-government at home and in the colonies, could have succeeded half so well."—Cf. Bryce, *American Commonwealth.* Whereas de Tocqueville noted with equal satisfaction what he found to be the salient characteristics of the political creed of the American people: "To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and in some degree of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of things for one's self alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the form;—such are the principal characteristics of what I shall call the philosophical method of the Americans."—*Democracy in America,* Part II, Book I, Chap. I. And again: "The civilisation of New England has been like a beacon lit upon a hill, which after it has diffused its warmth immediately around it, also tinges the distant horizon with its glow."—Part I, Chap. II.

[2] It is true that in England the aristocracy played a part in moulding constitutional monarchy. Yet we cannot fail to recognise the fact that the

background, both sought to foster the conception of the importance and dignity of the individual as expressed in the desire for self-determination and self-expression which was primarily utilitarian, an outgrowth of a puritanical, subjective mode of thought. The moral earnestness resulting from this manner of viewing life had bred a confidence in the ability of the individual to mould his own destiny, measured in terms of success, which could find its most immediate expression in commercial and industrial enterprise.

Further inquiry leads to the discovery of divergences equally important which mark off American constitutional practice as distinct, not merely as a form of government, but as a theory of State, which has fulfilled its historic rôle side by side with that of the monarchical form, and that of other constitutional governments which have since arisen. The fact that the United States adopted a written constitution, whereas England had not, is not of itself of vital importance. Cromwell had attempted to give England a written instrument of government, but had failed in that it was alien to the political genius of the English people. The authority of precedent was so fixed in the English mind that Parliament required

Middle Class, the Commons, were the ultimate source of power in the State.

In the same way in America, Virginia and the adjacent colonies bore an aristocratic imprint. They were settled by a very different type of men than those of New England—wealthy land-owners, adventurers, free-booters, with a later admixture of vagabonds and criminals transported overseas by the London police. These settlers, who had accepted episcopacy, concerned themselves little with questions of religious or public welfare, and were interested only in personal profit. However, it is of interest to note that the attempt made to provide Carolina with an English-made constitution, drawn up by no less an authority than Locke (See *Constitution of Carolina*) in 1669, though liberal in tone, never gained wide acceptance, and was abolished in 1693. In spite of the influence of foreign elements in the Pennsylvania proprietary colony and of the Dutch along the Hudson, the scheme of colonial organisation of the colonies was that of which middle class Massachusetts is the best and leading example.

no stabilising factor to support its authority, and would have found its freedom hampered by a written constitution which would require incessant amendment, or at least interpretation.[1]

In the United States, on the other hand, the weakness of constituted authority rendered it essential that a fixed formula of government should be at hand which would act as a stabilising factor among the anarchical tendencies of the newly formed political life. A written constitution could best perform this function. The Colonists, by their charters, had long been accustomed to written limitations to public authority and precise definition of its powers, which it was natural for them to wish to continue.

Yet it was only after repeated failure and long delay, thirteen years after the Declaration of Independence, that a written constitution was adopted. The American Constitution adopted in 1789 was the first attempt in modern times to subject the government of an independent state to a fixed written code; to restrict sovereignty of the State by requiring compliance and concordance with principles set down and defined. Whatever the drawbacks of a written constitution may be, the constitution adopted at Philadelphia by the Constitutional Convention which had labored for two years to frame a comprehensive statement of the basis of popular sovereignty, must be looked upon as an important milestone in political development. Exactly a century had elapsed since, in the Declaration of Right, the Parliament of England had bound itself to insure the protection

[1] In England the constitution comprises the whole body of public law, consuetudinary as well as statutory, which has grown up during the course of centuries, and is being continually modified by the action of the general will, as interpreted and expressed by Parliament.—Cf. Rudolf Gneist, *The History of the English Constitution.*

of civic liberty by representation. During this period constitutional government in England, while steadfast in practice, remained in theory a vague doctrine, and the powers of government lacked the precision of concise definition. In England constitutional government had been grafted upon older practice so that to the student of politics it remained an amorphous structure. The United States adopted the radical course of defining sovereignty and analysing its functions. The separation of government into three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—as advocated by Montesquieu, and the checks and balances it sought to introduce, led to the acceptance of the theory that the final expression of authority in the State, its code of sovereignty, is set forth in the articles of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the land.[1] It was the desire to insure permanence and order which had led the Americans to the unqualified acknowledgment of the State as a juridic organism in which the mechanism of government sought to assure strictly legal relations, not merely between citizens, but between the governing and the governed. Conformity to the letter and spirit of the Constitution was to become the principal test of validity.

Subsequent practice left to the executive and legislative branches of the government a very broad field of activity; especially in matters relating to foreign policy the executive was left relatively unhampered. However, the

[1] Article III, section 2, of the *Constitution of the United States* reads: The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

theory of State which can be adduced from the American example, though never definitely formulated by the framers of the Constitution, asserts the principle that it is the juridic relation which makes possible the smooth functioning of organised society. The chief object of the State is to assure, within legal limits, the growth of individual liberty and national freedom; self-help and self-government.[1]

It will be necessary, when discussing the question of the end of the State, to return to a more ample review of the American theory. It may suffice for the present to note that the American practice had a far-reaching repercussion, and reacted directly on the trend of public affairs in Europe.

[1] All subsequent constitutions, both democratic and monarchical, were set forth in a written document, signifying the importance attached to the American precedent. Yet except for the slavish imitation of Central and South American republics, regardless of the fact that the United States theory of State was, in many cases, wholly unsuited to the mentality of the people of these countries, no other nation, with the possible exception of the Helvetic Republic, has so literally adopted the juridic theory.

CHAPTER V

The Middle Class Mind

FREE HUMANITY—COSMOPOLITANISM—ECONOMIC INTEREST—INFLUENCE OF THE PHYSIOCRATS—ADAM SMITH—POLITICAL LIBERTY—ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

I

THE struggle for independence and the setting up of an independent State by the American Colonists evoked great enthusiasm among the ruling classes in France, not merely, as might be expected, because they saw in this event the just retribution for the loss of their own Canadian provinces, but chiefly because the age was one during which the idea of "free humanity" played so predominating a rôle. The last quarter of the 18th century witnessed the fruition of those theories of liberty, equality, humanity, sown so lavishly during the preceding decades. The common bond of mankind was the thought uppermost in the minds of men. Nationalism and patriotism were unknown. Cosmopolitanism as expressed in the phrase *ubi bene, ibi patria* was widely acknowledged as a reality which rational men had attained. Plans to establish leagues for the assurance of perpetual peace were actively pushed. Men such as Kant sought to devise a plan which would make possible the organisation of a State universal, to formulate a political constitution which would insure concord among men. A host of other politico-philosophical in-

quirers, following in the steps of Rousseau, were similarly engaged in seeking for a system of government which would reduce to a minimum all political inequalities and would eventually lead to the elimination of all differences and anomalies among men. It was fervently believed that a state of social harmony could be arrived at in which civil institutions would serve the progress and welfare of mankind. Man would, in the near future, enter upon his rightful heritage and enjoy as his inalienable right "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Not merely philosophers of authority and political thinkers of great originality, but all rationally-minded men readily acknowledged the advantages to be derived from these plans of political reorganisation and social betterment.

It must not be lost sight of that it was the middle class mind which offered the golden mean as the golden rule of life,[1] and never conceived of the possibility that a different mentality might exist among other classes of society.

There was nothing extravagant, nothing unreasonable in the programmes of reform outlined, as long as this middle class manner of viewing life was adhered to. It was apparently never considered that the over-simple solutions offered for the difficult social problems were, in spite of their rational moderation, liable to irrational and extravagant interpretation. There had grown up in the various capitals of Europe a coterie of middle

[1] Even Montesquieu who was an original thinker could not escape from the influence of his times, so that we find him, in discussing the measure of political liberty enjoyed by the English, declaring: "Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments, nor to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneasiness to those who have only a moderate share of it. How should I have any such design?—I who think that even the highest refinement of reason is not always desirable, and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes."—*De l'Esprit des Lois,* Book XI, Chap. VI.

class philosophers, political innovators and reformers, whose philanthropic speculations never induced them to abandon their theoretical viewpoint. There was a constant interchange of ideas among them, and this cosmopolitan atmosphere was favorable to the growth of the most liberal theories. But their authors had lost sight of a very important factor, in that they looked out upon life with a strongly tinged middle class bias, and never conceived of the practical application of their programmes except by men of their own stamp. The sincerity of their views cannot be called into question. Whether we look to Berlin, to Königsberg, or Geneva, to Paris, London, or Edinburgh, everywhere we find this same benign cosmopolitanism.

The Western World was in an inquiring mood. Men asked all manner of questions, and the rational mind felt itself competent to find a satisfactory solution. What was the value of art, of science, of religion, of politics, of the family, of the State? Men dealt in generalities. They looked upon life in a broad manner, which led them to despise the lessons of history and tradition, and to seek to solve all questions by applying the power of the mind. The ultimate test was, "What is conducive to happiness?" Is man happier under a free or despotic government? Is civilisation a benefit? Is inequality necessary? It was believed that by simplification, by the breaking down of barriers between classes as between peoples, by restraining the impetuous and urging on the laggards, an ideal civil society would result, in the creation of a middle class cosmopolitan World State. It is necessary to emphasise this dominantly liberal, philanthropic, middle class point of view in order to gain an understanding of the subsequent reaction.

It was no longer necessary to apologise for an in-

terest in the wellbeing of the "people," as Vauban had done when in 1717 he declared that to enrich the people was the only way to enrich the King.[1] The French Physiocrats,[2] influenced no doubt by the fact that the luxury of the court and the artificial civilisation which it fostered had brought the country to the verge of ruin, advocated a return to nature, by setting forth in logical argument that a "state of nature" was the only rational mode of life. They conducted an active inquiry into the nature of wealth, not as had been the practice in the past, in order to devise means for filling the empty royal exchequers, but with a view to ameliorating the condition of the poorer classes. They were the first to enunciate the principles of freedom in industry and commerce, and their doctrines of *laissez-faire,* which meant that anyone should be permitted to make what he likes when he likes, and that all trades should be open to everybody without government interference, and *laisser-aller,* which maintained that persons and goods should be allowed to travel freely from one place to another without the restrictions of tolls, taxes, or vexatious regulations, introduced the concept of liberty into economic enterprise, and gave a vital impetus to the new science of political economy.[3]

Constitutional government was the contribution of the middle class to political practice which had inspired confidence in its capacity and fitness to control the body politic. The middle class now added to the store of speculative theory certain fundamental doctrines of economic liberty, as correlative with man's political

[1] Cf. *"Pauvres paysans, pauvre royaume, pauvre roi."*

[2] Cf. Dupont de Nemours, *Physiocratie ou Constitution naturelle du gouvernement le plus advantageux du genre humain,* 1768.

[3] Cf. Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics,* Appendix B. 1., in which he gives an interesting survey of the growth of economic science.

liberty, which it was believed were essential to his well-being.

II

It was in the same year (1776) in which the Western World was engrossed with the perusal of the Declaration of Independence of the United States, and the middle class humanitarians all over Europe learned of what seemed to them the fulfilment of their fondest dream, that a people almost in a "state of nature" had adopted the noblest formulæ of social organisation, and were about to set up a government, based on current political platitudes, of the rights of man and sovereignty of the people so cherished by the cosmopolitan mind of the epoch, that Adam Smith published his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.*

Adam Smith was a respectable, middle class Scotchman, who had resided for a prolonged period in France, and had been in personal contact with the French Physiocrats. He was a good example of a leader of the cosmopolitan *intelligentsia* of the age. A man of keen vision, deep insight, and great capacity for painstaking inquiry, it has been said of him in our own day that "there is scarcely any economic truth now known of which he did not get some glimpse!" [1] Concerned as he was with the social aspects of wealth, Adam Smith developed and expounded with great precision the French doctrine of free trade. It was in harmony with the spirit of his times that he declared that economic development must be free, and with no little skill he brought proof to bear in showing that government interference hinders trade, and that even the most selfish enterprise

[1] Cf. A. Marshall, *op. cit.*

of the individual is of greater benefit to the community than the best-intentioned supervision or control by the State. His other very significant social contribution was that he suggested "value as a measure for human motive," and made money the standard of this measure.

Up to this time the motive of human conduct had been held imponderable. By the Church motive was believed to be measured by man's adherence to moral law, which, it was averred, he would willingly obey. By the State it had come to be held the acknowledgment of ethical considerations, as expressed in the laws and statutes of civilised communities, which obligated the individual to forego certain liberties, which might be injurious to others, in return for the numerous benefits of protection afforded by the State. But the factors which compelled compliance were, in either case, of necessity difficult to measure. They were essentially personal, variable, temperamental, and as such distasteful to the middle class rationalists, who were confident that a measure of motive which might act as the norm of social life could be discovered. Adam Smith, by methods of diligent inquiry and analysis, had arrived at the conclusion that it was demonstrable that the motive of man's action was in a greater number of instances economic, and could be measured on the one hand by the desire to obtain wealth, and on the other by the efforts and privations which would be endured to produce it. Money, he argued, could be taken as the fixed standard of measure. Economic freedom was, therefore, as essential to man as political freedom. In order that man could have fullest scope to develop, to be free, it was altogether as important that governments should not hamper individual freedom to trade, and should assure to all men engaged in commerce and industry the same liberty and

protection which constitutional government had secured to them as members of the body politic.

We henceforth are to find two manifestations of the concept of liberty—political and economic. Both were to increase the stature and importance of the individual. The Middle Class had attained political liberty. It now drew attention to economic liberty, in the first instance with the magnanimous generosity of the cosmopolitan, humanitarian point of view, which was later narrowed down by adversity, and degenerated into a new form of absolutism as the lower classes, pushing upward, sought to dispute with the Middle Class the benefit of this newly formulated economic liberty.

The contribution of Adam Smith to the ideology of liberty has possibly not been as fully acknowledged as it deserves, though his work as the founder of economic science has been over-emphasised. Hume and Stewart, his contemporaries, to say nothing of the French Physiocrats, had contributed largely to the storing up of that fund of information of which Adam Smith made so excellent a use. But what Adam Smith did do was to issue a declaration of economic independence, when he asserted that free trade and the freedom of the economic man are a vital necessity in a free State, the affirmation of true liberty. Economics, as a separate branch of social science, was declared co-equal with politics.

However, this declaration of economic independence remained for the time little more than a declaration; though the questions Adam Smith raised attracted the attention of a number of sympathetic and industrious inquirers.[1] Numerous historical and descriptive treatises concerning economic conditions, particularly among the working classes, drew attention to the poor, who hitherto

[1] Cf. works of Young, Eden, Tooke, McCulloch, and Porter.

had remained outside the scope of speculative inquiry. Economics, like politics, was dealt with in a philosophical spirit, and reflected the inquiring attitude of the middle class mind, which had had so large a share in influencing public opinion.

It must not be lost sight of in considering the state of public opinion in Western Europe on the eve of the French Revolution, that the men who were giving form and substance to the new political and economic theories were leading recluse lives. They were primarily concerned with theory rather than practice, with doctrine and dogma rather than with useful solutions to the practical problems which they had raised. Constantly formulating new hypotheses, opening new vistas of progress, they were interested mainly in exploring the new pathways. As a rule they were men devoid of psychological perception, apparently blind to the ferment they had aroused among the masses. Separated by a wide chasm from everyday life, they sought refuge in reason rather than in action. The vigor of their intellect far outran their power of decision. Busied with bold schemes of the liberty, equality, and fraternity, of humanity, and perpetual peace, they believed that they had solved the riddle of the universe, or at least that it was solvable by pursuing the course opened up by their rational methods.

CHAPTER VI

The French Revolution

FOREIGN INFLUENCE—THE NEW SPIRIT—THE TIERS ÉTAT—THE RIGHTS OF MAN—THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791

I

IT is beyond the scope of the present volume to pursue further the streams which fed the stagnant pool of political and economic oppression in France on the eve of the Revolution, which overflowed and rushed onward like a torrent, bearing the scum on its uppermost crest. It has, however, been essential to outline briefly the character of the epoch immediately preceding the Revolution, in order to comprehend the full sweep of the work of demolition it accomplished.

The revolutions and civil wars in England during the 17th century were the work of "men of action and men of God"; men who fought rather than men who thought; men who desired to regulate rather than innovate; men of quick decision, but slow deliberation; men whose field of vision was limited, but whose purpose was distinct, whose task was narrow but well-defined. They were in close touch with the spirit of the age which had been long in maturing. To them liberty was the essence of man, and moral law fixed beyond phenomena. At the same time there was a constant and close intercourse between the men of action and the men of theory; the latter followed rather than preceded, formulated the

accomplished rather than posited the potential, or confounded it with the actual.

The establishment of constitutional government in England was thus not the result of revolutionary accident, but of political evolution. The Middle Class had come into power without violently displacing the aristocracy, which remained strong enough to assert for itself a share of authority in the government of the land, and even to restrain the hand of the Commons when needful. The peerage was, however, being constantly renovated by accessions from the best brains of the Middle Class. Thus while the aristocracy in England retained many of its outward insignia of a privileged caste, already towards the close of the 18th century [1] it had become largely middle class in its interests and point of view, and in politics had begun to adopt a middle class, timid, conservative policy, totally alien to the true temper of boldness, independence, and social responsibility which distinguishes a vigorous aristocracy as a distinct force in the State. Middle class ascendancy had grown to maturity by a process of internal assimilation so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

As has been pointed out, the American War of Independence may, though the connection is slight, be looked upon as preliminary to the French Revolution in that it put into practice in part the political ideology of the French theorists. Here men for the first time drew their swords ostensibly for the sake of abstract rights, as outlined in the Declaration of Independence of 1776.

But the American experiment was one of State building

[1] During the period 1700-1800 no less than 34 dukes, 29 marquesses, 109 earls, 85 viscounts, 248 barons were created.

on a small scale, where there was no work of demolition to be accomplished. The Americans had to look only to the present and needed to give little heed to the past or even to consider the future. In America the revolution had been practically wholly constructive. It had been weakly and inadequately opposed, and had triumphed more by accident than by design. Its underlying motive was chiefly economic, and as a political event it was even to those concerned of secondary importance. The men who carried through the revolution in America were men who had long enjoyed the privilege of personal freedom and knew the value of liberty, understood its necessary limitations, and appreciated that its benefits could be enjoyed only by a strict adherence to law and order.

How different were the circumstances in France in 1789! For more than two generations the Middle Class had been asserting itself. It had gained control of the channels of trade, of industry, of science, of philosophic inquiry, of public opinion. Disgusted with the conduct of the monarchy, which had let slip the reins of government, and with the aristocracy, which had sunk to a low level of effeminate incompetency, the Middle Class in France, though conscious of its strength as the most vigorous and important element in the State, had no share in shaping its political destiny. One hundred and seventy-five years had elapsed since the Tiers Etat—the Commons—had last been summoned (1614), when, owing to the desperate financial situation of the country, and the failure of successive ministers to raise the necessary funds, Louis XVI, as a last resort, was induced to call for elections to the States General (1789).

II

The members elected to the Tiers Etat of 1789 were of a different stamp from those who had humbly addressed their sovereign on bended knee at the last session of the States General early in the 17th century. Now these lawyers, farmers, doctors, journalists, and pamphleteers who had been elected to represent the great Middle Class knew themselves to be the real power in France. At last the day had come when the theories of the rights of man, the sovereignty of the people, political liberty and equality were to be put into practice. The Middle Class suddenly found that it had rallied to its support the great mass of the population, the lower classes, whom the majority of middle class political theorists had never considered as possible participants in political freedom. This sudden and unexpected accession of strength must be held in view in estimating the chaos which ensued. Except possibly for the harangues of Rousseau, no voice had been raised in behalf of the political enfranchisement of the lower classes. Logical historical development seemed to demand that the Middle Class of France, the lovers of law and order, of moderation and of peace, should have a chance to reform the body politic, and establish a constitutional monarchy which would be relatively no more radical than that set up by Englishmen of this same class a century before. Such was the programme of the Tiers Etat. Excluded by force of arms from participating in the States General with the nobility and the clergy, the Tiers Etat thereupon constituted itself into a National Assembly, and invited the two other orders to join it.

The situation soon got out of hand. The Middle

Class had formulated the theory, the lower classes undertook the execution, and we have the storming of the Bastille and the sacking of the châteaux of the nobles. Then followed such episodes as that of August 4th, when the abject political worthlessness of the aristocracy was made evident. These supporters of a rationalised absolutism, ostensibly the strong arm of law and order in the land, voluntarily surrendered their political privileges and immunities in a fit of helplessness, hoping by this act of sacrifice of something they knew they could not hold, to save something which they hoped that they could.

Then came the famous statement of the Rights of Man, August 18, 1789, which we may for a moment compare with the Declaration of Right of 1689. Here we find the teachings of the middle class philosophers of the 18th century embodied in a document of State, solemnly adopted by the National Assembly, and later ratified by the King.

The "Rights of Man" set forth that all men are originally equal; that the ends of social union are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression; that sovereignty resides in the nation, and that all power emanates from it; that freedom consists in doing everything which does not injure another; that law is the expression of the general will; that public burdens should be borne by all the members of the State in proportion to their fortunes; that the elective franchise should be extended to all; and that the exercise of natural rights has no other limit than their interference with the rights of others.

In spite of the success of the Revolution the Middle Class, with characteristic moderation, clung to its cherished plan of a constitution, and we find the National Assembly transforming itself into a Constituent Assembly

(January 1790) for the purpose of framing a constitution, which was to make a place for the King, and even a House of Peers. Thereafter constitution-making proceeded, and in 1791 a constitutional monarchy was decreed in writing, as unlike the English model of constitutional monarchy as the declaration of the Rights of Man is unlike the Declaration of Right. The Constitution of 1791 showed clearly the influence of Rousseau, and his theory of the two powers—legislative and executive—in government, combined with that of the three powers adopted by the United States two years before. The Constitution of 1791 was believed by its framers to be a masterpiece of political wisdom. It was in effect a compromise, an effort to amalgamate monarchy with the principle of the sovereignty of the people. While it made the King the servant of the will of the people, it put him in an untenable position in that he had no share in forming this will.

The Constitution of 1791 had set up an irreconcilable opposition between the legislative and executive branches of government and rendered the smooth functioning of government impossible. The only way out of the difficulty was for one or the other to surrender its authority. The King felt that he could not; the Assembly would not. Thus the principle upon which the Constituent Assembly had framed its constitution, *"le nation veut, le roi fait"* soon proved itself inadequate.[1] Whether consciously or not, the Middle Class had by this time abandoned its intended moderation, had lost its grip, and was for the time being becoming submerged by the rapidly rising influence of the masses. The Legislative Assembly which

[1] Mirabeau, who was the President of the Constitutional Convention, in speaking of sovereign princes exclaimed: *"Vous êtes les salariés de vos sujets, et vous devez subir les conditions auxquelles vous est accordé ce salaire sous peine de le perdre."—Essai sur le Despotism,* Vol. II, p. 279.

undertook to govern in conjunction with the King, accomplished nothing. It was swept aside by the National Convention, which abolished the monarchy, and decreed the death of the King in 1793.

Immediately a fresh constitution was drawn up. It aimed at a representative system, following the American plan, republican in form, radical in content. The Reign of Terror ensued, and when the storm had subsided still another constitution was framed (1795). It provided for a democratic system of two councils, one of five hundred, the other of two hundred and fifty members; the former with the privilege of enacting legislation, the latter with the right to veto it. The executive authority was entrusted to a Directory of five; each director to be its president for three months. The Revolution was at an end. The Directory survived for four years, to make way for the Consulate, the dictatorship of Napoleon, and the Empire.

CHAPTER VII

The Idea of Nationalism

THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION—THE NEW CONCEPT OF LIBERTY—NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS—NAPOLEON I—HIS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE—HIS HISTORICAL RÔLE

I

THE Revolution in France had made a clean sweep of the old institutions, had destroyed all political barriers between classes, and had left standing neither central nor local authority. Middle class public opinion had triumphed. The Middle Class had come to feel itself the ruling power in the State. In spite of the excesses committed in the name of the sovereignty of the people and the rights of man, these concepts survived as political catchwords. They were more precisely defined in the new political theories. Political freedom had been transferred from being an attribute merely of the individual to that of the State. The individual will had fused itself with the national will. The State was no longer held a geographical expression, or even a sum of racial affinities, but an imponderable, intangible composite of opinion. As public opinion, so enthusiastically led by the proselyting political philosophers of the mid-18th century, aroused the individual to cast off the yoke of constituted authority, and displaced the centre of gravity in the State from the governing to the governed, thus realising individual liberty, so now the French people, conscious of their

national vigor, were anxious to bestow upon adjoining States the benefits of political liberty, which they believed that they alone enjoyed. A crusading zeal had seized hold of the French. They felt it to be their mission to free the world from the burden of monarchical absolutism and divinely sanctioned kings, if need be by force of arms. They were convinced that they would be welcomed enthusiastically by neighboring peoples. They outlined and carried into effect plans for the incorporation of the territories of the latter in France, so that they might be satisfied that the full privileges of "freedom" would be assured.

It is in this spirit that the Convention of 1792 voted to render aid to all oppressed peoples, and to liberate them from their rulers. Instructions in this sense were issued to French commanders in the field, and we find French forces penetrating the Rhenish provinces, Belgium, and Savoy. By plebiscites carried through after campaigns of intense propaganda, these areas were incorporated and made over into French departments. By 1795 the frontiers of France had reached the Rhine. Such were the conquests carried out in the name of political liberty. There is no evidence to show that up to this time the motives of action were other than unselfish, though the methods used were in many instances arbitrary.

Throughout this period French national feeling continued to be strengthened. National self-consciousness, national dignity had become political factors of determining importance. It is no surprise to find that it was in France that this sense of militant nationalism was first attained. The State fashioned in the image of man had been endowed with self-consciousness, and just as the individual seeks new fields of activity, more room to

grow, so the State—a composite, articulate, organic, individualised body politic—must be permitted to grow, to progress.

Such was the first tangible result of the putting into practice of the theories of progress, of liberty, of humanity, which had been the daily gospel of Europe during the three preceding decades. With naïve intensity the people of France proclaimed it not only their right, but their duty to impose political liberty upon those who they felt would not otherwise accept the new doctrines.

The constructive phase of revolutionary propaganda had begun. Middle class cosmopolitanism had developed into national egotism in an astonishingly brief period. The bolder ideas of cosmopolitanism seemed to offer no tangible possibility of successful materialisation. They were historically premature. The long road of nationalism had to be laid behind before international concepts could gain ground.

The first flowering of unselfish abstract nationalism, the spreading of political liberty to all peoples, and the awakening of national self-consciousness, matured under such unusual circumstances, withered rapidly. By 1798 France had abandoned her policy of political altruism; the proselyting zeal had spent itself or rather had been transformed into an inordinate lust for territorial conquest, which was to find in Napoleon the leader needed for such enterprise.

Though the restless energy of Napoleon was ill-suited to brook the harassing burden of a system of balances and checks, inseparable from the politico-juridic concept of the State, as expressed in constitutional government, yet he realised that this was the mould into which the State of his times must be fashioned, and he made use of it. He acknowledged that the people were the source

of all power, and embodied in himself their professed sovereignty. He opened the path of preferment to the individual and made fullest use of intelligence and merit to consolidate his position, and thus established a democratised despotism.[1] Napoleon's conception of his true historical mission was too strong to permit anything to stand in the way of its accomplishment. He bent his full energy to carry on the work of the Revolution, to secure the consolidation and the unification of greater France into a conscious national unit, and as a corollary, the hegemony of this national unit in Europe. He monopolised for himself and directed this national consciousness and embodied the newly-created national egotism, which rendered France irresistible when faced by peoples whose national consciousness had not been awakened.

As Louis XIV [2] had believed himself the embodiment

[1] "To sum up the imperial system, it may be said that its basis is democratic, since all the powers are derived from the people; whilst all the organisation is hierarchical, since it provides different grades in order to stimulate all capacities.

"Competition is opened to 40,000,000 souls; merit alone distinguishes them; different degrees of the social scale reward them."—*Napoleonic Ideas,* Chap. III, written by Prince Louis Napoleon, later Napoleon III.

[2] According to the doctrine set forth by Louis XIV in his own words: "The King represents the whole nation; all power vests in the King, and there is none other in the Kingdom but such as he decrees. The nation is of no importance (*ne fait pas corps*) in France, it is entirely absorbed in the person of the King. Kings are absolute monarchs, and have by the nature of things fullest authority and control over all the chattels and effects belonging not only to the laymen but to the clergy. He who has given Kings to the world willed it that they be respected as His lieutenants, reserving for Himself the sole right to examine their conduct. It is His Will that whoever is born a subject should obey without question."—Quoted from C. Thibaudeau, *"Histoire des Etats Généraux,"* Vol. III, p. 218.

It is of interest to compare this with the Napoleonic theory: "Napoleon was the supreme chief of the State, the elect of the people, the representative of the nation. In his public acts, it was the Emperor's pride to acknowledge that he owed everything to the French people. When at the foot of the Pyrenees, surrounded by kings, and the object of their homage, he disposed of thrones and empires, he claimed with energy the title of first representative of the people, a title which seemed about to be given exclusively to members of the legislative body."—Cf. *Napoleonic Ideas,* Chap. V.

of the State—the patrimony of France, the country and its passive populations—so Napoleon during the years of his ascendancy embodied the newly-roused national consciousness of the active, participant people. Here we can see the source of his power, the spontaneity of his success. Had he confined himself to the single purpose of the national consolidation of France, it is possible that he would have modified the course of history and accelerated the smoother evolution of nationalism. But the distant conquests which he had undertaken at the behest of the Directory had tested the new-found strength of the State and awakened its sense of power in the pursuit of difficult enterprise. The campaigns in Italy and in Prussia had made it plain to Napoleon that a closely-knit national State with conscript armies must inevitably conquer the older State organisation, where the morale had become debilitated, and the spirit of nationalism had not yet kindled a patriotic fervor.

II

No new contribution was made by Napoleon to the theory of State; no real progress in political practice is to be found during the years of his rule. He regulated and systematised the loose ends of Revolutionary policy, and restored a semblance of order and discipline to the newly-formed, conscious national will. He invented little, but borrowed copiously and judiciously: from the bees for his coat of arms from Chilperic to the ceremonial of his court from Charlemagne; from the Pandects of Justinian for his code of laws to the ideas of Rousseau for public pronunciamentos.[1] Most significant of all, he

[1] Cf. the interesting study by René Johannet, *Le Principe des Nationalités.*

adopted in so far as he was able the cardinal tenet of the programme of government of the dethroned Bourbons, their family policy, allying himself with the House of Austria by marriage, and placing his relatives on the thrones of adjoining States as outposts of the power of France. In his wars of conquest he sought elbow room for the growing national State. The discipline of these conflicts served to consolidate France into a strongly centralised Nation-State.

The more one inquires into the conscious political rôle of the first French Emperor, the more one realises how deep was the impress of middle class influence on his character. To him power was the rational attribute, the logical objective of the individual. He conceived power in a subjective sense and his point of view remained to the end that of a confirmed middle class individualist. He was dazzled by the concept of cosmopolitanism, while he made himself the missionary of nationalism. It would seem as though he believed that by his successful wars, carried on with conscripted, national-service armies, he could realise the middle class ideal of a federated, cosmopolitan World State. Napoleon was never able wholly to shake off the incubus of the doctrinaire teachings of pre-Revolutionary days. He sought no blending of national groups, no fusion of peoples on a basis of equality. Himself apparently devoid of a feeling of patriotism, by birth, tradition, and temperament an Italian, he had placed himself unreservedly at the head of the French, as the people that had first attained national consciousness.[1] He apparently never looked beyond the hegemony of France in a federated European State. Here we find the motive which

[1] Years later at St. Helena we find him exclaiming: "If I had been born a German I would have united the thirty million Germans under my sceptre . . . and they would have remained faithful to me."

impelled him to endeavor to unite the congeries of European peoples; Swedes, Spaniards, Prussians, Danes, Italians. Tsardom and the Papacy, absolutists, monarchists, republicans, all were called upon to play their part.

Not content with imitating the Bourbon family system, Napoleon openly sought to erect a World State with France as the head, and the other States as the subordinate members of the body politic. Engrossed though he was by the mirage of a cosmopolitan World State, Napoleon was to the end of his reign conscious of the importance of national unity as the basis of the political regeneration of the various peoples of Europe, as he had been in the days when, in accepting the crown of Italy, he declared to the deputation which waited upon him: "I have always had the intention of creating a free and independent Italian nation. I will accept the crown, but for only so long as my interests require it."

History offers few such examples of inflexible irony. For it is difficult to accept the view that Napoleon had not the breadth of vision or political acumen necessary to foresee that by carrying the torch of nationalism so high—in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, wherever his armies penetrated and remained—the spirit of national self-consciousness would be aroused, and would grow until these peoples, in turn becoming nationally conscious, would struggle to secure national independence and ultimately compass his overthrow. He thus became the most active agent of his own downfall. As Lamartine has expressed it, *"ayant soulevé les nationalités, les nationalités l'engloutissaient."*

Europe as Napoleon found it was strewn with the wreckage of decayed political systems; there was little that was glorious or sacred left standing, save a rich fund of high political ideals; a real and vigorous faith in

political liberty. It would have been too great a task even for a Napoleon to have erected a World State out of the peoples of Europe who, for centuries politically passive, were just awakening to national and political consciousness. His reign was, therefore, of necessity ephemeral. He had built his State out of a patch-work of decrepit absolutisms, into which he had sought to breathe the breath of national life.

However, it may be said of Napoleon with even greater truth than it has been said of Cæsar that when "fresh nations in free self-movement commenced their race towards the new and higher goals, there were found among them not a few in which the seed sown by Cæsar had sprung up, and which owed, as they still owe to him, their historical individuality." [1]

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome,* closing paragraph.

CHAPTER VIII

The Restoration

THE SPREAD OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT—SICILY (1812) —SPAIN (1812)—FRANCE (1814)—MINOR GERMAN STATES —THE DESTINY OF EUROPE—THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA —THE HOLY ALLIANCE—THE POLICY OF LEGITIMACY — AIX-LA-CHAPELLE — TROPPAU—LAIBACH—THE MONROE DOCTRINE

I

PATRIOTISM, which during the French Revolutionary period had evolved out of compatriotism, with which it may be held synonymous, the binding of men in a strongly-knit social group by ties of family, of kinship, of interest, the cockade of faction, the conviction of party, and lastly by an awakening of national consciousness, had served to render France dominant in Europe. Political unity had hastened the evolution of this patriotic national self-consciousness in France. Now national self-consciousness easily learned, zealously pursued, fanatically practised, was to lead to political liberty and national independence among other peoples, in the first instance in their emancipation from the control of their French initiators, as the preliminary to a long struggle for constitutional freedom.

While France was engaged in carrying out Napoleon's programmes of cosmopolitan aggrandisement and national enlightenment, England remained steadfastly aloof, relatively untouched by the influence of revolutionary

policy. For the people of England remained impervious to the blandishments of French political doctrines, which they looked upon with mistrust and suspicion. They sought to combat the French political theories of national self-consciousness with their own more cherished principle of individual liberty. The ruling Middle Class in England, thoroughly frightened by the excesses of the French Revolution, not only became increasingly conservative, but also exerted its whole strength and resources to check the progress of French political propaganda. The doctrine of nationalism, or national consciousness, as the basis of an independent State, was thoroughly distasteful to the English, who relied on the united strength of the various peoples—Scots, Welsh, Irish, as well as English —to support the fabric of the State. We can here trace the causes of the reactionary influence which led to the further tightening of the reins of parliamentary control, as exemplified by the abolition of the Irish Parliament after the disturbances of 1798 afforded the desired opportunity of making Ireland an integral part of the kingdom (1801). This anti-nationalist policy at home did not prevent England from fostering nationalist propaganda on the Continent, and coöperating actively with the Spaniards, Italians, and Prussians in their plans for national independence to drive out the French and crush Napoleon.

As England during the Middle Ages had on the whole remained outside the great leavening influence of the Crusades, and, though bound to participate in European policy, yet had evolved her own peculiar political institutions, so now the country felt only indirectly the effects of the sudden growth of nationalist principles which was to shape the political destiny of the peoples of Europe during the 19th century. For a time it appeared as

though this destiny was to depend solely upon the will of France, and the retrenchment of England had in it many of the characteristics of despair. Nevertheless when after 1808 it became evident that Napoleonic plans were unrealisable, we find English emissaries abroad urging the advantages of British constitutional liberty, as against the Napoleonic plans of cosmopolitan despotism, at the same time making good use of the patriotic ferment aroused by French nationalist theories.

Thus we find that it was the English Minister to Sicily, acting under instructions from his Government, who brought about the framing of the first constitution on the English model to be adopted on the Continent (1812). The Sicilian constitution was built on a modernised English plan. While it provided for a Lower House and a Chamber of Peers, the King remained a separate power, outside of Parliament, though parliamentary sanction was made obligatory for most of his acts. All feudal privileges and immunities were suppressed, and the influence of the French doctrine of the rights of man was recognised as underlying the attempt to amalgamate revolutionary theory with English monarchical principles, the latter prevailing in form.

In the same year in Spain, with a great part of the country still under the rule of the French, a very complete constitution was drawn up, which recognised the constitutional monarchical principle, provided for a King, but included only a single Chamber or Cortes, with no House of Peers, and made the King subservient to the will of Parliament. Neither of these attempts to establish a constitutional system survived the reaction which set in upon the downfall of Napoleon. On the day when Napoleon set sail for Elba (May 4, 1814) the restored King of Spain, Ferdinand VIII, celebrated the circum-

stance by abrogating the constitution, and it was not until 1836 that absolutism was overthrown; and only after prolonged revolutionary struggles was constitutional monarchy at last established (1875).

In Sicily a similar fate befell the constitution, and the heavy hand of Austrian despotism prevented the realisation of a constitutional régime until the country was liberated by Garibaldi and united to Italy (1860).

If we look through the pages of the history of the struggle for constitutional government throughout Europe we meet everywhere with the same vicissitudes. In France Louis XVIII granted a charter (June 4, 1814). It shows traces of the influences of English principles, but left more power in the hands of the King, affirming "that all authority in France rests in the King." This charter provided for two Houses, but electoral privilege to the Lower House did not take into consideration the great mass of the population which had become politically conscious, and had played such an important part in the affairs of State during the revolutionary period. Thus the charter acted as an irritant, and served to foment the discontent, which manifested itself in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

So it was in Germany. When the days of the Napoleonic régime had passed, and the Wars of Liberation had freed the country from foreign occupation, the reactionary forces were still too strong to permit the establishment of more liberal political institutions. Particularist influences had not been sufficiently overcome to allow the national consciousness, which had been so spontaneously aroused during the period of *Sturm und Drang,* to entrust the conduct of public affairs to a strong central authority. Some of the minor German princes did grant

limited constitutional rights: Nassau in 1814, Baden and Bavaria in 1818, Wurttemburg in 1819, and others later. But as long as the larger states, Prussia and Austria, remained under absolutist control, these minor efforts were without immediate political significance.

II

The Revolution had awakened the spirit of nationalism, the Restoration did all in its power to suppress it. The Revolution, the work of the Middle Class, had spread liberalism among the peoples of Europe; the Restoration made it its duty to drive these peoples back under the yoke of absolutism. The Revolution and the Napoleonic régime had been a period of conscious nationalist expansion, of growth, of action. There was current a broad faith in political liberty and a fervent conviction that man possessed certain imprescriptible rights. Now there ensued a period of nervous unrest and irritability throughout Europe. For the time being the exhilarating principle of nationalism was to be supplanted by a political subterfuge, well suited to the petty temper of the Restoration.

It is claimed that Talleyrand, in order to save France from partition, at the Congress of Vienna advanced the principle of legitimacy as the test of rational political practice. The idea in itself has little to commend it. It is a natural resultant of war-weariness; a desire to restore the régime of days gone by; as such it is an historical anachronism, and is inevitably doomed to failure. But if put into practice, such a political doctrine can and does

retard the natural flow of historical development. While it never leads to great events, it keeps men stirred up and disaffected until finally it is eliminated by the force of its own ineptitude. It may thus be looked upon as a parasitic doctrine, of which there are numerous examples in history.

Legitimacy as a political doctrine claims that authority in the State is not founded on power, but on accepted practice and high antiquity. As Pascal has remarked: "Justice is that which is established, and thus all of our laws which are established will be held of necessity to be just without being examined, for the reason that they are established." [1]

The bastard rule of Napoleon and his satellites was an offence against the social order, which had to be wiped out. The legitimate rulers must again be seated on their thrones, and the old institutions restored. Incidentally the principle of nationality was to be suppressed; national aspirations were to be crushed. Such was the doctrine which was to be the mainspring of all political combination and manœuvring. The Congress of Vienna, which spared France from spoliation on legitimatist grounds, undid the constructive work initiated by Napoleon, again dismembered Italy and Germany, establishing there a number of petty sovereign States; partitioned Poland afresh, and, as if to show its contempt for the principle of nationality, provided for the forcible union of two racially and religiously antagonistic peoples in the patching up of a single State out of Belgium and Holland. At the same time a Grand Alliance composed of the legitimate sovereigns of the five great States of Europe was formed to regulate the relations of the States of

[1] Cf. *Pensées sur la Morale.*

Christendom, "on principles of Christian charity." [1] It proved to be, as was to be expected, a combination of absolutist monarchs bent upon assuring the maintenance of the *status quo ante* on the basis of the territorial settlement of 1815. The Bourbons were everywhere to be restored to their ancient royal occupations, and by a special article of the text of the Alliance, the Bonaparte family was excluded forever from occupying a throne.

Legitimacy was henceforth to be the sole test of fitness, not merely in the administration of affairs of State and in politics, but religious questions, educational matters, even scientific research and philosophic speculation were to be subject to legitimatist supervision and censorship. The

[1] It is to be recalled that this alliance (November 20, 1815) brought within the realm of practical politics the vague evangelical generalities of the treaty signed by the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia, known as the Holy Alliance (September 1815). Here is set forth "in the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity" a basis for establishing a European policy: "conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance." And further that "the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the One family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom; that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life." Here was an attempt to enunciate a new type of mystical cosmopolitanism which would justify any reactionary policy pursued to check the spread of Revolutionary propaganda. All European sovereigns (except the Pope and the Sultan) were invited by the three Emperors to sign the Covenant of the Holy Alliance and with the exception of the Prince Regent of England did so. Even the English ruler let it be known that it was only owing to constitutional disability that he refrained from appending his signature, as he agreed fully with the principles set forth in the treaty and intended to be guided by its "sacred maxims." Though the Holy Alliance never had any practical application as a diplomatic instrument, yet the name came to be applied to the reactionary policy pursued by European cabinets during the ensuing decade, and fixed itself firmly in the public mind as a conspiracy of kings against the attempts of their subjects to gain political liberty.

Cabinets of Europe were now kept busy with their new inquisitorial functions, repressing and checking spiritual insubordination and political heresy. Government degenerated into purely police functions; politics, to police-court transactions.

Few periods in history[1] offer so sorry a spectacle as this decade (1815-1825), filled with the machinations, schemes, and intrigues of the miscellany of diplomatists whose naturally limited horizon had found in legitimacy a policy well suited to their talents. The Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822), called to consider ways and means to enforce legitimatist policy, proved how hopeless the task had become of attempting to govern without the consent of the governed. At Troppau, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had issued a circular note setting forth the principle of joint armed intervention in any State in which revolutionary movements might arise. No longer able to keep order within their own boundaries, the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian sovereigns agreed to render to one another mutual assistance. England was the first to withdraw from the legitimatist coalition by refusing to be a party to such a compact. The principle of legitimacy was already beginning to be undermined. Canning gave it a further severe blow when he actively supported the contention of President Monroe of the United States that any attempt to extend the

[1] An interesting comparison might be drawn between this period and the decade which began in 1919. Then it was agreed "to renew at stated intervals meetings sacred to the great common interests and to the examination of the measures which in each of these periods shall be deemed most salutary to the peace and prosperity of Europe." The idea was to make these congresses a regular institution through which the Great Powers should control Europe and watch France.—Cf. Seignobos, *A Political History of Contemporary Europe,* Part III, Chap. XXV. By a slight change of names of States we may ascertain the historical background of much that appears enigmatical in present-day history.

European system to the Western Hemisphere, as threatened by the Holy Alliance (1823) in its plans to restore the revolted Spanish Colonies in America to Spain, would be viewed by the United States as dangerous to their peace and safety, "an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." The Holy Alliance thereupon desisted from its plan of intervention in American affairs.

The ruling princes of continental Europe, concerned solely with their coterie policy, took little account of practical political problems. They had never been in contact with public opinion, which they pretended to despise. No longer directed with skill, nor assessed at its real value by the existing governments, neglected except when it expressed itself obnoxiously in the press, public opinion found itself without leadership, out of sympathy with public policy, and again passed under the control of the Middle Class, who for the time being deprived of political rights, was to make use of this instrument to gain control of power in the State.

Legitimacy as a political principle had, as was to be expected of so rococo a doctrine, failed to gain the support of the great body of politically-enlightened men, who had been taught by the lessons of the Revolution to take an interest in political affairs. Thus, in spite of the rigorous and unabated persecution and irritating repression resorted to by the legitimatist Governments, a new and vigorous public opinion was spreading, undermining absolutism at every turn.

CHAPTER IX

The Aftermath

THE TEMPER OF THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY—NEW SCHOOLS OF POLITICS—THE SOCIALIST DOCTRINE—ST. SIMON —THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS

I

THE temper of the 19th century was already beginning to show itself radically different from that of the 18th. The 18th century had been concerned with generalities, had dogmatically asserted the omnipotence of human reason and the supremacy of the individual. It had exalted liberty and equality; sought to frame governments on principles, and deduce political programmes from theory. This ideology had covered France with ruins, had drenched Europe in blood, dislocated society, and brought about a reaction so violent that it had strengthened the hand of monarchical absolutism, and plunged the peoples of continental Europe, including the Middle Class, into a condition of political servitude more vexatious and harassing than that experienced under the old régime. The Restoration had taught caution. It was now felt that too much trust had been placed in the individual; too much confidence in high-flown generalities and in *a priori* theories. Those holding the most divergent opinions, the fiercest opponents of the Revolution as well as its apologists, agreed that the criterion of political theory and practice must be sought, not in the individual,

but in the nation. In brief, individualism, the keynote of political speculation during the 18th century, which had made possible the career of a Napoleon, was to give way to nationalism. Private judgment was denounced as fallacious; the judgment of the majority believed to be more reliable than the wisest council of kings.

We now find in France, on the one hand, a so-called theocratic school of politics springing up. Its followers claimed to have discovered in tradition the source of all historical truth. They rejected the doctrine of perfectibility and progress as an illusion. They held that faith, not reason, and submission to constituted authority must govern social relations; for "sovereignty in the secular sphere corresponds to infallibility in the religious sphere." In spite of their outward adherence to the doctrines of the *ancien régime* it was the leader of this movement, Joseph de Maistre, who was among the first to proclaim the new nationalist thesis, when he declared: "There is no man in the world. I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, but as for man I declare I have never met him in my life." At the opposite extreme a frankly radical social theory was being evolved by a group of politico-social innovators who became known as Socialists. Though they accepted progress and maintained that history cannot turn back a page, yet they viewed with abhorrence the middle class doctrine of unfettered personal liberties and a social order based on maintaining individualist theories. According to their view, the individual is to be held of secondary importance. Society is not to be regenerated by man, but man by society. It was not the abstract man of pre-Revolutionary days, but a nationally conscious individual who felt himself a member of a definite social group. The individual, shorn of

all of his insignia of rank and political prerogative, depersonalised, was by the Socialists considered to be of value merely as a social unit.

The first broad forecast of Socialism is to be found in the works of St. Simon.[1] He claimed that neither the Church nor the State had been able to fulfil its true social mission and that therefore a new social order was necessary, based on socialist principles "scientifically" arrived at.[2] Though it was left to his followers to systematise his ideas, it is clear that St. Simon had in mind the erection of an industrial State, scientifically managed by those who were engaged upon the production of the good things of life. He aimed at the elimination of the consuming class which had hitherto ruled the State, confident that this would lead ultimately to the abolition of war. The chief importance of St. Simon as a precursor of Socialism lay in the fact that he was among the first to insist upon limiting the scope of the unfettered individualism which had been left as a heritage by the Revolution.

Political emancipation had always been the objective of the Middle Class. The politico-juridic concept of the State, which in everyday practice became known as con-

[1] Socialism in its present historical sense is a product of the 19th century. Though what may be termed socialist views were held by many 18th century philosophers and pamphleteers, yet they were generally vague and utopian in character. During the Revolution, Noel Babœuf, a political agitator, propounded a definite scheme of a socialist society which had considerable influence during the early years of the 19th century. He advocated a fantastic plan whereby the State was to inherit all property and sought to outline a rigid code in order to arrive at social equality. In his view the aim of society is the happiness of all, and "happiness consists in equality." It is significant of the temper of the Revolution that Babœuf was executed for taking part in a conspiracy to establish a government which would carry out his principles. Many of the doctrines later advocated by Fourier and others are traceable to Babœuf.

[2] Cf. *Du Système Industriel* (1821) and *Le Nouveau Christianisme* (1825).

stitutional government, was a middle class creation. In establishing this form of government, the middle class political theorists and politicians had relied on what they believed to be the innate moderation of man, the conviction that man is born good, that evil springs from his social environment, and that the reform of society can be effected only by the reform of the individual. The Revolution had strengthened this individualist bias. In a measure it served to transfer this individualism from the individual to the State, and invest the State with those privileges, characteristics, and prerogatives which it was believed belonged to the individual. The epoch which followed was to fix more firmly, and at last lead to the full triumph of the middle class principles of the politico-juridic organisation of the State. However, a new and increasingly numerous group of men, followers of St. Simon and later of Karl Marx, was to take up the struggle against these principles, not so much in the first instance for political liberty as for economic independence as a stepping-stone to social equality.

For the time being public opinion remained infinitely less self-confident than it had been during the 18th century, less ready to jump at conclusions, determined to test theory in the crucible before putting it into practice. This was in a large measure due to the fact that the average man who had prospered during the later days of the Revolution and the Empire had grown accustomed to concern himself little with his rights, and to confine his attention to the care of his interests. It would be impossible to arrive at a conception of the spirit of the new age, and gain an understanding of the causes which led to the facile triumph of the Restoration, without inquiring into the preponderating part played by economic expansion.

II

Economic freedom appeared less difficult to secure, less vexatious to safeguard, its benefits were found to be more tangible, its influence more peaceful, its results more immediately satisfying to the individual, than the hardships which had to be endured to secure so incommensurable a benefit as political freedom. The desire for political emancipation had led to the wars of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, which had devastated Europe, had squandered the wealth of nations, and left the people burdened with taxation and misery. It is not to be wondered at that peace, even at the cost of political servitude, should for a time be welcomed. The lesson which the Napoleonic interlude had taught was that great men, who employ their talents in affairs of State, disturb the social fabric and confer few benefits. Like natural laws, they are violent and often vicious. Whereas the application of genius in producing mechanical inventions, the harnessing of steam for motive power, for example, which further industrial enterprise and increase material well-being, alone can confer lasting good and accelerate progress. The study of mathematics and physical sciences had led to such inventions. The use of new machinery and motive power in industry, and the consequent industrial and commercial expansion, had given added influence to the Middle Class, and assisted it in consolidating its control of the means of production. This gave a fresh impulse to competitive expansion, which reacted on the political life of the period.

The Middle Class, while retaining its distinctively undisciplined, individualist attitude which found expression in competition, was alert to the political possibilities

of the new industrialism, which might assure for it ascendancy in the State. It was perceived that material wellbeing and wealth would afford the Middle Class the leisure necessary to pursue the struggle for political power with greater efficacy, and that the industrial movement, which was developing rapidly into the discipline of the factory system, might best afford the social security which it craved.

It was from England, where the control of the body politic by the Middle Class had been long and steadily evolving, that the industrial system had spread to the Continent. Free competition, which was the outcome of the middle class individualist doctrine, as expressed in the terms of "a fair field and no favorites," or again *"chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous,"* rejected coöperation as an antiquated survival of the guild system. Labor was held to be a commodity; the workman an economic coefficient of mechanical development. The possibility of the material or social improvement of the condition of the working classes was not considered. That the men who composed it should receive political rights for their benefit as a class, or even to ameliorate their economic condition, was held presumptuous. Human nature was disregarded. Economic laws were formulated in which the profits of the middle class employer were calculated in relation to wages as fixed quantities, the bare minimum to sustain life, wherein the wage-earner as a human being was not taken into consideration. The Middle Class, engrossed with economic questions which it endeavored to reduce to equations as rigid as those of mathematical science, paid no heed to questions of social development. Small enterprises, controlled by the workers themselves, a survival of the older system, were being rapidly absorbed by middle class capitalists, who organised their

business on a large scale, and acquired an efficiency and economy in production which it had hitherto been impossible to attain.

As a result the working classes were constantly receiving into their midst members of the Middle Class who had been forced down by the competitive system, which by a process of selection stimulated the strong elements to increased activity and wealth, and cast out into the great mass of unorganised workers those who had not, for one reason or another, been able to prosper. On the one hand the middle class capitalist, by enforcing factory discipline, was preparing the way for the rise of class consciousness among the workers, and on the other, as a result of the ruthless individualism of the competitive system, the working classes were receiving a better educated, more intelligent, but embittered leaven from the lower Middle Class. Such were the immediate effects of economic expansion, when the Middle Class on the Continent felt itself strong enough to seek political control in the State, which it now considered its rightful possession.

CHAPTER X

The Triumph of the Middle Class

GREEK INDEPENDENCE—THE REVOLUTION OF 1830—LOUIS PHILIPPE KING OF THE FRENCH—THE WHIGS IN POWER—THE REFORM ACT (1832)—BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE—ECONOMICS AND POLITICS—THE COMPETITIVE IDEAL—CAPITALISM AND NATIONALISM—THE BUSINESS MAN IN POLITICS—THE CASE OF ALGERIA—PORTENTS OF DECAY—CHARTISM

I

LEGITIMACY, which had succeeded in forcing nationalism temporarily into abeyance, declined after 1825, and nationalism once more came to the fore. The right of intervention, formulated at the Congress of Laibach, was seized upon by the Nationalists as an entering wedge. It was now declared that such intervention was "legitimate," when it supported the principle of nationality. Here was a doctrine which was to lead far afield during later periods. At the time it found immediate application in the affairs of the Greeks, who for six years had been struggling to emancipate themselves from the control of the Porte and set up an independent national State, when at last in July 1827, France, England, and Russia decided to intervene. The motive which stimulated these governments to action, in spite of their marked distaste for nationalist principles, was neither the pressure of public opinion nor coördination of policy. Each State that participated was inspired by its own individual policy, consonant with its aims. The naval battle of

Navarino, which by the destruction of the Turkish fleet brought about the success of the Greek cause, and the first practical application of the nationalist principle, also witnessed the first use of steam vessels in warfare. In both senses it was a distinct triumph for the Middle Class. The result was the creation of an independent Greek State (1829), and nationalism was firmly fixed in the public mind as the new guiding motive of public policy, which middle class publicists took great pains to exploit to advantage.

Nationalism as a political principle is the natural corollary of middle class individualism. Both depend directly on the competitive ideal. Both are antagonistic to coöperation. In its simplest form nationalism would seem to indicate that "every people has the right to form an independent State," but in reality it came to mean that "every people has the right to form an independent State which can as such survive." Competition was to become the basis of political liberty as it was that of economic independence. Henceforth trade principles were to prevail in politics. The Middle Class felt that it had discovered the secret of economic wellbeing in free competition, and that by applying these methods to politics it could secure the reins of government and further its personal fortunes. Politics and economics were linked together; political motive was given a semblance of life in nationalism; economic design as a political incentive, though present, remained concealed for a prolonged period.

II

The first historically successful experiment which the Middle Class made in gaining the seats of sovereignty

in continental Europe came in France in 1830, when the opportunity was offered by the blind policy of Charles X, to whom even the Restoration seemed too progressive. The *coup d'état* which drove him from his throne was accomplished with such facility that the middle class leaders were not prepared to handle the crisis unaided. It is typical of future method that they had no desire to overthrow the monarchy, but merely to gain control of the government. So that when the revolution had accomplished its purpose and brought the Middle Class into power we find a Paris banker, Lafitte, proposing the crown of France to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, who had taken no part in the revolution, in terms reminding one of typical business methods. "You are to take your choice between a crown and a passport," the new middle class king-maker is said to have remarked. On August 9, 1830, Louis Philippe was established on the throne, not as King of France but as King of the French. This subtle distinction of title was to prove of importance for future nationalist development. It implied the acceptance of the principle that sovereignty had been conferred upon the Prince by the French people, or rather by their self-appointed middle class representatives. The old idea of France, the country and its people, the passive inarticulate property of kings, had for all time given way to the newer principle of the nation, the French people, who were represented as sovereign by the title of their King. Louis Philippe showed that he felt himself the enthroned representative of the Middle Class. He called upon his banker-sponsor to form a cabinet, cultivated amicable relations with foreign States, repressed extremists, and inaugurated the *juste milieu* policy of moderation, so pleasing to the bourgeoisie.

The year 1830 is of much importance in the annals of the struggle of the Middle Class for political ascendancy. It marks its definite control of the State, the beginning of a new practice in politics. French political theory and English economic practice were to be the impelling motives in the evolution of the new theory of State. Both bore a distinctively middle class imprint. Nationalism and capitalism were developing hand in hand.

Four months after the Middle Class in France had gained control of the State, in England the Tory Government, headed by the Duke of Wellington, resigned (November 1830), and the Whigs, or middle class liberals, came into power and carried through the Reform Act (1832). By this act their representation in Parliament was extended, and their actual control of policy, which was inspired chiefly by economic motives, was secured.

Profiting by the occasion of the French revolution of 1830, Belgium had revolted, seceded from Holland, and established an independent government, which the British and French in conference at London undertook to legalise. The Dutch objected to the terms proposed and resorted to arms to regain the lost territory. The French thereupon occupied Antwerp, and a joint British and French fleet blockaded the Dutch coast. In 1833 a definite treaty of separation was signed, and Belgian independence was assured.

The new middle class government of France, while opposed to war with a people of equal strength and economic development which might interfere with trade and dislocate industry, and therefore anxious to cultivate friendly relations with strong, immediate neighbors, viewed in an altogether different light the possibility of

absorbing weaker and more backward States.[1] As business men held that the absorption of weaker competitors who were not exploiting their industries with sufficient energy was their legitimate and natural right, so for the first time this thesis was held to apply in the field of political expansion.

Across the Mediterranean lay a rich, unexploited country, Algeria. It had been for a long time a weak though annoying neighbor. The Algerians molested French traders and hampered French business enterprise, more especially those engaged in the coral fisheries off Bona. The French Government had an outstanding loan with certain Algiers bankers, which had been the cause of friction and dispute. These pretexts were now for the first time held ample motives for armed intervention.

Under Charles X the French Government had, since 1827, kept up a desultory blockade of Algiers, but had taken no definite aggressive steps when, on April 30, 1830, in a final attempt to placate the rising discontent of the Middle Class by acceding to its insistent demands for more vigorous action in Algeria, an imposing French force was landed on the African coast, and Algiers was occupied. Three months later Louis Philippe and the middle class government came into power. No time was lost. The campaign to subdue the country was energetically pushed. The drastic methods adopted by the French, such as the massacre of an entire Arab tribe at El Uffia, and the execution of Arab chieftains who had been invited to Algiers under a French safe-conduct, the plundering of rich estates, the desecration of ceme-

[1] It was probably part of the French programme to prepare for the annexation of Belgium on nationalist grounds, but the veto of England, the hostility of Prussia, and the opposition of Austria prevented the accomplishment of this design at the time, and Belgium was neutralised, so as to be placed beyond the absorptive aims of French expansion (1839).

teries and holy places, indicate sufficiently the methods adopted by the Middle Class in power of which one may find so many examples during the later years of the 19th century. These methods were altogether in keeping with current theories prevalent in competitive business, where the weak were considered natural prey, to be blamed rather than pitied for their misfortune.

The influence of the business man in politics had led to the exploitation of foreign policy by business methods, and the example set by the French in Algeria was to be followed later on by all great States. It is necessary to bear in mind the inauguration of this policy under the newly created middle class government of France in order to keep clearly in view the close parallelism between nationalism and capitalism.[1]

III

As during the 18th century, certain members of the aristocracy had held what were then considered advanced views and helped to further the spread of the new middle class doctrines of political liberty and progress, to the great detriment of their own interests as members of the ruling class, so now we find a group of middle class thinkers for the first time occupying themselves with the interests and needs of the working classes. It was in England, where the industrial movement had grown most rapidly and the working classes had been gaining in strength,

[1] The exploitation of India and other English colonial domains had been granted under charters and was carried on through the medium of companies avowedly as commercial enterprises. The occupation of Algeria, by an armed French force in behalf of business interests, was the first instance of its kind undertaken directly and officially by a government. It is therefore deemed advisable to give a few salient details as of historical importance in showing the new methods of colonial enterprise subsequently adopted by all the Great Powers.

that as early as 1825 trade-unions had been legally sanctioned for certain specific purposes. The organisation of trade-unions had awakened a new sense of class solidarity among the workers and had led to a rapid growth of political consciousness, which found its first expression in Chartism.

Some explanation of the real nature of the Chartist movement is required, in order to mark the various phases of political development which are being outlined. As a result of several years of continued bad harvests (1835-1837), of food shortage and general industrial depression, accompanied by the closing of factories, the position of the greater mass of the industrial workers in England had grown unendurable. The opinion became current among the more intelligent workingmen, as well as among a few of the more open-minded of the Middle Class, that as the workingman was excluded from all participation in the affairs of government, his interests were not safeguarded, nor was his welfare promoted. Six members of Parliament joined with six workingmen in framing a bill which was to be presented to Parliament, providing for the extension of suffrage to every male of sound mind who had reached the age of twenty-one, or if foreign born, who had resided for at least two years in the country.

This was the principal demand of the so-called "People's Charter" of 1838. It contained other provisions for parliamentary reform along democratic lines, including: no property qualification for members; vote by ballot; equal electoral districts; annual sessions of Parliament; and payment of members. These proposals were held at the time to be extremely radical.

Mass-meetings took place throughout the country to

agitate in favor of forcing Parliament to grant the extension of suffrage to the working classes. The Middle Class, though having only recently (1832) acquired full control of the government, held its ground firmly, and refused concessions. The more turbulent among the Chartists advocated a resort to arms, while the leaders of the movement attempted compulsory tactics, and even considered a general cessation of work (the first time the idea of the use of a general strike for political purposes was advocated). In June 1839, a petition bearing approximately one and a quarter million signatures, demanding consideration of the Charter, was presented to Parliament. The Middle Class in power, with an instinctive perception of the strength of its position and of the historical immaturity of Chartism, refused to yield, in spite of renewed agitation, which did not die down altogether during the ensuing decade.

During the height of the Chartist agitation plans for the complete reorganisation of society were made, including nationalisation of land, remodelling of the currency, and state loans to laborers who desired to become capitalists. This last provision shows clearly the true nature of the movement. The Chartists had little sympathy with socialist views which were already spreading abroad. There is no evidence of a desire to subordinate man to society, and the doctrine of individual rights, the bulwark of the middle class theory of state, was faithfully adhered to by the great majority.

On the return of more prosperous times, after the repeal of the corn laws, and the extension of free trade, the Chartist movement died down. The subsequent parliamentary reforms, which were eventually to include all the demands of the Chartists, were not granted as the

result of such methods of popular pressure. The Middle Class in England, strengthened politically by the firm attitude it had assumed in repressing Chartism, was now free to turn its full attention to problems of trade development, industrial progress, and colonial expansion.

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

Political Maturity

COMPARATIVE METHODS—THE TIME ELEMENT—METAPHYSICAL CHARACTER OF POLITICS—PHYSICAL FACTORS—DURATION

I

POLITICAL history among civilised peoples is in a great measure a critical survey of the course of their social development. The phases of this development can best be placed in cogently related order by methods of comparative analysis. The fact that the human mind can of itself form no distinct image of time, though the succession of historical events takes place in time, makes it the more difficult to perceive the direct sequence of events or, as we say, the cause thereof. By accumulating correlated events side by side, regardless of their time element, we may hope to arrive at a clearer, more systematic conception of their true relations. Some even go so far as to claim to be able to discern certain laws of historical periodicity.

Thus the comparative method in history is one of simplification; a short cut to a clearer presentation of what at first sight appears as a complex and complicated series of historical phenomena. By placing the Declaration of Right of 1689 side by side with that of the Rights of Man of 1789, a certain correlativity is arrived at. We might add to these the Constitution of the United States, also of 1789, and without great difficulty incorporate

these three important political landmarks in one series, and deduce therefrom a composite historical concept of the development of the constitutional theory of government. History affords a great number of such related episodes, from which the time element must be eliminated in order to arrive at an understanding of their proper significance. It is a most useful contribution of historical research that it affords the possibility of such comparative analysis by the elimination of the time element, which to the human mind is irrelevant, but which is the guiding factor in the application of political ideology to practice. Such research may further render the very good service of assisting us to determine what may be called political maturity.

It is naturally not by the mere juxtaposition of events recorded in history of what appears to be political development, that one may be expected to arrive at a precise knowledge of the actual stage of development at a given time. Nor can the duration of such a stage be forecast with any degree of accuracy. That a given cause has a tendency to produce a given effect is all that can be vouchsafed. But a more profound inquiry than has hitherto been attempted into the psychical as well as the physical factors of political motive will lead to the formation of hypotheses which need take no more for granted than do the more exact sciences or logical speculation; for politics no less than philosophy must construct its own subject-matter. Its manifestations are not independent of the human mind, as the events in history are not independent of the human will. To select any particular phase of human experience or natural features of environment, climate, fertility of the soil, or even ethnic character of a people, as has so often been done, and attempt to deduce therefrom the causes of the forma-

tion of a given political complex is merely a partial analysis. Politics in its true sense is the vigorous expression of the assertive characteristics of the complete man. Political theory and practice in their broadest application are, during a period of maturity, to be interpreted as the rational expression of the cultural development of a people. Politics cannot be understood unless looked upon as the sum total of all the factors of human experience, all the motives of human action, of the applied energy, virility, and intellect of man; his ideas and ideals, dogmas and doctrines; their practice and resultants, which when viewed from the heights of history in perfect balance show the picture of a rationalised social life.

One might be inclined to conclude therefrom that epochs of what we may call political maturity are prolonged for long periods when once social progress has come to fruition. Active inquiry fails to confirm such an hypothesis. Periods of political maturity are extremely brief. In the life of the Greek peoples, whose intellectual ascendancy continued dominant through many centuries, political maturity, as it is sought here to define it, continued at the most for sixty years. In that of the Romans, the age of the first Cæsar culminated in less than a generation, though its effects were felt during the next two thousand years.

It would be impossible to calculate with any degree of mathematical exactitude the period during which any given form of government may be expected to survive. Historical research might afford some grounds for comparative computation, but it would be of no great advantage, as the process of political evolution is not determined or limited by the prevalence of any particular form of government or theory of State. Looked at in this light, kingship, one of the earliest forms of consti-

tuted authority, as well as pure democracy, and the later forms of monarchical absolutism or liberal representative government which, with various modifications, have prevailed throughout successive centuries as the system of maintaining viable social relations, are based on the assumption of the existence of a great mass of politically unconscious humanity. In the civilisation of antiquity, slaves represented this element, which in more modern times was replaced by the serfs and latterly by the Proletariat.

History affords a graphic survey of the awakening of political consciousness in an ever-widening circle. The maturity of a given political movement may be measured in terms of political experience as manifested in the desire for a share of authority in the State, by a newly awakened politically conscious group. Thus in France during the 18th century political ideology outran political consciousness, and cosmopolitanism was speedily smothered by nationalism which was a politically mature ideology.

II

The question of political maturity thus resolves itself into an inquiry into the progressive spread of what we have termed political consciousness. Political capacity is first met with only in the most limited sphere among men who have attained an objective social viewpoint. History shows us that this has taken place in somewhat the following order: the tyrant, the king, the oligarchy, the aristocracy; and only after a further awakening of political consciousness, the middle class, in our own times, has had a share therein. Each category

of the social hierarchy as it attained control of the reins of authority concerned itself with its peculiar personal needs or as we might say established a dictatorship. It safeguarded in the first instance, then strengthened and protected political prerogative, and proceeded to mete out what it considered would be just and good within the limits of its strength; in other words to establish a government. Justice gives rise to law; goodness to public welfare. Both conduce to the permanence in power of the authority which can assure them. But their wise distribution in turn awakens political consciousness among a wider group of men, who will then attempt to gain a share in exercising this distinctive authority.

In this way it will be seen that the principles of 1789 were too broad for immediate application, and the attempt made to adopt them resulted in the violent social upheaval of the French Revolution, whereas the political development of the Middle Class in England a century before, coming after a long and arduous trial at arms, manifested itself more rationally, and in closer touch with actual conditions, resulting in a smoother transition. The principles of 1689 were politically mature, and spread with rapidity during the ensuing century. The abstract humanitarian principles of 1789 were premature, and did not come even to partial recognition until the middle of the following century. In their broader aspects the ideals of 1789 were never realised. Amalgamated with the newer concepts of Communism they were systematised, transformed, and used in part to formulate the basis of some of the social doctrines of the Proletariat.

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on this question of political maturity in order to make plain the political practice of the crucial decades, 1840-1860, which in point of time mark the full development of the middle

class theory of State, and the birth of a new thesis of social organisation.

A concise synthesis of the middle class concept of the State which reached its mature form at this time had led to the acceptance of the belief that the State, fashioned in the image of man, is endowed with a body and soul, and as such is born, grows, and dies. According to this conception, the State was held to be (1) A group of men—of indeterminate number, (2) occuping a fixed territory, of indeterminate size—who have sufficient coherence of motive to act as a working unit in public affairs, *i.e.* (3) national unity. Furthermore the State was (4) a living organism, which had a (5) growth and development of its own as, a (6) moral and spiritual being, (7) endowed with constitutional functions, which determine the relations between (8) the governing and the governed, and as a (9) legal person between States and possessing (10) a national spirit and national will. Some political theorists of the time even went so far as to insist upon determining the sex of the State, and declared that the State is a "moral organised masculine personality." [1]

Here we have reached the height of the personalisation of the State. Nationalism had become the cohesive force in the body politic. To achieve national unity and independence became henceforth the ambition of all the peoples of the West. For political ideology knows no national boundaries; politico-social evolution, no geographical limits. In the end artificial as well as natural barriers, differences of language, geographical position, education, and even racial or historical divergence can do no more than retard the spread, but cannot arrest the growth of a satisfying dogma. Such a creed was

[1] Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State*, p. 23.

nationalism. It was the most inspiriting doctrine, the most powerful asset of the Middle Class, in that it united a people with a quasi-religious fervor in the pursuit of a common aim—the greatness and power of the Nation-State.

CHAPTER II

The Spread of Nationalism

LOUIS NAPOLEON—CONSOLIDATION OF MIDDLE CLASS CONTROL IN FRANCE—COMTE—THE TEACHINGS OF POSITIVISM—UTILITARIANISM IN ENGLAND—THE SITUATION IN GERMANY—THE ZOLLVEREIN—FICHTE—RACIAL INFLUENCES

I

DURING the twenty-five years which had elapsed since Waterloo the Napoleonic legend had been slowly gaining in strength. The Holy Alliance, a combination of kings, had for a time replaced the Napoleonic plan of a so-called holy alliance of peoples. "The Holy Alliance is an idea stolen from me," Napoleon is made to declare in the graphic survey of the aims and policy of the great Emperor written by his nephew Louis Napoleon and published in 1839. The author then adds: "That is to say, a holy alliance of the nations through their kings, and not of the kings against the nations. In this consists the immeasurable difference between his idea and the manner in which it was realised. Napoleon had displaced the sovereigns for the temporary interests of the nations; in 1815 the nations were displaced for the particular interests of the sovereigns. . . . The policy of the Emperor, on the contrary, consisted in founding a solid European association, by causing his system to rest upon complete nationalities, and upon general interests fairly satisfied." [1] Such was the political policy of

[1] *Napoleonic Ideas,* Chap. V.

the first Napoleon, according to his nephew, who was to inherit the task of carrying it to its logical conclusion.

Louis Napoleon was a man of vigorous intellectual attainments and shrewd political judgment. His entire career shows him to have been the willing servant of the political theories which he believed had been created out of whole cloth by Napoleon I. Louis Napoleon apparently never perceived that the doctrine of nationalism was the basis of the middle class theory of State which had evolved out of the 18th century individualism, and had been made use of by Napoleon I as a stepping-stone to world power which he identified with cosmopolitanism. Louis Napoleon's horizon was more limited. He was so engrossed with the idea of carrying on the nationalist policy begun by his uncle that he repeatedly marred his prospects by his inability to wait upon opportunity. As early as 1830 we find him taking part in a nationalist rising in the Papal States, which ended in a fiasco.

The influence of the Napoleonic name, which exalted Louis Napoleon as the natural heir of the "greatest captain of all ages," was reviving throughout Europe. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the following year the leaders of the Polish insurrection in their national rising against Russia should have offered to Louis the command of their forces and the crown of Poland. This was a direct challenge to the edict of the Holy Alliance. However, the Polish outbreak was crushed before he could avail himself of the offer.

In 1832 the Duke of Reichstadt died, and Louis Napoleon henceforth considered himself the rightful heir to the French throne, the standard-bearer of nationalism. His prestige in France was growing. He had written

several essays on political subjects which had won for him marked consideration. Unwilling even now to await a favorable occasion whereby he might hope to win a sure following in France, or at least prepare and mature a plan which might have some chance of success, we find him intriguing with a colonel of artillery to subvert the Strassburg garrison. As was to be expected, the attempt failed and Louis was banished from France.

In the meantime public opinion in France had seized hold of the idea of nationalism with renewed vigor. It had come to be recognised that the glory of France had been raised to a higher level under Napoleon I than during any other period in her history. Nationalism, as exemplified by Napoleon I, had endowed the nation with patriotic consciousness, had made possible the acceptance of a rational nationalist ideology, and had spread the prestige of France throughout Europe. It was in response to the insistent demands of public opinion, as a recognition of the great services rendered by the Emperor, that the ashes of Napoleon I were brought from St. Helena back to France (1840). Louis Napoleon, with his usual impetuosity, sought to make capital out of this event by effecting a landing at Boulogne. Again he failed in his design, was captured, sentenced to imprisonment for life, and confined in the fortress of Ham.

Nationalism, henceforth the dominant political motive in France, consolidated middle class control, and came to be associated with the name of Napoleon in spite of the grotesque part Louis had played at Strassburg and Boulogne.

II

If we attempt to summarise the political position of France in 1840 we find that a new spirit was manifesting itself. The ascendancy of the Middle Class had given rise to a more compact social organisation. The older, more brutal, and arrogant individualism was dying out. It was felt that, unchecked, it weakened the social fabric. A new sense of discipline was being introduced which led to middle class bureaucracy in the State, and more efficient organisation by division of labor in industrial enterprise. It was during this period, when nationalism was gaining fervent adherents in continental Europe, and the Middle Class was tightening its hold on the body politic, that Auguste Comte was engaged with his lectures on Positive Philosophy (1830-1842).

Positivism, though a direct outgrowth of St. Simonian Socialism, appears in the light of its true historical perspective as an attempt to formulate a precise middle class theory of State, which would reconcile existing anomalies and eliminate the disruptive individualist bias of middle class ideology by substituting therefor a rigid yet rational social discipline.

The middle class juridic concept is the basis of Positivism: "Life and conduct shall stand wholly on a basis of law." At the same time it was asserted that the individual has no rights except to do his duty. After surveying the history of European civilisation, Comte came to adopt the view suggested by Condorcet that the various peoples pass on the torch of progress as if they were one single people. In his law of the three stages —theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific— he claimed to have discovered a satisfactory norm for

the interpretation of history. Comte declared that Europe was on the threshold of the third or positive stage, and made it his mission to give scientific precision to social phenomenon, to establish social science, sociology, on the basis of law, just as natural science was being codified. He attempted to prove that social phenomena are subject to variations, the causes of which are race, climate, and political action. But underlying these causes of variation is the main current of historical development of progressive growth. Comte's voluminous denunciation of equality, sovereignty of the people, of the rights of man, was essentially in keeping with the new spirit of his time, though he was not deterred from making use of arguments so favored during the 18th century in support of his own theories. Comte's plan to reorganise society, and the methods he proposed to create a new social order by giving to man a fixed, immovable place in the social hierarchy such as prevailed during the Middle Ages, as well as his self-conferred title of *"Fondateur de la Religion de l'Humanité,"* need not detain our attention beyond our noting in Positivism what appears as an attempt made to counterbalance the development of the political consciousness of the Proletariat. It is not suggested that Comte definitely apprehended the immediate rise of proletarian class consciousness, but rather that he endeavored to give to the Middle Class so recently in power in the State a formula which would make possible the development of a harmonious social organisation, and at the same time provide for the absorption of the rising Proletariat. He recognised the weakness of the middle class politico-social programme which could exploit the advantages of the division of labor, but had not hitherto found it

possible to adopt them for itself. We can thus discover in positivism an effort to bolster up middle class ideology, which, vigorous and unassailed, had hitherto relied principally on the emotional vagaries of nationalism as a doctrine capable of winning nation-wide support. Comte endeavored to introduce order, discipline, precision, finality, to call attention to empirical method, to limit speculation and knowledge to observed facts, to reduce the intelligible to mere phenomena, and not advance beyond strictly scientific analysis and construction.

In England utilitarianism [1] which arose at about this time was, like positivism, of which it was an offshoot, though lacking the more rigid discipline of Comte's system, a manifestation of a similar spirit of middle class moderation, as incapable of self-denial as it was of heroism. Here capitalism evolved, under the influence of this new doctrine, that duty coincides strictly with interest, and that a perfectly prudent man is necessarily a perfectly virtuous one.

In France nationalism was to be made to serve a selfish, limited, political philosophy. Divorced from the idealism which had attended upon its early development, it was to lead France to Sedan. Both France and England and following their example all other great States, as they attained national consciousness, were to accept as axiomatic in political practice that "the histories of ancient Rome and not a few modern States prove

[1] Cf. J. S. Mill, *On Liberty—Introductory:* "It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."

that a career of consistent rapacity, ambition, selfishness, and fraud may be eminently conducive to national prosperity." [1]

Up to 1840 the progress of constitutional liberalism throughout Europe, and the spread of nationalism and capitalism, had been slow. Beyond the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, middle class political theory and capitalist economic development had remained in a rudimentary state. In spite of the propaganda carried on by the more energetic young liberals, absolutism had retained a relatively firm grip in all of these countries.[2] In certain States in Germany even the mediæval orders had been retained. The Empire had been fashioned by the Congress of Vienna into a new Germanic Confederation modelled on the old Holy Roman Empire which Napoleon had disrupted in 1806. Austria was again the leading State in the Confederation, and the Diet of Frankfort was an assembly representing the various governments in which none of the peoples had a share. In the Hapsburg realm, composed of various national groups, the unity of the State was based on the racial antipathies of its component peoples, and nationalism as a political principle of independence had hitherto been skilfully suppressed by playing off these antagonisms one against the other, more especially in Italy where the nationalist ferment was the strongest.

In Germany proper the ascendancy of Prussia was becoming increasingly manifest. The disabilities under which German commerce suffered as the result of the

[1] Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals,* Vol. I.

[2] In 1836 the Queen Regent of Spain was compelled to recognise the Constitution of 1812. The following year a new constitution was granted which provided for two Houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. In 1838 a revised constitution was adopted in Portugal. But in both countries the people took little active share in political affairs, except as partisans of clerical reaction or of anarchical radicalism.

fact that each of the numerous petty principalities had its separate custom-house, had led to the formation of the *Zollverein,* which placed Prussia in a preponderant position in dictating the economic policy of a greater part of the country. Thus the first steps towards national unity under Prussian hegemony proceeded from an economic impulse, which was quickened by the subsequent development of political consciousness.

III

The political sense of the German people has been variously estimated. Their capacity to establish a stable, durable, uniform government over the great area inhabited by ethnically and socially related peoples is limited by the strain of diversity in their character, which inclines them to particularism. We also find among them a speculative, philosophical cast of mind which precludes a nice adjustment between the possible and impossible, or an understanding of the proper use of compromise, a *sine qua non* of political development as currently understood.

Among no other European people has philosophical inquiry so completely influenced political practice. The absence of an individual bias, amenability to discipline and self-abnegation, which are racial characteristics of the German people, the frank striving for a spiritualised æsthetic, rather than a materialist ethical ideal, had produced among them a tendency towards political idealism not to be met with among other races in Europe. This is in part to be accounted for by the fact that the Germans have remained in a great measure outside the sphere of Italo-Greek culture, and in their political de-

velopment evolved a theory of State, outwardly patterned on prevailing models which came to them from abroad, yet were never thoroughly acclimated among them. In more recent times when the politico-juridic concept of the State was adopted by the Germans it was destined to remain alien to their national character, which lacked the definiteness and precision, the civility to appreciate the nice balance of parts it set up in the State. However, it cannot be gainsaid that the Germans of the North, at least, came to imitate its forms, the clockwork of government, with greater success than their masters, precisely because this politico-juridic concept did not interfere with the essence of Statehood, as they understood it.

Of all the peoples in the West who have hitherto attained political consciousness, the Germans are the most akin to the Orientals; endowed with the fierce prejudices and still fiercer enthusiasms of an Eastern people. They brought with them into the heart of Europe their spiritual fecundity, their prolific idealism, their unsettled and unsettling pantheism, and above all a consciousness of racial purity and homogeneity, a survival of the caste system distinctive of their Indo-Germanic ancestry. This was especially true of the Prussians, who had remained a politically insignificant group until Frederick II ascended the throne of Prussia in 1740. An acute student of history, he recognised the paths which lay open to him to increase his prestige by the use of force and awaken the German people to the part they might one day be called upon to play as arbiters of European destiny. Thoroughly tutored in the subtleties of French political theory and practice of his time, of which he made such good use, unscrupulous in his methods, reminding one of the versatile intriguers of the Renaissance, he was

to be continuously engaged in aggrandising his country. During the century which had elapsed since that date, the people of Prussia had responded to the pressure placed upon them. The paternalism of Frederick II, the numerous wars he waged to increase the power and prestige of Prussia had, in his day, failed to arouse a sense of national consciousness among his people. This was in part due to the fact that the King despised his own language and the customs of the Germans as semi-barbarous, and together with the other ruling princes of Germany imitated the French. In part, it is to be accounted for by the fact that the middle class cosmopolitan viewpoint, which had spread from France, found in Prussia many enthusiastic and sincere supporters, to whom it seemed that at last by the enforcement of this new cosmopolitanism the Prussians, hitherto held a *Knechtsvolk,* might be admitted into the European family on terms of social and political equality.

It was not until after the disastrous defeat at the hands of the French at Jena and Auerstadt (1807) and the annihilation of Prussian forces, that a voice was raised, by one who had been a leader in the cosmopolitan movement in which Hegel in his early years also took so prominent a part, in behalf of nationalism and political liberty. It was the philosopher Fichte who first called the attention of the Germans to their national homogeneity and racial purity, and postulated the abysmal contrast between an *Urvolk* (the Germans) and a *Mischvolk* (the French) whose nationalism was the product of political theory, and not of racial homogeneity. The logical outcome of such a doctrine, which stirred to the depths the primitive racial pride of the hitherto subservient peoples of Germany, was shown in the battle of the Nations (1813), in the triumph of those fighting

for their fatherland over those contending for political hegemony.

Henceforth a vigorous racial, as distinct from political, nationalism was to grow up in Europe. The nebulous doctrines of humanity, universality, or cosmopolitanism of Kantian days were to make way for the concretion of a theory of State in which the principal practical thesis was to be based on the profound conviction of the racial supremacy of the German people.

CHAPTER III

The Awakening of Germany

THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL—HIS POLITICAL IDEAS—THEIR WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE—COMPARISON OF GERMAN, FRENCH, AND ENGLISH THEORY—THE ACCESSION OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV—ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT —THE NEW NATIONALISM

THE new German theory of State received its accepted formulation by Hegel. In his rather involved way of putting it: "The State is the self-conscious ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society." [1] Upon this thesis Hegel proceeded to establish the theory that the State is the foundation of all social life, apart from which the individual has no importance, no commensurable value. According to his view the State is organised liberty. Liberty is cognisable only when the individual will is joined with the collective will as expressed in laws and institutions: "Really every genuine law is a liberty . . . it embodies a liberty. . . . But the more we fortify liberty, as security of property, as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his talents and good qualities, the more it gets taken for granted." And again: "A constitution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development, and runs

[1] Cf. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind* (translated by W. Wallace), Section 35.

through at the same time with it the grades of formation, and the alterations required by its concept." [1]

Hegel tells us that in outlining his idea of the State he has not in mind any particular State. Nevertheless, it was impossible for him not to have reference to the Prussian State as it existed in his day, and the historical circumstances of his epoch. It was only natural that this precise and logical formulation of a theory of State, which took into consideration the peculiar genius of the German people, their political plasticity and growing national consciousness, should have been adopted by Prussia, and later on have been exaggerated and perverted into an official theory of State which the united energy of the nation was to seek to bring to a speedy realisation.

When Hegel exclaimed that absolute government is divine, self-sanctioned, and not made, or that "the monarchical constitution is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of development and realisation of reason," he was glorifying the Prussian State. Yet Hegel was not, as has often been maintained, blind to political progressiveness; we find him declaring, "The spiritual bond between sovereign and subject is public opinion. . . . It is the true legislative body, national assembly, the declaration of the universal will, which lives in the execution of all commands." [2]

While Hegel had no confidence in representative government, he despised the old bureaucracy. He railed against the lifeless routine of the Prussian political life of his day, and asserted loudly that "everything which

[1] *Op. cit.*, Section 539-540.
[2] *Op. cit.*, Section 542.

is not directly required to organise and maintain the force for giving security must be left by the central government to the freedom of the citizens."

Hegel conceived of the State as an organic totality, founded on political loyalty. He fused public and private duty, and erected the State into an immanent, all-pervading power. Of the political practice of States he has little to say. Political functions he regarded as empty formulæ, though he emphasised the social functions of the State, especially its educational system, and its cultural and social discipline.

Many of the suggestions made by Hegel (for they are no more than suggestions) are altogether removed from the realm of the practical. We have selected from the great obscure mass a few of the more salient, which may serve to clarify the basis of the theory of State which was to evolve in Germany during the ensuing decades.

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on the Hegelian concept of the State in view of the preponderating influence it was to have on political development during the coming era. For the first time since the Reformation, Germany was to contribute to social development a distinctive theory of social organisation, which was to find concrete application. When we compare the Hegelian theory with that which prevailed in France, absorbed as the French were by the struggle of the Middle Class for supremacy in the State and the extension of French hegemony abroad, or with the practice of England, engrossed as were the English with questions of trade expansion and the development of capitalism, in both of which the tendency towards a purely materialist, utilitarian, egoistical concept of the State was being fostered, we find that the ideal elements of the newly

formulated German theories, in spite of their disciplinary harshness, gave to the State something of its former spiritual significance.

Henceforth, side by side with the French theory of State, with its concept, equality, and its expression, nationalism, and the English thesis of individual economic liberty, and its expression, capitalism, we find the German theory of racial supremacy, and its subsequent expression, imperialism.

The peoples of Western Europe, under the influence of France, were henceforth to strive to attain national unity, as a forerunner of political liberty, and entrust the guidance of the body politic to the Middle Class, as most fitted to realise these ends. In Central Europe, under the leadership of Prussia, national unity was imposed by the authority of the State. The Germans were to gain national unity and political independence inspired by the ideal of racial supremacy rather than by a conscious appreciation of the benefits thereof.

II

The influence of Hegelian ideology first began to make itself felt in the realm of practical affairs after the accession of Frederick William IV. More than thirty years had elapsed since the Fichtian thesis of racial supremacy had aroused a sense of national patriotism among the German people, and united them in driving out the French. During the reaction which followed after the War of Liberation in Germany, the irritating persecutions which accompanied the reëstablishment of

absolutism had awakened a sense of disgust at the methods of government in vogue. The men who had sacrificed so much for the cause of national liberty found themselves enslaved by the reactionary rule of the petty princes, whose sole aim was to further their particularist ambitions.

In Prussia the revival of material prosperity had been rapid, and the economic expansion of many German States was greatly facilitated by the *Zollverein.* It was coming to be felt that Prussia was the natural head of the German confederacy, and that Austria with her polyglot peoples was no longer destined to be the real leader in German affairs. Nevertheless, Frederick William III adhered conscientiously to the tenets of absolutism, and lent his active support as a member of the Holy Alliance to crushing all attempts to establish more liberal institutions.

It was at this juncture that Frederick William IV ascended the throne. He began his reign by promising to introduce a number of needed political reforms, and did actually take some steps to renovate the antiquated machinery of government. But he was temperamentally unsuited to carry out consistently any single policy and had little sympathy with the rising liberal movement, which he looked upon as an importation from abroad. However, he exerted much energy in fostering the spirit of nationalism and sentiment of racial unity among the German peoples. He showed by his policy and conduct, in spite of the mystical strain in his character and his naturally vacillating temper, that he was fully conscious of the historical importance of the movement of national unity. As Hegel had expressed it: "In the existence of a Nation the substantial aim is to be a State and pre-

serve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (*a mere nation*), has, strictly speaking, no history—like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery." [1]

The view of Hegel that a monarchy must concern itself with social problems even more than with purely political questions, received the new King's full endorsement. It is not intended to convey the impression that Frederick William IV was a strong leader of German political development, but rather that in spite of his prejudiced views he felt compelled to take part in the revival of the earnest spirit of nationalism, and seek in its development to secure for Prussia the leadership of a new German confederation from which Austria was to be excluded. Nationalism in Germany thus became something altogether different from what it meant when the term was used either by the French, or in reference to France.

In France the question of race did not enter. The old struggle for racial supremacy between the Gauls and Franks had never been settled; these as well as the other heterogeneous racial elements which composed the French State had been sufficiently fused for all practical political purposes into a single French people. Nationalism in France had rapidly developed as the focus of middle class political theory, the motive-force of their control in the State, the unifying bond of public policy which had received the sanction of public opinion. Much of the enthusiasm for the establishment of States on nationalist principles so current in the days of Napoleon I, or as when Lamartine had declared: *"Ressusciter l'Italie suffirait à la gloire d'un peuple,"* seemed to be disappear-

[1] *Philosophy of Mind,* Section 549.

ing, and an egotistical interpretation was growing up, which was to influence the conduct of foreign policy. As capitalism in England had marked out a new orientation of foreign affairs, so now in France nationalism was coming to be identified with strictly utilitarian motives. Both contained elements of dynamic expansion. England, under the pressure of capitalism, was opening up distant markets, acting on the assumption that every new British colony was to be considered a market for British goods, and as such a speculative enterprise which was worth the expense incurred in securing and governing it. The French were not blind to the advantages of an aggressive colonial policy. The growing national self-consciousness among the peoples of Europe and the decreasing prestige which the French foresaw they would inevitably suffer thereby, led them to seek new fields of activity in distant lands. The dream of attaining the hegemony of Europe as the champions of the national aspirations of subject peoples had, however, by no means died out.

Both nationalism and capitalism frankly aimed at increasing political prestige and material prosperity. New outlets were needed for the growing national energy. It was becoming imperative to mark off for future exploitation such parts of the world as could provide the raw materials and cheap food supply essential to maintain a rapidly increasing industrial population. At the same time, the Middle Class, avid for gain, saw to it that its own material wellbeing should increase in a geometrically progressive proportion as between the middle class capitalist and the proletarian wage-earner.

Foreign policy, under middle class guidance, soon confused the motives of nationalism and capitalism, so that

in the course of time they became practically synonymous, and gave rise to a new single expression—imperialism.[1]

In Germany, on the other hand, nationalism was in its early phases a racial as opposed to a political theory. As has been pointed out, it was based on a belief in the racial purity and consequent superiority of the Germanic peoples. Nationalism so interpreted had in it the elements of ideal rather than material aims. It sought to bring about racial emancipation, and was as such a centripetal force. In seeking internal consolidation and internal national unity, the leaders of the new national movement in Germany had to combat the intense particularism or regional allegiance which was a remnant of the old Germanic spirit of diversity. During this stage, nationalism in Germany remained a metaphysical, as distinguished from a political motive. Yet it was not uninfluenced by economic considerations. It was felt that trade requirements demanded a more closely knit national state, and industrial expansion fostered this desire. To the Germans nationalism was an economic and social, as opposed to a political and rational concept. Nationalism thus understood may be compared to a natural force, which was destined to develop untutored, among a people who lacked political balance, and had little gift for social organisation.

It was soon evident that nationalism in Germany would lead to a policy of territorial expansion in which the vigor of the strongest and most military state, Prussia, would make use of the only methods it understood to realise its hegemony—the resort to arms.

[1] It is significant to record that imperialism in its Franco-English interpretation (*see* p. 249 note), and in its Germanic sense, the latter possibly the more politically accurate usage, should have converged, making conflict between the two groups unavoidable.

In considering the position of Germany shortly after 1840 it must be borne in mind that, in spite of the growth of national consciousness, there was still little expression of national solidarity. Germany proper was split up into thirty-three kingdoms and principalities of all sizes and all shades of government, from mediæval despotism to the most moderate constitutional régime. Among these Prussia stood forth as the strongest and most populous, but it lacked the moral prestige to rally the other states to its support, and its leaders were peculiarly unskilled in the arts of political persuasion. Public opinion, such as there existed, supported the idea of nationalism, and the concept of national unity was approved by a great majority of the German people. However, none of the German States was willing to surrender its distinctive prerogatives, and preferred the loose and dispirited hegemony of Austria to the rigorous discipline of Prussia.

In Austria nationalism was a disruptive force. The nationalist ferment among the various races was already beginning to threaten the life of the State. The tactics of playing off one nationality against the other were no longer wholly successful. The Hapsburgs, who had hitherto exerted a powerful influence in European affairs and were the leaders in the reactionary policy of the Restoration, still clung tenaciously to absolutism and were uniformly hostile to all constitutional reforms. The anomaly of having Austria, which was structurally opposed to the principle of nationality, and whose whole theory of state was to be summed up in the words *divide et impera,* retain the hegemony of the German confederation was patent to all.

But Prussia lacked the political experience to avail

itself of the opportunity offered in 1849 to acquire by peaceful means the headship in Germany. Therefore the final overthrow of Austrian supremacy and the establishment of the new German Empire were left to a decision at arms.

CHAPTER IV

1830-1848

LOUIS PHILIPPE—ECONOMIC FACTORS—ATTITUDE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS—THE RIGHT TO VOTE—THE EXTENSION OF SUFFRAGE —REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAKS OF 1848—CAUSES—ITALY —FRANCE—GERMANY—AUSTRIA—HISTORICAL MOTIVES

I

In spite of outward calm and the absence of great wars or other disturbances in Europe for nearly two decades (1830-1848), the feeling of political unrest was again spreading. France still remained the fountainhead of political liberalism, and the active restlessness of her politically alert people continued to influence the policy and political programmes of the other peoples of Europe.

During these last years of French ideological hegemony, a change had come over the Middle Class in power in France. Signs of political fatigue were beginning to become evident. The ruling class, no longer a coterie or even a small group, but now expanded into a distinct governing class which made itself felt throughout the land, lacked the stability of a fixed social order. On the one hand, the Middle Class received new recruits from among the more successful and prosperous of the working class; on the other, the successful bankers, merchants, and manufacturers endeavored to buy their way into the socially exclusive aristocracy, of which a figment still remained, and withdrew from an active

participation in affairs. A policy of political *laissez-faire* which had resulted in the loss of a consistent course of action had developed a marked subservience to material interests. Nationalism was being transformed into an interest and was no longer an inspiring incentive.

The narrow, individualist policy of retrenchment pursued by Louis Philippe's Government had led to a distrust of the growth of nationalism in Germany and Italy. This was not the result of any clear-sighted perception of the possible outcome of the establishment of two great rival States across the Rhine and the Alps. For no steps were taken to interfere with the process of national consolidation which was there proceeding, as had often been done in the past in accordance with the traditional French policy, so successfully pursued especially in Germany since the treaty of Westphalia (1648), of weakening the cohesive strength of neighboring peoples.

De Tocqueville has judiciously remarked: "Commerce renders men independent of each other, gives them a lofty notion of their personal importance, leads them to seek to conduct their own affairs, and teaches them how to conduct them well; it therefore prepares men for freedom, but preserves them from revolutions. . . . Violent political passions have but little hold on those who have devoted all their faculties to the pursuit of their wellbeing. The ardor which they display in small matters calms their zeal for momentous undertakings." [1] Though when writing these words he may have had in mind the people of the United States, they refer with great precision to the Middle Class in France and England at this time. In both instances the Middle Class had succeeded in establishing a limited democracy, gov-

[1] *Democracy in America,* Book III, Chap. XXI.

erned as a limited monarchy. Political restraint was tolerated as long as it did not exceed the minimum compatible with permanence of government and public order, as this was held the most desirable method of maintaining peaceful conditions in the State, and peaceable relations with neighbouring States. Towards the middle of the century the Middle Class had adopted this conservative viewpoint, though it had not as yet altogether lost its mental elasticity. The political privileges and immunities, based on tradition and birth, which had been enjoyed by the aristocracy under the old régime, had been transmuted into economic privileges and immunities as the basis of political rights of which the Middle Class held the monopoly.

We may here trace the rise of the new thesis that man's chief concern in life is in reality economic, and that his political activity as hitherto understood was destined to become an avocation. In accordance with this conception the Middle Class had come to believe that it had realised the ideal form of government, which technically vests sovereignty in the whole number of citizens or subjects; though the exercise of sovereign power is entrusted to a limited, politically conscious group—the electorate —which in turn delegates the actual business of state, its government and administration, to a very small number of selected or sanctioned representatives. The electorate was thus a politically privileged class, and political privilege was based on a property qualification, consonant with the interests of the Middle Class with which it had come to be identified.[1]

Outside of this relatively limited group of electors,

[1] The political prerogatives exercised at this period by the House of Lords in England, and the House of Peers in France, must be looked upon as survivals of decreasing importance, more especially as middle class views prevailed in both houses.

there remained the great mass of the unenfranchised, who contributed to the creation of the material prosperity of the State and made possible the economic expansion and material wellbeing upon which middle class ascendancy rested. It is not intended to suggest that the Middle Class had as yet become parasitical, nor that there had grown up within it that capitalistic oligarchy which was later on to seek to control public policy. But the Middle Class, still essentially individualistic, had lost whatever energetic political cohesion it had possessed. The rank and file were already beginning to lose interest in affairs of State. The majority were content to entrust to their selected and sanctioned representatives the conduct of public affairs, relying on the vigor of public opinion to act as a corrective should the need arise. In surveying the state of mind of this ruling class, it is readily discerned that it had come to neglect moral agencies in political practice. The Middle Class was henceforward to depend more and more upon the triumphs of science and inventions as applied to industrial enterprise. It was to be its principal preoccupation to have at hand an abundant supply of cheap labor, trained to serve the newly-created, highly-specialised industrial machinery, and rich sources for raw materials, rather than to concern itself with problems relating to the well-ordered functioning of the body politic.

It had come to be accepted by the majority of the Middle Class, and historical precedent was cited to confirm the current conviction, that "the happiness and welfare of mankind are evolved much more from selfish than from virtuous acts, and that the prosperity of nations and the progress of civilisation are mainly due to the exertions of men who, while pursuing strictly their

own interests, were unconsciously promoting the interest of the community." [1]

II

It was during this epoch, when the character of commerce and industry was being transformed, when skilled workmanship as a conscious and absorbing interest of the worker was giving way to purely mechanical labor, and the working classes, no longer absorbed in their tasks, were pursuing their occupations more by reflex than by the continuous use of their faculties, that political self-consciousness along new and independent lines began to manifest itself among them. The example set by the middle class electorate, whose will was expressed by a numerical majority, had led to the question whether the will of the majority in the State, as Rousseau had outlined it, might not better be arrived at by an expression of the political convictions of the actual numerical majority of all the citizens. Would not the removal of all political disabilities which still subsisted and kept a greater section of the adult male population in subjection to the enfranchised classes, be of immense advantage to the working classes?

The demand for the extension of the suffrage was thus an attempt on the part of the masses to secure a share in government which, under the constitutional system, had developed altogether to the advantage of the Middle Class. The politico-juridic concept of the State had evolved out of the theory of the legality of constituted authority, which had set up a contractual relation between the governed and the governing. It had

[1] Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals,* Vol. I, p. 38.

created an opposition between these two elements in the State in which self-identity was not at first realised by the Middle Class.

By a process of dilution of authority, inevitable under a representative system which was essentially democratic, the electorate had come to feel itself the most powerful factor in the State, and looked upon constituted authority as the servant of the individual will. The functions of government had come to be performed by delegation, and all authority not specifically delegated was held to remain vested in the politically conscious class—the electorate. But this electorate was an élite whose numbers were relatively limited. The suffrage so understood was an expression of sovereignty. Theoretically, such sovereignty must correspond to the political status of the person exercising it. The extension of the suffrage was thus the demand for partnership in sovereignty in the State by those who believed they were entitled to participate on a basis of equality with the existing electorate. Both in England and France the question of the extension of the suffrage had been, and was to continue to be, agitated. By a minimum of concession, judiciously granted, in many instances to further the political designs of the party in power, electoral reforms that were carried through in England satisfied the more insistent demands; so that throughout the 19th century fresh strength was, in varying doses, infused into the electoral body. It was less difficult to carry through such a programme in England, where the aristocracy had retained a certain politico-social significance, and class distinctions remained more fixed.

In France the problem of electoral reform was more complex. No fixed social status had survived the Revolution. It was more difficult than in England to de-

fine with any degree of precision upon whom the right to vote should be conferred. The political value of the individual and what should constitute the basis of the right of suffrage had become a pressing political issue. The idea that all citizens possessed the inborn right to participate on equal terms in electoral privileges was repudiated even by the more liberal-minded, who sought to establish certain distinctive tests, useful in ascertaining the political maturity of the individual voter. English theorists suggested wealth, intelligence, social position. Later, education was seized upon as the best possible test of fitness. For a prolonged period, it had been accepted by the Middle Class that authority in the State should represent the interests of those concerned. The dread of the control of the body politic by mere numbers, and of the domination of the State by the illiterate, became widespread at this time. It was believed by some that such an eventuality could best be obviated by the extension of educational facilities, which would result in a broader participation of a greater number of educated persons in affairs of State. Such were the developments which were to mark the progressive stages of the extension of the suffrage, and served to prolong the retention of interest in the representative system.

For the time being, the individualist bias of the social structure, which had arisen with middle class control in the State, was too strong to permit any further partition of political privilege, which in France and England was looked upon as the distinctive prerogative of the Middle Class.

The importance of the individual elector had been magnified to such an extent that he came to consider himself a free agent whose influence could make itself felt in the State. There was an absence of political discipline,

a lack of balance in estimating the value of the right of suffrage viewed from the standpoint of the individual, which not only made of it an important social function, but vested in it the final expression of political liberty.

The right of suffrage was exclusive because it was valued, and valued because it was exclusive.[1] To the Middle Class in power it was a patent of superiority. To it the sovereignty of the people was no longer a generic expression, understood in a collective sense, but was interpreted as the sum of the individual enfranchised wills. It was apparently unmindful of the fact that in practice actual sovereignty was entrusted to the control of the will of the majority as delegated to the duly elected or sanctioned representatives. As such it was distinctly contradictory to the doctrine of Rousseau upon which it was based, that sovereignty is vested in the general will, cannot be delegated, and is inalienable.[2] Sovereignty, according to his theory, is the expression of the will of the actual majority, which is embodied in laws. Laws are not fixed, but subject to change as the will of the majority changes, and thus the majority has the right to resist constituted authority, if need be to change the constitution and make a new social contract which will be binding, but only as long as upheld by the majority. Rousseau had in mind the absolute numerical

[1] No better proof of the declining importance of the suffrage as a measure of political motive need be adduced than its vulgarisation during the succeeding half century until at the close of the second decade of the 20th century it had come to include not merely all males but females as well. In its early stages suffrage was a privilege with obligations; its spread led to perversion of its privilege and the abandonment of its obligations.

[2] "Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will cannot be represented; it is the same or it is different; there is no mean." —*Contrat Social,* Book III, Chap. XV.

majority in a State in which none suffered political disabilities.

But the Middle Class which had gained political power after so prolonged a struggle was unwilling to share its control of the State, which it conscientiously believed worked for the greater benefit of mankind. The idea that all adults should be entitled to equal suffrage, regardless of differences of wealth, sex, social position, or education, was held inconsistent with the scientific basis upon which representative government had developed as an image of the best, not of the lower average man.

Such was the position taken by those in power in 1848 in face of the growing political ferment which permeated the working classes. In France the demand for an equal share in sovereign power in the State, the right to vote, was to cause a violent revolutionary outbreak. In other continental States where absolutist rule still survived, the working masses joined with the Middle Class in demanding political liberty, or, as in the case of Italy and Hungary, national independence.

III

A survey of the fundamental factors which led to the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 reveals three causes of this spontaneous movement, which embraced all the States of continental Europe, and left such a deep impression on subsequent political development. Two of these factors were closely related and indicative of the strength and vigor of middle class liberalism which had been spread abroad by the enthusiastic exponents of constitutional liberty and nationalism; the third was in

the nature of a premature expression of proletarian consciousness.

It was in Italy that the first attack on surviving absolutism was made. Milan and Sicily rose in revolt. The movement spread throughout the peninsula. Not only were constitutions granted by Charles Albert in Piedmont and Francis II at Naples, but Charles Albert also placed himself at the head of a coalition of forces, contributed by all the sovereign princes of Italy including the Pope, for the purpose of driving out the Austrians. No sooner had the plan been decided upon, than the lack of political perception and broader insight into the possibility of the success of the movement caused a reaction. The Pope withdrew his approval, and the Neapolitan forces retired. Then followed the establishment of the short-lived Venetian and Roman republics and the flight of the Pope from Rome. The Piedmontese were beaten and dispersed by the Austrians at Novara (March 1849). Austrian authority was reestablished in northern Italy, and ruthless repressive measures were instituted. At the end of two years, nothing remained of the great enterprise in constitutional nation building except the constitution granted in Piedmont, to which the King faithfully adhered.

Meanwhile similar events were taking place elsewhere. In February 1848, Louis Philippe was dethroned as a result of his insistent refusal to grant an extension of the franchise, and the Republic of 1848 was established after a proletarian outbreak had been violently repressed. The government set up was based on a representative system which provided for and elected a President.

In Prussia the popular movement demanding a constitution arose with unexpected suddenness. Frederick

William IV professed that he was ready to give up his royal titles and prerogatives for the sake of the welfare of his people, should they demand it. He sought to impress upon the German princes the necessity of abandoning their particularist pretensions, in order to assist in the formation of a united German State under the leadership of Prussia, offering himself as candidate for the imperial dignity. In the meantime, he undertook various liberal reforms and summoned a representative assembly to discuss and draw up a constitution. But the Diet at Frankfort of 1849, owing principally to the intrigues of Austrian diplomacy, failed to approve of Frederick William's plan for German unity under Prussian control. As in the case of Italy, nothing came of the movement at the time. The Prussian King did not even keep his word in regard to the promised constitutional reforms, and all of his pledges remained unfulfilled.

In Austria a similar wave of political unrest threatened the unity of the Hapsburg lands. The army, however, remained loyal. As a result the constitutional liberties, granted under duress, were never carried into effect after the nationalist risings in Hungary and Italy had been quelled.

In an effort to arrive at a true appreciation of the real significance of the historical events of an epoch, too much importance is apt to be ascribed to episodic disturbances, revolutions, wars, on the ground that during such upheavals, changes are brought about which render it easier to trace direct translation of theory into practice, of motive into action. Yet it would be difficult to discover any very real support for the widespread belief that during periods of disorder or of armed conflict the correlation of motive and action is simplified. History

must concern itself with something more than a mere account of events, of action, which of itself is sterile unless we are able to arrive at some understanding of the underlying motives. Motive is the psychical, action may be termed the physical aspect of reality. The subservience of both to an identic unity is difficult of proof. Yet it is this unity, which when it finds expression, impels to growth, decay, or change. In other words, the action or event is the execution of the motive which has reached maturity. It is conceivable that it might be possible to trace a cyclic series of motives which, schematically presented, would show clearly when motive develops into action. Or better yet, as a clock measures time by subdividing time into hours, minutes, and seconds and has rendered it possible for men to coördinate activity, to introduce order and discipline into social life, so it was coming to be believed that the will, the conductor of action, can in a sense be measured in terms of motive, and understood as action. In this way it may be seen that in social intercourse the will appears as the inexhaustible medium of energy, of dynamic life, the agency of behavior from which history derives its commensurable unity. It is on this foundation that the unity and continuity of historical processes have been built. History endeavors to trace the systematic development of this evolution: the freeing of the will from the trammels of the supernatural, the superstitious and finally the dogmatic domination of the teachings of classical antiquity—in brief, the concept of free will which finds its truest expression in the term, political liberty. The fact that such liberty is something that can be acquired, that it is an attribute of the will rather than of reason, has hitherto been only imperfectly understood as the fundamental motive of political development. The

idea that the will in point of fact governs the actions of man rather than his reason was destined to become the most powerful incentive of social growth, which was to bring about the overthrow of the accepted concept that the social order is rationally sanctioned by its legality.[1] Political society under middle class rule had established the axiomatic character of the rational social order; now the element of volition as the decisive expression of social consciousness was to be introduced. The realisation of the fact that the individual as such can make himself free in spite of his previous condition of servitude, that liberty as the motive becomes the measure of the impulse, the will to action, and finds fullest expression in political liberty had, as is shown by the events of 1848, become a permanent acquisition of the peoples of Europe. Political consciousness thus understood was henceforth held the expression of a desire for liberty, the benefits of which were, at the period under review, only obscurely realised by the majority.

The causes of the scant success which attended the revolutionary movements of 1848 can thus be accounted for. The most significant outward cause of failure was the absence of unity of action, organisation, and steadiness of purpose. In other words, the motive of the movement was in a great measure only vaguely realised. To the majority it was still a subjective desire for freedom, the desire of individuals who were excluded from sharing in something that other individuals already possessed. Given the organisation and preparation—when political

[1] It is not to be understood that the opponents of the middle class thesis of State were able to perceive at the time the divergence between the rational and the volitional interpretation of historical development. Nevertheless we can now trace the first tentative application of this idea in Communism, which can be adequately comprehended only when viewed as the dawn of the volitional, rather than the twilight of rational politico-social philosophy.

and national freedom had become a clear objective aim and was no longer merely a subjective impulse; in other words, when unity of motive and action was realised—it was destined to succeed and go beyond its original boundaries. This unity was achieved within less than three decades, for the reason that there was nothing radically new, nothing fundamentally different in the demands made for constitutional liberty and national independence which had already acquired the fixity and sanction of established practice. It was not a new theory of human freedom, not a new social order that was being demanded, but a mere extension of political practice. Such was the nature and general scope of the closely correlated movements for the spread of the accepted doctrines of political liberty, national and constitutional, in 1848.

There was a third and new element infused into the conflict by a small group, which categorically denied the alleged benefits to be derived from constitutional government or the politico-juridic concept of the State. The purely individualist bias of middle class political theory was denounced by the leaders of the new movement as anti-social. They denied that the principles of equality and legality are to be held the basis of true liberty, or that the State under the rule of the Middle Class, even if the liberal principles of representative governments were extended to their utmost limits, could satisfy the needs of the working classes; for it was not equality, political or social, which they sought. They frankly demanded the establishment of a new social order under the dictatorship of the workers, hereafter calling themselves the Proletariat.

CHAPTER V

Communism

THE MANIFESTO OF 1848—THE MARXIAN THEORY—HISTORICAL MATERIALISM—THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL—ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY—OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRATIC DOCTRINES—REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS

I

It was in February 1848 that the Manifesto of the Communist Party was issued in London on the eve of the revolutionary outbreaks which occurred at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Palermo. For the first time the Proletariat as an organised group was to take an active part in public affairs. The more sanguine hoped that in Paris, at least, by overthrowing the existing government it might be possible to establish a social organisation based on communist principles.

The "Manifesto," which contains the fundamental thesis of Communism, was drawn up by a committee of radical agitators under the guidance of Karl Marx and Engels. In view of subsequent developments and the historical importance of the new movement, it will be necessary to inquire into the background and evolution of Communism. Viewed from an historical standpoint, Communism presented a programme of politico-social reorganisation as distinctly original, and, in this sense, no more radical than those of 1689 and 1789, which prepared the way for the triumph of the politico-juridic

theory of State, and the control of the body politic by the Middle Class.

Since the days of Plato's republic, through the centuries at repeated intervals, plans for an ideal social order have been drawn up. In more recent times, Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* and Tommaso Campanella's *Civitas Solis* had a considerable influence on the writings of the political philosophers of the 18th century. However, it was not until after the French Revolution, during the early years of the 19th century, that any real attempt was made to put into practice the so-called communist theories, such as the schemes of St. Simon and the *phalanges* of Fourier in France, of Owen in England, and others. While Marx did not deny their value he repudiated all such plans as one-sided, fantastic caricatures of the social order of the future, which have no counterpart in reality except in so far as they presage a social organisation in which class antagonism, class struggle will have been eliminated.

The basis of Communism, according to the Marxian theory, is to be found in this class struggle. "The history of every society down to our own times has been the history of class struggles," are the opening words of the body of the "Manifesto." The leaders of Communism sought to overturn the social order and to establish new social arrangements as part of their plan to eliminate the unfair exploitation of, and miserable economic conditions prevalent among, the working classes which the Middle Class, since it had assumed the dominating rôle in the State, had merely sought to ameliorate by offering the panacea of constitutional liberties. The Communists maintained that all plans of social reform were to no purpose, as in the fulness of time the ascend-

ancy and dictatorship of the Proletariat was its natural destiny, an inevitable historical necessity.

This element of historical determinism is the ideological foundation upon which Communism, according to the Marxian thesis, is built. As such Communism is not classed as an ideal or even a desired goal; it is not an aspiration of a group of political innovators, but is held to be the inevitable outcome of the process of historical evolution, of the class conflict which has narrowed itself down to a struggle on the part of the Middle Class to retain its control of the body politic, and of the Proletariat to overthrow this ascendancy and establish a new social order.

It is directly from Hegel that Marx borrowed his theory of growth by antagonism; of struggle as the principal factor of development. He transformed the Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the abstraction of growth by antithesis, into a positive historical factor as explaining the processes of proletarian political action.

Marx tells us [1] that it was while preparing a critical review of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* that he came upon the idea which was to serve as the ground of all of his future speculations. As he expressed it:

"In the production of means of existence, men enter upon definite relations, which are inevitable and independent of their will; relations of production, which are correlative with the stage of the development of productive forces. The complex of these relations of production is the economic basis of society—that is to say, it is the real foundation upon which is raised the superstructure of political and juridical society, and to which

[1] Cf. *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie,* Preface, pp. iv-vi.

the determined forms of the social order correspond. The methods of production of the necessities of material life determine in general the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. It is not man's consciousness which determines his existence, but on the contrary his social life which determines his consciousness. . . . A social system does not destroy itself before it has developed all the productive force which it could contain, and other methods of production do not take its place before they have been incubated in the old social order. Furthermore mankind always puts questions which it can answer satisfactorily, for in examining the problem closely it will be seen that the question is raised only after the material conditions which permit of its solution are at hand. . . . The relations of production of the Middle Class are the last antagonistic form of social production . . . but in the productive forces which are developing in the bosom of the middle class social order are to be found the material conditions necessary to resolve this antagonism."

And Marx hopefully adds: "With this social organisation the prehistoric period of humanity comes to an end."

According to this doctrine it is the inevitable, ultimate destiny of the Proletariat to succeed the Middle Class in control of society; a historical necessity, the filiation of which can be traced as distinctly as that of the rise of the Middle Class upon the overthrow of the aristocracy. Just as during the close of the mediæval period certain enlightened men foresaw the transformation of the social order, the rise of modern States, and modern political organisation under the control of the Middle Class which was to rest on nationalism and capitalism, an outcome of the increased importance of the individual, so now according to this doctrine the middle class régime is drawing to a close, and far-sighted persons can already perceive the signs of the dawn of the

new social arrangements, and the domination of the social order by the Proletariat. The moderate, liberal, philanthropic, individualistic, middle class ideology is to make way for a harsher, more dogmatic, disciplined, arbitrary, coöperative social theory, which in the realm of practical affairs will be more akin to the domination of the aristocracy during the feudal period.

The social revolution advocated by Marx and his communist followers was, they believed, inevitable. Those who read aright the lessons of history, they averred, can trace all historical development to its underlying "economic substructure."

Such is the groundwork of historical materialism, called by its supporters the "ultimate and final philosophy of history" which purports to be a scientific, as distinguished from an ideological, analysis of historical evolution.[1] According to this theory it is not by their own free choice, but because they cannot do otherwise, that men first satisfy their most elementary wants, which in turn give rise to other more complex wants. In order to satisfy these new demands men invent new implements and organise new methods of production, which precede and influence all subsequent growth and historical development. The materialist interpretation of history is an attempt to reconstruct the genesis and subsequent development of social life, based upon the economic bias of all historical progress. History is merely the narrative of the struggle between those who possess the means of production and those who do not; a class conflict in which those who are excluded from sharing in the benefits of the means of production seek to wrest them from those who possess them. Thus history shows three great economic epochs: slavery, serfdom, and cap-

[1] Cf. Antonio Labriola, *Del Materialismo Storico.*

italist organisation. The fourth, according to the Marxian thesis, will be coöperative exploitation when class antagonism will have been overcome. From the Marxian viewpoint the Reformation is to be looked upon as a rebellion of the German people against their economic exploitation by the Papacy. Economic causes underlie all historical evolution, which by the modern methods of historical criticism have been brought to light, though the sequence of events is in many instances obscure. In brief, there is no episode in history which does not by its origin refer to underlying economic factors. "At the dawn of traditional history economics is already operative."

History according to this view is the work of man. It "is the work of man in so far as man can create and improve his instruments of labor and with these instruments can create an artificial environment, whose complicated effects react upon him and which by its present state and successive modifications is the occasion and condition of his development." [1] Historical factors cannot be held the result of man's critical or rational faculties, but are determined solely by his external needs and opportunities, which serve to develop his faculties. Thus the course of human events is a sum, a succession, a series of conditions which men have accumulated in the course of their changing social life, and as such does not represent either a fixed course of action and activity, or a deviation from an altogether perfect and felicitous plan. Progress is purely empirical. Historical materialism rejects the thesis that political action, scientific evolution, juridic development are civilising factors which assist in the interpretation of history. Its supporters hold that historical development is to be traced to economic causes, and can only be fully interpreted in the

[1] Cf. Antonio Labriola, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV.

light of their true relations, and that these are predetermined.

This new economic interpretation of history was "born on the battle-field of Communism." It presupposed the appearance of a Proletariat on the scene of political action, it took for granted the existence of the Middle Class and the social order as it actually existed in Europe and America. It claimed to be a scientific revolutionary doctrine in that it alleged to have discovered the fundamental causes, traced the course of action, and forecast the development of the revolution of the Proletariat. It attempted to lay bare the causes of all other social revolutions which have taken place in the past and the conditions under which they occurred, and to show at what point class antagonism results in the overthrow of the old order and its substitution by the new.

II

Historical materialism, the economic interpretation of history which Marx and his followers claimed to be the only rational means of preparing for the advent of Communism, was the object of much obloquy, even among the Socialists. Scientific Socialism, or Critical Communism as Marx called his doctrine in the Manifesto of 1848, took pains to distinguish itself from other Socialist groups. The latter were characterised as middle class Socialists, social reformers, and social idealists, who sought to sow dissension among the working class by attempting to patch up the old social order by means of political and economic reforms, instead of assisting in breaking it down. Strong in their conviction of the scientific basis of their thesis, the Communists

boldly announced the final triumph of the working class over the Middle Class, and the dictatorship of the Proletariat as an historically necessary event. The Proletariat, they claimed, formed a distinct and separate social group, which it would be historically impossible to integrate with the Middle Class of which it was an outgrowth, as the Middle Class itself and the politico-juridic organisation of the State and representative government had grown out of the aristocratic feudal system. The Proletariat, therefore, was not destined to be absorbed, in spite of all the philanthropic programmes of social betterment which might in the future be undertaken by the Middle Class. The sufferings, the hardships, the neglect, the injustice which the Proletariat suffered and was destined to suffer, were to be welcomed as serving to consolidate and strengthen its sense of class consciousness, and endow it with class solidarity, so that when the time came it would be ready to overthrow the existing social order, and revolutionise the capitalistic system by abolishing middle class political and social organisation of classes and of States.

The Communists rejected the doctrine of equality, the juridic basis of social order, the government of States as instituted by the Middle Class. Justice and equality among individuals, they declared, are illusions which no sophistical, juridic theory can render valid. The diffusion and widespread acceptance of this "liberal" ideology had made possible the rise to power of the Middle Class, and entrenched individualism behind the ramparts of so-called political liberty. The politico-juridic concept of the State, with its individualistic terminology and conceits, its psychological categories and its liberal professions, had enervated mankind by placing too heavy a burden on the individual. The individual has no true

initiative; he is the servant of his economic status, or, as has already been noted, "Ideas are the reflexes of economic relations; methods of production first present themselves to the mind as representations; ideas and ideals are nothing more than translations of these economic factors." The individual is of secondary importance, and all individualism must be suppressed to allow for the fullest and most rapid development of class consciousness among the Proletariat. This is essential in order to prepare for the final struggle with the Middle Class, which will inevitably result in the triumph of the Proletariat, owing to its corporate sense and absence of individualist bias.

Class antagonism, the Communists declared, must remain until the Proletariat has overthrown the capitalist system and gained control of political power in the State, which will then lead to the establishment of a new cooperative social order wherein true equality will be realised. But as long as the Middle Class survives as the sole political power in the State; as long as government remains "an executive committee of the Middle Class," so long the Proletariat is destined to struggle to bring about the destruction of the existing social system. The growth of the wealth of the Middle Class need not deter the Proletariat, as it is inevitably bound up with the strengthening of proletarian consciousness. The increase of the means of production, the increase of the number of producers, the growth of capital and its concentration in the hands of the capitalist class are accompanied by the growth of the Proletariat in vigor, numbers, and class consciousness.

Throughout the Manifesto, and in fact throughout the writings of Marx and his followers, the ruthless realism of their doctrine is everywhere in evidence. There is

nothing utopian, nothing vague or extravagant in their programme, when viewed in its proper perspective and interpreted in the light of its context. It is not maintained that Communism is a natural or desirable doctrine. It is not claimed that it is suited to all men or to all social conditions at all times, or that if detached from its historical setting it would not be looked upon as a wholly unnatural thesis of social organisation. It is merely a symptom of the dissolution of capitalist society; a dissolving force, a destructive weapon to accomplish a work of demolition and make way for a constructive social organisation. It is to be looked upon as a poison, violent and devastating, which is to destroy the middle class individualist exploitation of mankind and to break down the tissue of the "vicious circle of production," the competitive system.

The Communists had no sympathy with the various forms of State Socialism, such as were advocated by Lasalle or Louis Blanc. State Socialism, while it contained revolutionary elements, harked back to legality and equality, the right to work, the right to a living wage, which, in the opinion of the Marxians, is an altogether middle class manner of envisaging the problem of labor in a capitalistic and not a proletarian sense. The failure of the June revolt of 1848 at Paris had made plain the futility of such halfway measures as the so-called national workshops and other similar attempts to graft proletarian theories on middle class practice.

Nor can any attempts which may be made by the Middle Class, primarily in its own interest, to increase the efficiency of labor, by remedying the abuses of the industrial system, by social legislation, by improving wages and diminishing hours of work, do more than retard the final triumph of the Proletariat and the socialisation of

the means of production. As a part of the natural process of decay of the Middle Class such social legislation is to be expected. It will aim, in the first instance, at securing the nationalisation of the land and the placing of the State in control of raw materials and the necessities of life. These are proposals which, according to the Marxian thesis, it may be expected will be offered by social reformers and middle class Socialists to preserve the ascendancy of the Middle Class by modernising the politico-juridic theory of State and establishing a new form to be called social democracy.

But Communism will have nothing to do with democracy, which it holds essentially the product of middle class individualism. It is of some significance and a proof of its essentially destructive nature, that Communism outlined no programme to provide for the reconstruction of the social order, and concerned itself essentially with the overthrow of the existing régime. Marx formulated no system of social reorganisation, leaving it open for the future to evolve naturally its own social structure.[1]

The Manifesto does, however, specifically outline a mode of procedure to be followed in destroying the existing middle class hierarchy. It may be summed up in the single proposition: The abolition of private property. This is not so revolutionary a proposal as it may at first sight seem. Property has throughout history undergone successive transformations. The French Revolution abolished all feudal property and made room for the rise of middle class property. The Communists

[1] Marx in a letter to the English Socialist Beesby—whom up to that time (1869) he had considered the only true English revolutionary Socialist or Communist—after having read an article published by the latter on the future of the working class, stated that he now realised that he (Beesby) was at heart a reactionary, for "whoever lays down a programme for the future is a reactionary."

urged the abolition of middle class property, as the living embodiment of the exploitation of the Proletariat, and looked upon the transfer to the Proletariat of the means of production merely as a preparatory stage. When class distinctions have been abolished, a coöperative method of production is to take the place of middle class individual ownership. "Communism deprives no one of the power to appropriate for himself his share of production; it merely deprives men of the power to gain control over the work of another."

The abolition of private privilege is by the Communists to be extended to include the entire fabric of middle class society. Thus established religion, education, the family, the State, which are conceived of as expressions of individualism, of individual initiative in a middle class sense, are to be done away with. To achieve this purpose they discarded all accepted ethical and moral considerations. "Abolish the exploitation of man by man, and you will do away with the exploitation of one State by another." When class antagonism shall have disappeared in a State, hostility between nations will disappear.

Though the Manifesto admits that workingmen have no country: "The struggle of the Proletariat with the Middle Class, although not intrinsically a national struggle, nevertheless has assumed the form thereof. The Proletariat of each country must first of all overthrow its own Middle Class," yet Communism concentrated its entire energy in bringing about the overthrow of the Middle Class in each separate State, and did not have in mind the destruction of national States, but merely the placing of the Proletariat in control in the State, which would thus transform its character and social ordering without destroying its ethnic or national characteristics.

III

Such is a brief outline of the main principles upon which Communism rested. It contained no constructive programme of policy. It was a symptom of the decay of the Middle Class, a factor of demolition of political society built up on nationalist principles and based on juridic relations. Conscious that the Middle Class had first to fulfil its historical rôle, Marx had no oversanguine hopes of the immediate success of Communism. He merely asserted that the phase of the control of the social order by the Middle Class would pass in due time and that that of the Proletariat would take its place. It was the duty of the Proletariat, as part of its historical mission, to hasten the overthrow of the Middle Class which should be no longer delayed.

Thus in 1848 we find the Communists in France helping the social democrats and more radical liberals in their struggle against the conservative middle class government of Louis Philippe. Yet when he was dethroned, the Middle Class firmly held the reins of power, established a republic, and repressed the Communist attempt to carry out its programme. In England the Communists had lent support to the Chartist movement; in America to various programmes of agrarian reform. In Switzerland they helped the radicals, who, though a middle class party, were struggling for a broadening of popular control. In Poland, in Hungary, in Italy the Communists pledged their support to the nationalist movements. In Germany and Austria they took an active part in promoting middle class aims in the struggle against absolutism. But in all these various revolutionary movements the Communists never "neglected an opportunity to awaken

in the minds of the working class the consciousness of the inherent antagonism between the Middle Class and the Proletariat, so that when the time should come the Proletariat would be ready to take up the struggle in its own behalf."

Viewed historically, Communism, as outlined in 1848, was a reaction against the loosely framed, vague, altruistic formulæ of 1789, which had professed to insure political liberty to mankind, but which had in reality brought about the economic enslavement of the majority of the peoples of the Western World, and the rise of a new class of unenfranchised workers to whom the benefits of political liberty, as well as of social equality, had been denied. It was the aim of Communism in the first instance to arouse a sense of class solidarity and political consciousness among this unwieldy, uneducated, unorganised social group; to introduce a semblance of discipline and order, to coördinate projects of social reform, and above all to oppose the strong current of uncontrolled romanticism which had arisen among visionary and impractical social workers and was manifesting itself in such movements as Fourierism, Owenism, Brook Farm, and Harmony Hall.

Looked at from a broad, unprejudiced viewpoint, Communism appears as an attempt to transfer to the arena of class conflict the doctrine of might versus right, of competitive struggle for power, which had been so successful in fostering the growth of national States. Marx recognised what he conceived to be the practical validity of the Hegelian concept of the State. He wished to transform it in accordance with the scientific, historical spirit which had led him to formulate the materialist interpretation of history. Hegel, he remarked, had stood history on its head; it was necessary to stand it on its

feet again. That is to say, that to Hegel the idea was reality. Marx declared that reality was transformed by man into ideas; in other words historical materialism, the economic moment showed the way to be followed in investigating the processes of social development.

As the control of power in the State, the moulding force in society, had through succeeding ages become subdivided and diluted until it had been inherited by the Middle Class, who kept up the old forms under the new mechanism of democratic government and public opinion, so by a natural sequence of argument, the logical conclusion was reached that the numerically preponderant Proletariat was destined some day to become the dominant group in the State. Marx, in spite of his originality, never emancipated himself from the strong national bias in his character. All the programmes he subsequently set forth in the international movement betray this innate conviction of German racial supremacy.[1] He never went beyond a purely national point of view. The cry of the Manifesto, "Proletariat of all countries, unite!" was made with a mental reservation. In this sense Marx remained altogether under the influence of the spirit of his times. The era that was opening was to pay little attention to Communist doctrines, but much to those of nationalism and of national unity.

[1] It has been suggested that Marx, owing to his Jewish origin and more especially his cosmopolitan training, was in point of fact indifferent to questions of nationality, and that he conceived of the State as "built on the ruins of a hundred living polities." But that he did not have an abstract, toned-down sense of nationality is proved by the active support which he gave in later years to the aggressive policy of Prussia, in the war with France; his high admiration for Moltke and Bismarck, and the enthusiasm with which he celebrated the victories of Germany over France, to the great surprise of his disciples and followers abroad.

CHAPTER VI

The Nation-State

THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1852—THE SECOND EMPIRE—THE CENTRALISATION OF AUTHORITY—COLONIAL EXPANSION—THE BRITISH EMPIRE—INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITIONS—PROSPERITY AND POLITICS

I

THE revolution that had swept Louis Philippe from his throne had gone beyond the limits agreeable to the Middle Class. The four June days of the socialist rising at Paris had caused an immediate reaction. In the Constituent Assembly, which at once assembled (June 13, 1848) to draw up a constitution, an unexpected figure appeared. Louis Napoleon, who had escaped from his French gaolers two years before and had fled to England, hastened to France on the outbreak of the revolution in February and professed himself in full sympathy with the Provisional Republican Government. He was, however, requested to leave France, which he agreed to do. But on being elected a member of the Constituent Assembly, he took his seat. His presence aroused a storm of protest among a large section, who foresaw the possibility of his intriguing to gain control of the reins of government. In the face of the opposition so openly manifested, Louis Napoleon resigned his seat and quitted the country.

The prospect of the return of a member of the Bona-

parte family to executive authority in France haunted the framers of the new constitution. The Napoleonic legend had grown to great dimensions. The prestige and glamour of the dead Emperor, whose burial-place had become a shrine of pilgrimage, had inflamed popular opinion. The majority had grown very weary of the petty, inconsequential policy of Louis Philippe's government, which the new Provisional Government had adhered to. Louis Napoleon thereupon once again returned to France in September 1848 to take his seat again in the Assembly. He had been elected by five separate constituencies.

Meanwhile, the work of constitution-making proceeded. The alarm of the Middle Class at the reappearance of a Napoleon is reflected in the form of government which was provided for. The power of the President was limited by a series of checks, which left the final authority in the hands of the National Assembly.

Three months later Louis Napoleon was elected President of the Republic. His Presidency, his *coup d'état* and dictatorship of 1850-1851, the popular approval expressed by ballot of his assumption of imperial dignity, and the new constitution of 1852 whereby Napoleon III was proclaimed "by the grace of God and the national will Emperor of the French," are to be explained in the light of a new orientation in political practice.

It is necessary to go beneath the surface of the semblance of absolutism which Louis Napoleon revived. Napoleon III owed his title to the nation. He had been elected President and sanctioned as Emperor by popular vote. The new constitution of 1852 recognised the principle of universal manhood suffrage. In reality it provided for only two powers in the State: the will of the majority and that of the Emperor. The will of the people was held to be the source of all power in the State. The

constitution was to be submitted to them for approval. It provided that imperial authority derived its strength from their sanction. But the conduct of public affairs, the initiative in legislation, the control of foreign policy, of the army and civil service, were left unreservedly in the hands of the Emperor. Ministers could be dismissed at pleasure and served only to defend the policy of the Emperor before the Chamber, which could reject, but not improve, harmful legislation.

It would seem as though the French people, tired of the endless debates and the hedging policy of a representative assembly, when it could at last express its opinion by ballot, preferred to vest unlimited executive authority in a single man, confident that the ultimate court of appeal was the nation. Representative government in France had for the time being been eclipsed. Political privilege as expressed by universal suffrage, which had been extended to the adult, male population, had sought to give to the nation a unity and coherence which it had not hitherto attained. The Middle Class, at first so alarmed at the rise of another Napoleon, was not slow to perceive that in reality the new Empire did not injure its broader interests. There now seemed no obstacle in the way of the indefinite expansion of the power and wealth of a State which would adhere to a capitalist-nationalist programme. Class struggle with the rising Proletariat, which had begun to define itself, seemed eliminated. The nation appeared to present a united front. The magic of numbers, the vote of the millions of citizens which had legally sanctioned the change in government, seemed to have given rise to a new sense of national power and national solidarity. The nation had for the first time expressed itself.

It was this new form of nationalism that was to become

the controlling factor during the rule of Napoleon III. He was to take up the old programme of Napoleon I and make it the key of his political practice. To do this it was necessary to unite all authority in a single hand. The nation was ready and willing to grant this authority. The past decade had been one of vacillation and distrust. Political theorists and idealists, men of moderate, liberal views, who wished to avoid entangling obligations, who favored *laissez-faire* in politics as they did in business, had continued in control of the government. They had grown hostile to the development of nationalism abroad, which, they seemed intuitively to grasp, would not ultimately be of benefit to France. The Republic of 1848 under the guidance of the poet Lamartine had made ample professions of faith in favor of the nationalist movement. But in point of fact the Provisional Government had refused any real assistance to the Italians, the Poles, and the Irish.

Louis Napoleon, upon his election to the Presidency, put an end to this vacillating policy. He felt himself the acknowledged champion of nationalism. He was ready to rehabilitate France in the eyes of Europe and the world. To do this he was to undertake to realise the dictum of the great Napoleon who had proclaimed: "The Government that will be the first to raise the standard of nationalism and proclaim itself the defender thereof will dominate Europe."

II

The Europe of 1850 was no longer that of 1830. A spirit of ruthless competition was beginning to control the relations between States. National patriotism and national loyalty were being made to serve the ends of economic and political expansion. National spirit was taking

shape and fixing itself as the formative force of great, strongly consolidated States. The national will henceforth was to become identified with the concept of the State. To develop national strength, to become a Great Power, and if possible a World Power, was the main ambition of the concentrated energy of the State.

To carry out the new political programmes, centralisation of authority was essential. It was felt necessary to define and render precise the character of the State, to fuse all regional characteristics in one national figure. John Bull as England, or France represented as Marianne, were more than mere symbols for the use of political cartoonists. By them the State was personalised. The Nation-State thus conceived had come to represent and visualise the fusion of national energy and national capacity, and compel attention by its overtowering strength. To increase this strength by expanding its boundaries hand in hand with its commerce and industries was deemed the surest and simplest method to heighten national prestige and add new power to the State. Government was looked upon as a mechanism which was to function for the purpose of giving life and vigor to the State, to excel in competition with other States as men sought to excel in competition with other men.

The State was to become the hero of a new hero-worship. Liberty was translated into privilege, in politics as in business. De Tocqueville has pointed out that "Society is tranquil not when it is conscious of its strength and wellbeing but, on the contrary, when it believes itself to be feeble and infirm, and fears that it will die if it make the slightest effort."

The restless activity of the ensuing decades would seem to testify to the fact that the peoples of Western Europe had become conscious of their strength and wellbeing.

It cannot be gainsaid that there was a vigorous expansive energy displayed, which promoted difficult enterprise. An assertive outlook on life, a realist perception of what appeared to be the needs of the moment, a positivist, mechanistic view of the relation of men to their environment, a blind subservience to the tenets of competition had increased the nerve force and power of resistance of the peoples of Western Europe. The wellbeing, which had resulted from the tireless pursuit of economic ends, had translated itself into power.

The democratic, middle class social structure of the 19th century and the struggle for equal opportunity had accustomed men not to look too closely for a nice balance between cause and effect. There was no time for searching inquiry into the possible unforeseen results of a plan of action or policy which was to be entered upon. It was felt that if too much time was spent in plans, too little would be left for their realisation. Men were content to take big risks. The success of some of the greatest inventions which had revolutionised the economics of social life had hitherto often been retarded by timidity and lack of faith in new undertakings. Speculative enterprise which produced such successful results required an acute appreciation of the needs of the moment, rather than a patient inquiry into the detailed working out of their consequences. The industrial system had bred a type of man who combined caution with daring, thrift with initiative. The romantic, contemplative spirit of the generation that had been reared during the Napoleonic wars had all but vanished. Men were eager for new enterprise, not to be undertaken in a spirit of adventure, but frankly for profit.

It is in this new spirit that the great colonial empire, which England had been building up, was brought to its

logical climax. Trading companies were no longer given monopolies and grants. The principle of free trade had triumphed, and the State asserted its sovereign rights by occupation, cession, or conquest. That the sun never sets in the British Empire became the boast of power, the incentive to fresh effort among her industrious, patriotic Middle Class, whose prosaic outlook on life was lighted up by the reflected glory of the vast World State which its industry had made possible, and its commerce and enterprise held together. The people of England now wished to let the world know what they had accomplished along the lines of trade expansion. In 1851 we find the Prince Consort engaged in promoting the plans for an International Industrial Exhibition to be held at London; the first of these exhibitions which were to become so prominent a feature of the ensuing era. Queen Victoria headed the subscription list to raise the funds necessary to advertise to the world the progress and preëminence of British wares. As long since Catholicism had understood that *"même Dieu a besoin de ses cloches,"* so now it was felt that the State had need to be known, to advertise its power measured in terms of its products. High hopes were placed in these industrial exhibitions, which followed each other in rapid succession in various parts of the world. They were intended to "diffuse a love of industry and peaceful emulation over the whole globe," and while it was admitted that commerce had its weak and even degrading elements, it was believed that "few occupations of man are more humanising, or tend more to teach the value of peace and goodwill." Such were the opening scenes of the drama of nationalism and capitalism, as enacted by the Middle Class, as soon as it had secured complete control in the State. It was not, however, as was expected, to result in establishing peace and

goodwill among men, but to lead to a fierce and embittered struggle for power among States.

Though a small orthodox-liberal group viewed with suspicion the increasing encroachments of the State in what had hitherto been considered the domain of private affairs, and the diversion of public attention from the traditional middle class policy of *laissez-faire,* which had made possible the progressive advance in national prosperity, a greater majority was daily being won over to the new way of thinking. The State had become a living reality, a concrete factor in everyday life. As it was felt the aim and duty of the individual to develop his natural capacity and prove his ability, so the personalised State was expected to strain its full energy, to prove and manifest its capacities, to develop its national power. It was coming to be believed that petty States had a very "dubious and insecure existence," which they could only render secure by seeking the protection of, or attaching themselves to, stronger States. The chief recognised means of increasing the power of the State in competition with other States was by a skilful, daring foreign policy supported by a strong army. The internal prosperity of the State was best fostered by affording full scope to individual enterprise within the limits of national interest. The private life of the individual was subordinated to the needs of the State. The State arrogated to itself close supervision of its citizens in order to strengthen its authority. It now required strict adherence to the laws of the land which regulated more minutely than ever the varied activities of the individual. It demanded peremptorily the performance of such recognised obligations as the payment of taxes or, in some States, also military service. On the Continent the introduction of compulsory military service, the strategic disposition of

the chief railways, which were all constructed so as to pass through the capital, the telegraph system, which was looked upon as the nervous system of the State, contributed to render more distinct the image of the personalised State. It came to be accepted that "nationality gives the chief impulse to public life."

CHAPTER VII

Napoleon III

HIS NATIONALIST POLICY—RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS—THE POSITION OF RUSSIA—PAN-SLAVIC MOVEMENT—THE CRIMEAN WAR—THE RÔLE OF ENGLAND—THE CONGRESS OF PARIS—RUSSOPHILE TENDENCIES

I

It was during this final phase of the formative period of the Nation-State that Napoleon III found himself with a free hand to carry forward the programme of the nationalist expansion of France. The policy he pursued to achieve this end has been variously estimated. There are those who would see in the Emperor the champion of oppressed nationalities, who kept Europe in a state of continuous turmoil in carrying out an altruistic policy which was to compass his downfall. There are others who claim that Louis Napoleon had a very shrewd perception of the best methods to be pursued to increase the power and glory of France, and that he undertook no enterprise without seeing to it that France was paid in full for whatever services she rendered. "It is true that Napoleon interested himself in a number of oppressed nationalities, but he never went to war in their behalf." He opened up negotiations with Hungarian revolutionists in order to urge them to war against Austria. He assisted the Italians only upon condition of their agreeing to the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. He

urged Prussia to drive Austria out of the German Confederation, and after this had been accomplished, demanded compensation for his benevolence and good advice in the form of the right to acquire Luxemburg.

There can be no doubt but that there is a part of truth in both these points of view. Napoleon III was essentially a man of his epoch, sensitive to its moods which he interpreted in all circumstances as favorable to his own plans. It was commonly accepted in the Europe of the day that France represented the "principle of nationality." Under the rule of Napoleon III France was to become the pattern of a closely-knit, homogeneous Nation-State, whose government and administration were looked to as worthy of imitation. He took advantage of every opportunity to increase this opinion by proving that it is by competitive methods, identical with those of the business world, that the State may be expected to rise to power, and enjoy prosperity.

In 1850 three States besides France were counted as Great Powers: England, Austria, and Russia. England was well-known to Napoleon III. Its people had on more than one occasion offered him a safe refuge. As his nearest neighbor, who was daily growing wealthier and more powerful, Napoleon III felt drawn to friendly intercourse with England; the more so as the British Government, still engrossed with assimilating its newly acquired colonial domain, was disinterested in the affairs of continental Europe, and would give him a freer hand there and protect him from flank attack. The mistake Napoleon I had made in antagonising England was to be remedied by his nephew who, during the early years of his reign, cultivated the friendliest relations with the Court of St. James.

Austria, with its legitimist, absolutist theory of State,

its anti-nationalist structure and policy, was looked upon by French public opinion as the natural rival of France. The harsh methods of repression of the nationalist risings in Italy and Hungary had resulted in awakening a strong sentiment of animosity against the Austrian Government, which in France was now held to be "a standing menace to Europe." The fact that the Vienna authorities had already repudiated their promise, won during the days of the revolutionary outbreak of 1848, to grant liberal reforms, and had withdrawn the concession of a representative assembly as soon as they felt strong enough to do so, added to the distrust which the people of France felt towards the Austrian Government, and strengthened the position of Napoleon III in prosecuting an anti-Austrian policy which had the approval of public opinion.

Russia at this time lay beyond the sphere of intimate contact. The Tsar maintained his absolutist régime apparently intact, untroubled by revolutionary propaganda, which, when it became annoying, was rapidly stamped out. Nevertheless, nationalism as a political incentive to aggrandisement found even in the Emperor Nicholas I a fervent disciple. But it was a different nationalist impulse from that which prevailed in the West. It was wholly egoistical, and was made to promote the autocratic power of Russia and to denationalise her non-Russian subject peoples. To increase the prestige of Russia, Nicholas I made war on the Persians and then on the Turks. He initiated the Pan-Slavic movement, which was extended to the Balkans and to Austria in later years. He attempted to Russianise all his subjects, and forcibly to convert the Roman Catholics to the Orthodox ritual. His hostile attitude towards the Poles, his conversion of that country into a province, and other similar activities which were reprobated in Western Europe, were inspired by

the same nationalist sentiment which had become the motive-force of public policy there, and proved the political and social solidarity of Russia with Western Europe, in spite of the paramount interest of Russia in Asiatic affairs, which had hitherto contributed to keep the country outside the orbit of Western political progress. Nicholas I had remained aloof from Western European affairs. He viewed with suspicion the increasing prestige of the British in Central Asia, and watched closely the development of liberalism in the West. When in Poland liberalism had assumed the form of a national insurrection he had repressed it with vigor. Called upon by the Austrians for assistance to stamp out the nationalist revolt of the Magyars, he sent a powerful force into Hungary in 1849, with the result that this nationalist rising also was suppressed. By this act Russia had gained the enmity of the peoples of the West.

II

The real causes of the Crimean War were complex. The encroachments of Russia on Turkey and the activity the Russians displayed in Central Asia threatening British possessions in India were contributing factors. While public opinion in France would have viewed a war against Austria with more enthusiasm, the fact that Russia had assisted Austria in suppressing the struggle for national liberty of the Magyars, and the sympathy aroused for the Poles by the harsh treatment they had endured at the hands of Nicholas I, had made popular any aggressive policy which Napoleon III might choose to pursue against Russia.

It was expected of Napoleon III that he would resur-

rect the military prestige of France by a successful foreign campaign. Though the memory of the galling defeat of the French in 1812 had no part in practical politics, yet the recollection of the Moscow campaign was ready to hand, and was skilfully made use of to arouse patriotic enthusiasm for a war against Russia. The lessons of the history of Napoleon I had not been lost upon Napoleon III. The latter realised that a well-balanced coalition is inevitably stronger than a single State, no matter what the other odds may be.

As soon as Napoleon III had consolidated his position at home and by the assumption of the imperial dignity felt this position secure, he began to venture on foreign enterprise. He drew closer to England and found her willing to listen to the arguments in favor of a campaign against Russia. The pretext for war was found in the dispute over the protection of the holy places in Palestine, which Napoleon III claimed for France in the name of the Roman Catholics, and Nicholas I demanded on behalf of the Orthodox clergy.

It would appear that Russia counted on being supported by Austria in case the situation should become unduly strained. Nicholas I sent a special ambassador to Constantinople in February 1853 to press his claims, and at the same time demanded the sole right of protecting the Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The Porte appealed to the Western Powers. In June a French and English fleet sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean. Negotiations continued until Turkey, supported by the Allies, declared war on Russia (October 5, 1853).

A Franco-British expeditionary force was in due course landed in the Crimea, and the siege of Sebastopol was begun. Austria failed to come to the assistance of Russia, and as the result of diplomatic pressure even went so far

as to join the Western allies, though she took no active part in military operations. The war dragged on without decisive result. Epidemics ravaged the allied armies and caused more casualties than active fighting.

The French, who had borne the brunt of the operations, were growing tired of the war. On March 2, 1855, Nicholas I died, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander II. The accession of the new Emperor seemed to presage the gratification of the French desire for peace. Negotiations were opened at Vienna to find a suitable ground for an adjustment, but nothing came of the attempt.

The siege of Sebastopol was pressed with renewed vigor. Napoleon III made ready to proceed to the Crimea to take over the command of the allied forces in person. Then came the news of the French victory at the Malakoff, the fall of Sebastopol, and the destruction of the greater part of the Russian Black Sea fleet in its harbor (September 1855).

In the meantime Napoleon had given up his plan of proceeding to the scene of operations, so that after the victory Paris witnessed a military triumph the like of which had not been seen since the days of Napoleon I. The Te Deum at Notre Dame was made the occasion of a magnificent military display. "All Paris turned out to see the procession pass, and when the gala carriage drawn by eight horses led by equerries on foot, in which Napoleon III clad in the uniform of a general had taken his place, appeared, a great cheer broke forth from the assembled crowds: *'Vive l'Empereur, Vive l'Armée.'* "[1] The honor of French arms had been avenged. Napoleon III had refurbished the military glory of France. He was ready for peace.

But such was not the mood of England. The news of

[1] Cf. La Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* Vol. I.

the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet was received with enthusiasm. The British were now anxious to continue the war with renewed vigor. The capture of Sebastopol was regarded by them merely as a preliminary operation. England was intent upon dispatching a fleet to attack and annihilate the Russian Baltic fleet. But public opinion in France was tired of the war, which had been of little profit to the country. Moreover, the destruction of the Russian fleet in northern waters would have given England too great a naval superiority. Napoleon III realised that the only possible object which might induce the French to continue the war was the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland. To this project England refused to give its adherence. Thereupon Napoleon III, while outwardly preparing for the continuance of the war, nevertheless let it clearly be understood by Russia that he was ready for peace. The preliminary negotiations were conducted through Vienna. The conditions were submitted to Russia in the form of an ultimatum, on November 14, 1855. The neutralisation of the Black Sea, the cession of Moldavia and part of Bessarabia were stipulated. After some tortuous negotiations and delays, Russia finally accepted the demands (January 16, 1856). One month later a peace congress was convoked to meet at Paris. Seven European States were represented. Prussia, who took no part in the war, had begged to be admitted, as questions of international importance were to be discussed; while Piedmont had won the right to a seat in the Congress, as she had dispatched a small force to participate in the expedition.

The Congress of Paris began its work in earnest on February 28. Napoleon III soon found himself playing the rôle of arbiter between the English delegates, whose disappointment at not continuing the war had translated

itself into a desire to exact a humiliating peace, and the Russians, who though they had lost the war, now felt that they had gained in Napoleon III, if not a friend, at least a benevolent well-wisher, who would use his influence in restraining any exaggerated claims which might be put forward by the British Government. In return for these good services, Russia, the enemy of yesterday, was ready to support French policy as long as not incompatible with her direct interests. Napoleon III, in response to public opinion, desired to help the process of the formation of national States in the Balkans. The protectorate of Russia over Moldavia and Wallachia had been abolished by preliminary agreement. France, in pursuance of its nationalist policy, proposed the union of these two principalities as the basis of the formation of a new Nation-State. Russia agreed; but Austria and Turkey violently objected to the interference of France in what they deemed to be the internal affairs of the Balkans. To avert the danger of widening the breach between France and her former allies, it was thought advisable to adjourn the settlement of this question until the conclusion of peace.

Three weeks after the opening of the peace conference the atmosphere had become tense. "Everybody is annoyed; it is time to sign," the Austrian ambassador noted, voicing the general sentiment of the delegates. On March 30, to avoid further complications, peace was speedily signed. England and Austria were loud in their recriminations against Napoleon III for having intervened on behalf of Russia and softened the terms of the treaty. He had in addition sacrificed Polish freedom to his new Russian friendship. The protocol of November 14, 1855, had provided for the signing of a secret treaty of alliance between France, England, and Austria to guarantee the

enforcement of the terms of the treaty and the integrity of Turkish territory. Napoleon III took no great pains to conceal his lack of enthusiasm at being a party to such an agreement, which he was nevertheless compelled to enter upon (April 15, 1856).

The new Russophile attitude of Napoleon III was in a measure due to the skilful policy pursued by the Russian peace envoy to the Paris Congress. Napoleon III was not insensible to the flattery implied by the deferential attitude of the Russian Government, which had in the past been the leading spirit in the Holy Alliance and the most implacable enemy of his house. At the same time, the Emperor of the French was already preparing plans for future aggrandisement nearer home, in which the neutrality, if not the active coöperation, of Russia was an essential element.

CHAPTER VIII

The New Nationalism

SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION—RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES—NAPOLEON III AND ITALIAN UNITY—THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA—VILLAFRANCA—EFFECTS OF UNION OF ITALY—POLAND—FRANCO-RUSSIAN TENSION—THE MEXICAN EXPEDITION—BISMARCK AND THE WAR WITH DENMARK—ANNEXATION OF THE DANISH DUCHIES—PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA—SADOWA—THE TREATY OF PRAGUE—THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION—THE COLLAPSE OF THE MEXICAN EMPIRE—THE LUXEMBURG INCIDENT—THE GERMAN MENACE—THE WAR OF 1870—SEDAN—THE FOUNDATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

I

It has been necessary to enter in some detail into the situation arising out of the Crimean War and the Paris Congress, in order to make clear the factors of continental European policy, which were destined to have so deep an influence on political evolution.

Russia had again been drawn into the vortex of Western European affairs and was making friendly overtures to Napoleon III, though the Tsar was congenitally opposed to the latter's interpretation of nationalism and the erection of Nation-States. England had allied herself with France, partly with the view of avoiding the possibility of another Napoleonic war, partly to make use of France in thwarting Russian expansion in Central Asia and if possible to involve Russia in a Western policy.

The old German Empire was on the eve of dissolution, and Prussia was pushing forward her claims to German hegemony, which it was beginning to be realised could be accomplished only by the forcible ejection of Austria from the Germanic Confederation. The Hapsburg realm, torn by nationalist dissensions, nevertheless retained a semblance of its former influence. Vienna had become the scene of all negotiations of Near Eastern problems.

In the Balkans the various peoples still under the rule of the Turks were beginning to feel the stirring of the national impulse to state building. The Danubian principalities had acquired autonomy; the Greeks were demanding the annexation of Crete; the Serbs and Bulgars were agitating for independence. In Italy, Piedmont had the same task before it as Prussia had in Germany, but Cavour, the leading statesman of his day, was convinced that the Italians were not strong enough to confront the Austrians unaided, and was looking for assistance. At the Paris Congress he had had occasion to discover that Napoleon III would lend a willing ear to his plans for the national unity of Italy under the House of Savoy, and he worked assiduously to assure for himself this proffered aid. Such was the situation in Europe during the decade when Western policy and Western political practice, dictated by the Middle Class, and still to all intents and purposes uninfluenced by the pressure of the Proletariat, may be said to have become pivotal throughout the world.

In the Orient Japan was being opened to peaceful Western intercourse by the United States, and China was entering upon closer relations with the West. British trade with China had grown to be of great importance, and an occasion was soon to be found to force an entering wedge which was to open China to Western commercial penetration. The French and British were act-

ing in concert in Chinese waters, and the new markets of the East required, it was believed, a more energetic Europeanising policy, which could best be promoted by securing direct diplomatic intercourse with Peking.

In the United States the economic as well as the social factors of slavery had, with the growth of industrial and commercial enterprise, the consequent wellbeing in the Northern States, and the more direct and intimate intercourse of the latter with the South, resulted in a distinct cleavage of policy regarding the extension of slavery. It was coming to be felt that the country could no longer remain "half slave and half free." While the Southern States were essential to the industrial prosperity of the North, the South, with a market for its cotton in England, could, it was thought by some of the Southern leaders, have a prosperous existence as an independent State. Here also war clouds were gathering.

The world had suddenly become a smaller place to live in. The various peoples had become dependent upon one another, in order to be able to satisfy their wants. Under the impetus of the competitive system these wants were continuously being enlarged, and greater efforts were being made to satisfy them. Commercial expansion had become closely linked with national expansion, and it had come to be believed that the strong, national States were the ones most fitted to promote commercial prosperity and assert their position in world affairs.

In Europe the nationalist impulse had come to dominate political life. England in pursuing her more selfish plans of capitalist expansion sought to reconcile the desire for national independence, in so far as it concerned foreign States, with her own liberal views of government in which democratic principles were recognised, without committing her to any nationalist programme at home. It was

left to France to assume the more perilous rôle of active champion of nationalism, which for the time being was tending to make her again the principal factor in European affairs.

In spite of the growing hostility between Russia and England, Napoleon III adhered closely to his plan of remaining on good terms with England and promoting the alliance between the two countries. With the friendship of Russia seemingly assured, and with England as his ally, Napoleon III felt that he could safely venture to intervene in the affairs of the Italian peninsula. No time was lost in laying the foundations for this undertaking. Six months after the Paris Congress a Franco-British fleet appeared in Neapolitan waters, to remonstrate against what these two Powers professed to deem the misgovernment of the King of Naples. Russia, somewhat to the surprise of France, promptly protested against this action as interfering with the rights of an independent sovereign. The allies, posing as supporters of liberalism and good government, persisted in their plans. However, Napoleon III felt that before pursuing his policy it would be better to come to some definite understanding with Russia. An era of diplomatic intrigue now opened which continued uninterruptedly throughout the Second Empire.

The aim of Napoleon III was to succeed, on the one hand, in restraining Russia from actively assisting Austria as she had done in 1849 in Hungary should the Italians seek to throw off the yoke of the Austrians; on the other, to insure Russian neutrality in the event of French intervention in Italy, and if possible secure the support of Russia by inducing her to mobilise a Russian army along the Galician frontier as a threat against Austria. France further reserved for herself the right of

territorial acquisitions at the expense of Italy and in return promised to agree to the revision of the clauses of the treaty of Paris regarding the neutralisation of the Black Sea, which Russia deemed intolerable. These negotiations were kept secret and not even carried on through regular diplomatic channels, but by a personal agent of Napoleon III at the court of Alexander II, which serves to lend credence to the belief that in Italy the French Emperor pursued a purely personal policy.

II

Napoleon III now was free to take a more active part in posing as the protector of the Italian peoples and to champion their aspirations for national unity. The Piedmontese were soon to afford a favorable opportunity for more aggressive action. In the meantime, perceiving that war was inevitable, Austria turned for support to the States of North Germany.

As the result of a secret agreement entered into between Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombières (July 1858), Italy was, under certain eventualities, promised the support of French arms. Austria readily fell into the trap set for her. The Vienna Government dispatched an ultimatum to Turin and soon thereafter declared war (April 1859). French assistance was thus secured. The French won signal victories at Magenta and Solferino. In the midst of these successful operations, Napoleon III suddenly agreed to come to terms with Austria, and an armistice was signed at Villafranca (July 11, 1859) followed by a patched-up peace. The causes of this *volte*

face are not far to seek. Russia, alarmed at the proportions of the nationalist rising in Italy and its possible repercussion in Poland, had begun to waver in her friendly support. It is even suggested that, owing to her preponderant influence at Berlin, she was able to induce the Prussians to mobilise along the Rhine, or at least did not prevent them from doing so. Napoleon III was afraid that he had committed himself unduly. His interest in Italian unity was secondary to his project of carrying forward a profitable anti-Austrian policy, which at the time was immensely popular in France, and to securing adequate territorial compensation, which would make him appear as a conqueror in the eyes of his own people.

However, the process of the unification of Italy was not stopped by the withdrawal of the French. The nationalist movement continued. The British lent their support to Garibaldi in his enterprise against Naples. In the meantime Napoleon III again changed his attitude. He now threatened the Piedmontese with armed intervention should they attempt to occupy Umbria, and he reinforced the French garrison of Rome.

Alexander II expressed his satisfaction at this change of front, and hoped that the French would carry out their threat. Though nothing came of it, the treachery of the French, as it was qualified by the Italians, left a deep impression in Italy, and influenced subsequent Italian foreign policy.

In spite of this setback the process of the unification of Italy continued. The Kingdom of Italy, including all the States of the peninsula excepting Venetia and Rome, was proclaimed an independent State under the sceptre of the House of Savoy, and as such was recognised by the Powers with the exception of Austria (1861). In payment

for the part the French had played in the Italian war of liberation, Savoy and Nice were annexed to France; a very profitable compensation for a campaign which had lasted only nine weeks.

Looked at in the light of its actual accomplishment, Italian unity appears merely as a part of the complicated nationalist programme of Napoleon III. In reality it was founded on the far deeper motive of racial homogeneity as the basis of state building, which at this epoch came to historical maturity. It was the expression of the national consciousness of a people whose political development along lines of middle class liberalism had been retarded. In Italy, as in Germany, nationalism was not primarily a political project, but a racial requirement. It was currently believed by the supporters of the new nationalist doctrine that it was an historical necessity that the peoples of Italy should be united in a nationally homogeneous State. This consolidation could no longer be delayed.

The position of Napoleon III was now preëminent in Europe. He was already looking for new fields of activity. Again the Polish question had come to the fore. The successful struggle for national unity in Italy had, as was to be expected, a direct repercussion in Poland. While friendly relations with Russia were highly desirable, Napoleon III realised that the plight of Poland had aroused French public opinion to such a pitch that it would be useful for him to take some action. Russia perceived the new orientation of French policy and the tendency of Napoleon III to consider himself strong enough to forego conciliating Russian feelings. Alexander II drew closer to Prussia. The Berlin Government was called upon by the Tsar to coöperate with Russia in keeping the Poles in subjection. When the Polish ques-

tion [1] was beginning to be the cause of tension between France and Russia, Napoleon III became conscious of the mistake he had made in arousing the antagonism of the Tsar. He was, therefore, unwilling to resort to arms to assist the Poles to obtain their independence, especially after he had received information regarding the *rapprochement* which had taken place between Berlin and St. Petersburg. He now sought to divert the attention of France by engaging upon an expedition on the American continent.

III

The disturbed situation in Mexico had long been the subject of complaint of the European Powers. Profiting by the circumstances arising out of the Civil War, then raging in the United States, which left that country out of cause, France, England, and Spain in 1861 sent an expedition to Mexico for the purpose of compelling compliance with the claims presented by their respective subjects. The Mexican Government then in power became alarmed, and an agreement was entered into which was approved by England and Spain, but which France on one pretext or another refused to ratify. When the Spanish and English contingents were withdrawn the French remained behind, and in April 1862 Napoleon III declared war on Mexico.

Reinforcements were sent out, and on June 10, 1863, the French occupied Mexico City. Napoleon III was now in nominal possession of a vast overseas domain. The United States torn by a war, which it seemed at the

[1] In regard to the Poles Napoleon III is said to have declared: *"J'ai changé ma manière de voir sur bien des points, disait il a l'un de ses amis, mais je pense sur la Pologne comme en* 1831."—E. Olliver, *Empire Liberal,* Vol. VI, Chap. III.

time would probably result in the splitting of the country into two relatively weak States, was unable to assert forcibly the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which for forty years had served to protect the American continents from European intervention.

In spite of his success in Mexico, in Europe the prestige of Napoleon III had been shaken. He had been unable to procure the active coöperation of England in his project for securing the independence of Poland, and he had turned to Austria for assistance, which had been only half-heartedly conceded. In February 1863 the Polish nationalists, confident that they would receive armed assistance from the French, were carrying on a strong campaign against the Russians. France now found herself confronted with the alternative of declaring war on Russia, or of receding from her position. Napoleon III sought refuge in a compromise. A joint diplomatic intervention on the part of Austria, England, and France was proposed, which was to secure the recognition of the civil and religious liberty of Poland. In June a *démarche* in this sense was made, but Russia, confident that England would not take up arms and that Austria was loth to do so, refused to consider the proposals made, and France for the first time since the accession of Napoleon III found herself isolated in Europe. Public opinion in France was in favor of the war against Russia, and a war party at court urged the Emperor to take a decisive stand, but this he prudently declined to do, and war was averted. But the Franco-Russian friendship had been destroyed. The Polish revolt was suppressed by the Tsar with his habitual firmness. The animosity of the Russians had been aroused, and they took occasion to show it by cultivating more assiduously the existing intimate and friendly relations with Prussia, by favoring her

projects for expansion, and by approving of the plan of annexation of the Danish Duchies. The British Government, mistrustful of the growing power of France which had been increased by the Mexican adventure, welcomed the breaking off of the friendly relations between France and Russia.

There is no historical evidence upon which to base the assumption that Napoleon III at this time entertained any suspicion of the ulterior designs of Prussian aggrandisement. On the contrary, he seems to have favored the creation of a strong Prussian state as essential to the balance of power in Central Europe. Deprived of the support of Russia, conscious of the lukewarm feelings growing in England, Napoleon III turned to Austria. Here we can perceive the motive which led to the selection of Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. Napoleon III hoped thereby to win the support of Austria and allay the suspicions of England, while maintaining a sufficient control over the new sovereign of Mexico to retain for himself a free hand in American affairs. In May 1864 the new Emperor and Empress of Mexico landed at Vera Cruz. The French army of occupation remained in the country, assisted by an Austrian contingent and a Belgian legion.

Meanwhile the situation in Europe was rapidly approaching a crisis. The guidance of international policy was passing from the French. Prussia, strengthened by the proferred friendship of Russia, was making ready to assert her ascendancy in Europe. Bismarck had completed his tour of duty as Ambassador to Russia and to France, and had returned to Berlin to put through the plans for the reorganisation of the army in the face of strong popular disapproval. In official quarters it was even feared that a revolutionary outbreak would result

from the harsh methods Bismarck pursued. He grasped at the opportunity offered to find a happy diversion for national energy in a war against Denmark. With Austrian coöperation Denmark was easily brought to terms. Schleswig-Holstein was occupied; and Europe confronted with the *fait accompli* (1864). Confident in the strength of his newly-formed army, Bismarck was already preparing for the war against Austria. By his skilful manœuvring Austria was led into a difficult position over the question of the annexed duchies. A formal attempt to avoid war was made by Russia, France, and England. Russia was not seriously concerned with restraining Prussia, and France appears to have viewed the aggressive attitude of Prussia without undue alarm.

The Mexican enterprise was giving Napoleon III more cause for concern. In November 1865 the United States had addressed an urgent note to France, demanding the withdrawal of the French forces from Mexico, insinuating that the United States would be compelled to intervene in behalf of the republican party in Mexico in case French support was not withdrawn. For a time Napoleon III paid little heed to the demands of the American Government. He was watching the developments of the situation in Europe.

The struggle between Prussia and Austria for supremacy in Germany could no longer be postponed. The brief month's campaign led to the rout of the Austrians at Sadowa and the armistice of Nikolsburg (July 1866). Napoleon III seemed suddenly to realise the peril of the military superiority of Prussia. If her victorious progress was not checked, Prussia would come to occupy a preponderant position in Europe. Without delay he set to work to arrest the further rise of Prussia. The Italians, who had declared war against Austria simultaneously

with Prussia, had suffered defeat, but were ready and anxious to continue the war. Napoleon III brought pressure to bear and restrained the Italians from persisting in the campaign. Venetia, which had been handed over to him, he turned over to Italy. Bismarck for his part had ulterior reasons for not pressing Austria and her South German allies unduly. He did not wish to throw them into the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of Prussia. He foresaw that the South German States which had sided with Austria in this war would soon be incorporated in the new German Empire, which he hoped to revive under Prussian leadership.

Within another month the treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) was signed. By it Austria was excluded from participation in the new organisation of German States. The possession of Venetia was confirmed to Italy. Prussia formally annexed the Danish Duchies, and various North German States which had sided with Austria were incorporated. The new North German Confederation was constituted (1867). The King of Prussia thereby became the hereditary President and General of the Confederation, to whom was entrusted the sole direction of German foreign policy. He was assisted by a responsible Chancellor whom he nominated. The authority of the President was in a measure checked by the Reichstag, a representative body elected by universal suffrage, and by the Bundesrat which represented the governments of the allied States of the Confederation. To these the legislative power and the control of the federal administration were entrusted.

In Austria, also, political reorganisation had taken place. Since 1860 the process of granting local self-government to the various races had been undertaken. By the Fundamental Law (February 1861) each racially

distinct national group was to have its own Landtag and enjoy partial autonomy, while all were to elect members to a common Reichstag, which was to control the Imperial Government and enact the general legislation of the realm. However, Hungary had consistently refused to send representatives to this Reichstag. After the treaty of Prague, Vienna made renewed attempts to conciliate the Magyars, who demanded that the Hungarian Constitution should be acknowledged, and the laws of 1848 and the virtual independence of Hungary be recognised. This was finally agreed to by Vienna. It meant the restoration of the dualist system whereby Austria and Hungary, though ruled over by the same sovereign, was each to have a separate Parliament and separate Ministries. The two appointed a joint Assembly or Delegations, which was to act with Ministers common to both States in matters concerning foreign affairs, finance, and war.

The outcome of the Austro-Prussian War left no doubts in the mind of Napoleon III as to the policy of expansion which Prussia would soon embark upon. The prospect of having to carry on a war with the United States over Mexico had become serious, owing to the firm attitude of Washington. Therefore, soon after Sadowa the Emperor ordered the recall of French troops from Mexico. He realised that the cause of the Imperial Government in Mexico was lost, and he urged Maximilian to abandon his throne. This Maximilian refused to do. The evacuation of the French was spread over a period of six months. Finally in February 1867 it was completed. As was to be expected, the Mexican republicans took up arms, and in May the Empire was overthrown, the Emperor was taken prisoner, and executed (July 1867).

IV

The position of Napoleon III was now seriously impaired. His foreign policy was violently attacked in the Corps Législatif. His autocratic rule was beginning to be felt to be irksome. The docility with which the nation had followed and supported his various foreign enterprises had changed into an attitude of resistance. The Emperor found himself compelled to make concessions to the popular demand for the return to a more liberal constitutional régime. Various decrees were issued during the early months of 1867 modifying the constitution in this sense. These were carried out during the next two years. Both Houses were granted the right of initiating legislative measures. Ministers were permitted to become members of Parliament, and were to be held responsible to the Senate.

In order to retrieve his waning fortunes, Napoleon III now sought to obtain adequate compensation for his benevolent neutrality towards Prussia during the war of the latter against Austria. At first it had seemed plausible to the Emperor to seek this compensation in territory along the Rhine, and he actually did present demands for the left bank, including the city of Mayence (August 1867). The Berlin Government was unwilling to listen to such proposals, and Napoleon III cast his eyes upon Belgium and Luxemburg. Before proceeding further with these negotiations he sought to sound Alexander II and secure the views of the Russian Government, which he hoped would possibly be willing to lend its assistance in pressing his demands amicably in order to avoid friction with Prussia. But he found the Russian Emperor impassible, and received no encouragement from that source.

Meanwhile Napoleon III had determined to secure the approval of Berlin of the purchase of Luxemburg from the King of Holland. Negotiations were entered into and met with apparent success, both at the Hague and Berlin. Satisfactory progress had been made, signatures were about to be affixed to the final documents of transfer, when on April 1, the newly assembled Reichstag voiced its disapproval and demanded that the German Government see to it that negotiations be stopped and the sale of Luxemburg to France be prevented. It was the first time that the new united Germany had spoken, yet its demand was not to be disregarded. Russia warned Napoleon III of the probability of war should he persist in his project. To save his face the Emperor was compelled to agree to the neutralisation of Luxemburg, and a congress was convoked to meet at London to adjust the matter.

After the Luxemburg incident it was evident to shrewd political observers that a war with Prussia, which had just been so narrowly averted, could not be long delayed, especially since it was evident that Russia seemed little inclined to restrain Prussian ambitions. The Tsar took every occasion to tighten the bonds of his relations with Prussia, and resisted the repeated efforts now made by France to detach Russia from her Prussian alliance. For some years past Russia had been held by France a negligible quantity. Now Napoleon III realised that an understanding with Alexander II was essential if the political equilibrium of European States was to be maintained. Externally relations with Russia had greatly improved since the crisis caused by the Polish question. Napoleon III endeavored to point out to the Russian Emperor that the continued, unchecked growth of Germany, the fostering of the new nationalism based on racial unity, would inevitably result in an attempt on the part

of the Prussians to incorporate all German-speaking peoples, from Courland to Alsace, in one vast empire.[1]

But he was unable to detach Alexander II from his German affiliations, and the Tsar took the occasion of an interview with the King of Prussia to agree upon a friendly policy which Russia would pursue in the event of a war between France and Prussia (June 1870).

V

The increasing influence of the Hohenzollerns in international affairs had been shown by the election of a prince of the elder branch of the house as Prince-Regent of the Danubian Principalities. Having been successful in placing a Hohenzollern prince on the throne of a rising Balkan State, the Berlin Government, now for the first time conscious of its political ascendancy and desirous of asserting its newly-acquired strength, put forward the candidature of another Hohenzollern, the elder brother of the regent of the Principalities, Prince Leopold, for the vacant throne of Spain (February 1870).

France suddenly found herself confronted by what appeared to be a serious menace. The spectre of the revival of the Empire of Charles V seemed to haunt French public opinion. The threat of German hegemony in Europe had become a reality. Napoleon III, the defender of nationalism, the instigator of national unity, who had sought to dominate Europe by the creation of a number of satellite Nation-States, now found himself

[1] Before proceeding to his post at St. Petersburg (October 1869) the new French Ambassador, General Fleury, received the following special instructions from Napoleon III: *"Le Général Fleury fera comprendre le danger que fait courir à l'Europe l'idée germanique qui si elle continue à grandir, doit naturellement englober en sa sphère d'action tous les pays qui parlent allemand depuis la Courlande jusqu'Alsace."*

faced by the new racio-nationally united Germany, whose vitality and aggressive power seemed to destine her to supplant France as the dominant State on the Continent.

Nationalism, as interpreted by the Germans, was not a political principle which was merely to be made use of to serve diplomatic intrigue, but a dynamic social force, which was to sweep the French thesis aside. Racial unity, controlled and disciplined, was to be the corner-stone of the new state building. Nationalism, as understood in Germany, was a physical as well as a political need. It was born of a combination of racial and intellectual pride, which promoted the belief that everything was possible which strong men dare to undertake. It was a nationalism bred of the absolute spirit of the preceding generation; neither personal nor individual, but racial, collective, and social. The German people felt ready to shape their own destiny.

Europe had watched with interest the rise of Prussia and the successive stages of her political evolution. It had applauded the outcome of the Austrian campaign, and the rebuff administered to France in the Luxemburg affair was looked upon as a manifestation of the vigour of German national consciousness, which was greeted without undue censure by the other Powers. England, interested chiefly in the maintenance of the balance of power, remained a somewhat cynical spectator of what she imagined was still the old political game that was being played on the continental chess-board. Austria had not forgotten the humiliation of 1866 and could under certain circumstances, it was believed in Paris, be induced to take up arms against Prussia.

As the result of pressure brought to bear, the candidacy of Prince Leopold to the throne of Spain had been withdrawn. But the difficulties which beset Napoleon

III still remained. Unrest at home and the continued financial crisis had undermined the prestige of his government. It seemed that the only way out was to be found in a successful foreign war. In spite of the great progress made by Prussia in her military reorganisation, the French armies, which had seen much fighting in distant lands under difficult conditions, were held superior in equipment, tactical training, and strategic leadership. The probability of Austria and the South German States joining the French was not to be excluded. Here Napoleon III would have a coalition which he was confident would be victorious. The nation seemed to stand solidly behind the Emperor in his firm attitude towards Prussia. The aspirations of the latter to European hegemony, the adoption of the favored French doctrine of nationalism as the aggressive factor of her foreign policy directed against France, had aggravated the feeling of enmity which had been growing up. When war could apparently no longer be prevented, France took up the challenge and declared war (July 19, 1870).

On August 5 the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris notified the French Government that "if Austria mobilises, Russia will mobilise; if Austria attacks Prussia, Russia will attack Austria." With Austria [1] thus immobilised the last hope of assistance had vanished. Then came in rapid succession the defeats of the French armies, culminating in Sedan (September 2, 1870), the surrender of Napoleon III, the Revolution of September 4. Na-

[1] It may be of interest to recall that during the early part of June 1870 Napoleon III dispatched a confidential emissary to Vienna to arrange the plans for a joint invasion of Prussia by France and Austria. Napoleon III also expected Italy to join in the expedition and it was agreed that, in the event of war, the French forces were to concentrate in Northern Bavaria, where they were to be joined by the Austrian and Italian contingents, and this great army was to march on Berlin via Jena.

poleon III, a prisoner, disappeared from the scene. A Provisional Government was formed which attempted to continue the struggle. The enemy had invaded France. The German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles (January 1871). Paris capitulated after a five months' siege. Then came the armistice and the establishment of the Third French Republic. Paris passed into the hands of the Commune, which held out for six weeks (April 2–May 21). Peace with Germany was signed at Frankfort (May 10, 1871). The Republican régime reëstablished order, and the French set to work paying off their war indemnity.

CHAPTER IX

Realpolitik

THE MOTIVES OF PUBLIC POLICY—NEO-MACHIAVELLIANISM—MORALITY AND POLITICS—THE PERSONALISED NATION-STATE—DEFINITION OF REALISM—PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND—THE INFLUENCE OF PESSIMISM—SCHOPENHAUER—DECLINE OF THE POLITICO-JURIDIC THEORY OF STATE—THE STATE AS POWER—VOLITIONAL FACTORS

I

THE events of the period which came to a close with the Franco-Prussian War have been reviewed in brief outline in order to recall the relevant factors in the historical evolution of the Nation-State. They will serve to call attention to the febrility with which plans of aggrandisement were pursued; the energy displayed in undertaking distant enterprise; the speculative nature of the risks assumed; the desire for compensation, both for armed intervention and for friendly neutrality; the secret agreements between governments, and the rapid changing of partners in an alliance; the making of treaties with mental reservations that they might be revised, abrogated, or even violated if the need should arise. An atmosphere of suspicion pervaded the relations even between friendly States. Nation building had developed into a routine policy. Armed assistance, or neutrality as the case might be, were resorted to with a view to the advantage to be reaped from the policy pursued. War and threats of war, alliances and attempts to disrupt the

friendly intercourse between other States had for their object the hope of immediate gain rather than the affirmation of a constructive policy. National prestige and military power had come to be looked upon as assets which had a market value. National energy was devoted to the task of developing a clearly marked individuality of a given people; in digging a deep chasm between States; in stamping with an indelible imprint those national characteristics which had become the trade-mark of the Nation-State.

After 1860 interest in internal affairs, the structure of the State, questions of individual liberty and political prerogative, for the time being became of secondary importance. Foreign policy, international relations, the assertion of the national will, the extension of national influence became the chief political preoccupation.

Representative government, whether monarchical or republican in form, had in principle been established, and was being gradually extended in practice to all European States with the exception of Russia. Men had come to believe that the constitutional system was to be the final form of government, and as it seemed the best adapted to promote national prosperity, they accepted its limitations. A new spirit dominated political life. There was an absence of faith in fixed principles, a lack of conviction that rights are to be regarded as inalienable, a growing distrust of reason, and an unhealthy deference to "the powers that be" and the *fait accompli.*

The separation of morals from politics,[1] which Machiavelli had first emphasised in modern times as es-

[1] The Romans first distinguished law from morality and gave it a definite form. The State was thereby limited in that its legal character was defined and concerned itself less with the ethical ordering of the world. No one could resist the State if it uttered its will. But the Roman State limited itself; it restricted the province of its own power and its own action.—Cf. Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State,* Book I, p. 39.

sential to the proper development of political responsibility and which succeeding generations had stigmatised as diabolical, now came to be recognised as a great step in advance, a factor of progress in that it had served to free politics from the trammels of morals, as the State had been freed from the domination of the Church.

Nothing could better serve to portray the new temper of the times than the rehabilitation of Machiavelli as a political philosopher which took place at this time, and the efforts made to rank him with Aristotle as a master of political wisdom.[1] The Machiavellian doctrine that political development cannot be made subservient to moral law, that in promoting the welfare of the State the Prince cannot be held amenable to the accepted code of morals, now gained the support, not merely of politicians, but also of political theorists and public opinion. Politics, it was contended, is concerned solely with affairs of State and has in view the advantage of the State; morals has to do with private judgment, the good and the bad, with which politics has no concern. The personalised Nation-State was developing a code of conduct of its own which had nothing in common with private morals. "Princes sometimes commit shameful deeds, but we cannot blame them when their acts are useful to their States, for shame is covered by advantage and is called wisdom." [2]

It was not asserted that the individual was of no importance, but that his importance and greatness could be measured only in terms of the importance and greatness of the State of which he was a member. The Nation-State had become an entity, a world in itself, which sought

[1] Cf. Treitschke, *Politik* (*Das Verhältniss des Staates zum Sittengesetz*), Book I, Chap. III, and Lord Acton's Introduction to *Il Principe*, edited by L. A. Burd.

[2] Laurent, *Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, Vol. X, p. 344.

to absorb all the interests, all the talent, all the wealth, vigor, and intellectual capacity of its members, and to claim from them the fruits of their energy and enterprise to enhance the greatness and power of the State. The imprint of nationality had come to be held the proudest possession of the individual, and to be a loyal Frenchman, Englishman, or German almost more important than to be an honest man.[1]

II

It was during this period that realism became the dominant motive not merely in politics, but was reflected in art and literature. Romanticism which had arisen at the time of the taking over of the control of the body politic by the Middle Class about 1830 had to all intents and purposes died out.

In politics, realism, *Realpolitik,* as the Germans who were the first to introduce it in its modern interpretation called it, bases policy solely on the real, not on the imagined, factors in a given situation. It pretends to mean the scientific diagnosis of the component factors of a given political complex, the separation into their primary elements of these various factors, and the weighing carefully the reaction of each in a given situation viewed purely objectively, and only thereafter determining upon a policy in which the margin of doubtful and unforeseeable elements are reduced to a minimum, if not entirely eliminated. A realist policy is one of scientific speculation, where the risk involved is far less than it outwardly

[1] As Bluntschli, writing at this time, declared: *"Der Staat ist ein ganzes ein Welt für sich. Was im einzeln böse erscheint wird im Zusammenhang gut gemacht. Die männliche Tugend des Patriotismus ist nirgends rein von Beimischung Leidenschaften nötig für die Staatspraxis."*

appears. The end which it is sought to attain is always to be well within reach, much under the assessed strength of the effort required to attain it.[1]

If we examine the philosophical background upon which this realist political practice was etched, we will find that it reflected the negative pessimistic outlook on life which had undermined the buoyant faith of men in themselves. Scientific research was revealing that man was not, as had hitherto been believed, the privileged image of a Divine Being, but merely a member of the animal kingdom linked in close parentage with the lowest forms of animal life. The belief that man was specially created for a definite purpose was thereby proved false.

Perfectibility and progress, which it had hitherto been so difficult to reconcile with the concept of the immutable nature of man, now found in the Darwinian theories of evolution, of natural selection, and the survival of the fittest adequate confirmation. These new doctrines appeared to confer scientific sanction upon the competitive system. With the progress of the biological sciences, what we may call the biologic interpretation of social life arose, which transposed wholesale to the realm of political and economic life those laws of evolutionary development which had come to be accepted as explaining satisfactorily, purpose in nature.[2]

[1] *"Realpolitik ist welche von den wirklichen, nicht den eingebildeten Bedürfnissen des Volkes ausgeht, welche die vorhandenen Kräfte und Mittel richtig schätzt, die feindliche und freundliche Macht sorgfältig berechnet und nur erreichbare Ziele austrebt. Nur mit dieser Politik sind Erfolge möglich."*—Bluntschli, *Politik,* p. 322.

[2] It is to be noted that these doctrines gained currency after the first enunciation of the communist principles of Marx. It has always been denied by the scientific socialists that a relevant analogy may be drawn between the ruthless struggle for survival in nature, and the right of the stronger to appropriate for himself all the benefits of civilisation, as social life is not to be held ruled by natural laws, but by economic laws which historical materialism seeks to interpret. (*See* p. 163.)

The spread of the doctrines of middle class liberalism, the extension of democratic ideals and of political equality had made men independent and self-reliant, but at the same time rendered them conscious of their weakness as individuals. They had lost all sense of fixity in the social order. The motives of public policy, the factors of social development, even political liberty which they had struggled to acquire, now meant little to them as individuals. Public opinion was moulded by a corps of skilled specialists who expressed the aims and ambitions of a party or a government through the press. The increase of the means of communication, the new discoveries in science, the rapid growth of large industrial centres, the distant wars undertaken for obscure motives, had uprooted men from their old associations and their former modes of thought. An eclectic spirit had broadened their outlook. It professed to find something useful in all the various philosophies of the past, to reconcile divergences, to compromise conflicting opinions. Religious prejudice had almost wholly disappeared. Political controversy served to absorb the polemical instincts which had hitherto found an outlet in religious disputes. Intellectual and moral speculation were left in the hands of men who for one reason or another were unable to take part in active life. The Church remained; withdrawn from the world, it was daily losing ground. Indifference in matters of religion had become widespread. The scientific temper of the age increased the tendency towards agnosticism and scepticism, which few religious leaders were found able enough to combat. This was in a measure due to the fact that the clergy was largely recruited from a mediocre, uninspired type of man, unfit as a rule for the more exacting life of affairs. Uncertainty and doubt regarding the object and end of life had

taken deep root. What faith there remained was no longer implicit, but inquisitive and critical, and found itself daily assailed by the self-evident truths which science laid bare.

For science had attracted men endowed with the most eminent mental faculties who, by their inventions and new theories, served both philosophy and industry. Men of the type who in the past had concerned themselves with questions of the moral nature of man, and who had helped to build up the code of moral law which had made possible the development of moral faculties, now concerned themselves with keen investigation of the secrets of nature and natural laws. They sought to discover such new truths as could, in the first instance, have a practical value in everyday life and only in a secondary way explain the ordering and meaning of the universe.

This new scientific spirit, this rigid empirical testing of truth bred a critical temper which made men conscious of the uncertainties latent in all theories, suspicious of their conclusions unless confirmed by repeated experimentation.

The dogmatic spirit of positivism was making way for a new critical attitude, which held that in human affairs probability is far more often ascertainable than certainty. A finite intellect must be a fallible intellect. Man is a conditional being, and cannot know absolute certainty. "We must resign ourselves to be guided, even in matters of high concern, by low probabilities."

The pursuit of wealth was becoming the principal concern of men. Industrial and commercial life absorbed the best energies of an ever-increasing majority. The discoveries of science and the intellect of men engaged in scientific research were capitalised as part of the new industrialism. Politics, however, still attracted men of

virility and foresight, who found in the monotony and uniformity of democratic institutions a suitable field for their energies as leaders of a docile and increasingly well-disciplined multitude, which was willing to be cajoled or coerced in the guise of patriotism. Heroism, a love of glory, deeds of valour for valour's sake, a broad, disinterested outlook on life, a contempt for rewards, the brilliant culture of a select few, had been definitely discredited and supplanted by a mild-mannered, self-centred, close-calculating, dull, respectable, and genteel way of life.

Men felt isolated in an ever-growing, ever-changing world. They had lost their social bearings and retained a consciousness of their individuality chiefly through loyal allegiance to the personalised Nation-State.

The doctrines set forth by Schopenhauer, which had for more than a generation been disregarded, now came into vogue with the revival of neo-classic pessimism:[1] "The notion of right as well as that of liberty is negative. Wrong is positive. The rights of man: 'everyone has the right to do that which does not harm another.' "

Schopenhauer had emphatically declared that the existence of such a body of social coercion as the State testifies to the innate injustice prevalent among men. The State, according to his view, is to be looked upon, not so much as a common good, as a protection against foreign foes and domestic dissensions. All rights are in reality based on the strength to maintain them. Courage is to be explained as a voluntary effort made to ward off a present danger in order to avoid a greater danger in the future. In politics as in life "might is right." "If you

[1] "Not to be born is the happiest destiny, but after that the greatest happiness is, after birth, to return as soon as possible from whence one came."—Cf. Sophocles, *Œdipus at Colonus.*

do not wish to be enslaved, enslave your neighbor in good time, as soon as his weakness gives you the opportunity; if not he will enslave you." [1]

Such were some of the tenets of the new pessimism, so alien to the spirit of initiative of Western civilisation. This pessimistic point of view permeated deeply the spirit of the times. It undermined the positive vigor of middle class control in the State, and must be interpreted as indicative of its decay. Schopenhauer's doctrine of this "worst of all possible worlds" was carried to its extreme by Hartmann, who, standing as he claimed at the nexus of the conscious and the unconscious, declared that when humanity had become intelligent enough to realise its misery it would destroy itself "in a last despairing act of cosmic suicide." [2]

In politics, the older middle class maxims of policy, which had sought to assure a harmonious balance of power in the State, as well as between States, had been supplanted by a passionate partisanship, a desire to affirm the power of a particular party within the State, or of a particular State in competition with other States. The control of government was passing into the hands of an extra-legal grouping of men, a party, which defined and carried out the will of the majority in home affairs and influenced the conduct of foreign affairs. Public opinion was becoming the repository of public policy. It was no longer an opinion moulded by a free intercourse of ideas, or by a clear-sighted referendum to an educated Middle Class, but more and more was being made use of as the mouthpiece of a small group of party leaders, who by their shrewd understanding of the needs of the moment, by pandering to demands which they had

[1] Cf. Schopenhauer, *Recht und Politik.*
[2] Cf. Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious.*

been careful to create and could thus satisfy, had gained the approval of their followers. Public opinion was no longer creative; it criticised and controlled rather than ruled.

III

The politico-juridic theory of the State was giving way to a fresh concept. It was coming to be felt that the personalised Nation-State had a great number of other functions to perform, besides those of enforcing abstract right. A purely juridic interpretation of the contractual obligations as binding the relations between the governed and the governing was now held inadequate. Legality in politics in its stricter sense was an abstraction which had grown sterile. The practical, cautious, matter-of-fact mind, the scientific temper of the new industrialism precluded the frank acceptance of the juridic concept of the State in its positive, dogmatic sense. As in the practice of the law, legality had made room for equity, which pays due regard to circumstances, examines into the particular state of affairs, makes allowances for extenuating conditions, and issues a verdict in the light of events and the dictates of public interest, so, under the influence of the new political ideology which was growing up, the power of the State was to be based on internal concord, on toleration of divergent opinion in questions relating to religious, political, or social matters. This was possible only by a more lax interpretation of the law than had hitherto prevailed. Internal peace which political practice sought to promote was not held an end in itself. It served to strengthen the cohesive unity of the State, so that it might be able to assert its power or defend its

policy, if need be by armed force, in the competitive struggle with other States.

The function of representative government came to be to make laws, not with any special reference to their ethical or moral value, but in view of their particular and immediate benefit to the interests of those directly concerned. The fact that these laws were made by the representatives of the politically conscious body, the electorate, who were believed to be in close touch with the needs and aims of the community, and as such able to give expression to its rational desires, gained for the laws enacted the authority and immediate sanction which hitherto had required long-established tradition and custom. The laws passed by these legislators, whose term of office was in many instances limited, had lost all contact with any broader ethical values. They were as a rule enacted for the benefit of a particular group of people, at a particular time, and as they were liable to repeal, the sanctity and majesty of the law which was the basis of the politico-juridic theory of State was being slowly undermined.

The belief in the omnipotence of the will as the dictating force in human affairs which Rousseau a century before had outlined,[1] now for the first time received tentative application and resulted in the further transformation of political practice, which was to influence the conduct of affairs of State.

A well-balanced rationalism, a desire to limit and moderate the incoherent forces of nature, to dictate to them the discipline of the human mind, was giving way to a belief in the supremacy of the human will.

The direct relation of this new interpretation of the freedom of the will to that of political liberty might

[1] Cf. *Contrat Social,* Book III, Chap. I.

readily be traced. Hitherto political liberty had been interpreted as a limited freedom, subject to the dictates of accepted practice, ethical standards, and moral law. The revival of the Machiavellian doctrine of the complete separation of politics from morals was accompanied by, or rather in a large measure the result of, the newly awakened faith in the omnipotence of the human will. The theory that man if given free rein could make himself what he willed was speedily adapted to apply to the Nation-State. It had come to be doubted that the course of human history, the flow and sequence of events, was either natural or necessary. Not only was it subject to change, to accidents, but especially to the will of man, the nature of which was only vaguely understood.

The new science of psychology attracted able inquirers who sought to investigate the motive of human action, to formulate a scientific hypothesis of the will divested of its moral attributes, and if possible to arrive at a clearer understanding of its nature. The will, independent of moral direction, untrammelled by moral law, was held to be best suited not merely to guide the destiny but to promote the welfare of the State. It was becoming the current conviction, proved by so many examples drawn from everyday life, that moderate mental faculties, inferior capacity, and even limited opportunity could be transformed into assets of great power by a firm, tenacious, persevering will. It was coming to be felt that the will, steeled against vacillation and weakness, could more than offset other deficiencies. The survival of the fittest meant the survival of the strongest will to survive. It was not lost sight of that the individual could often to great advantage make use of the negative qualities of will such as endurance, stamina, fortitude. But in the affairs of State the negative ex-

pression of the will was deemed inadequate to promote practical political aims, as the State had at its disposal the means of coercion based on the use of armed force. In other words, the State was held an expression of a positive will; the individual often of a negative will. The State must not endure; it must act. Political power is to be measured by the success of the policy pursued. The State must outline this policy with care, and weigh carefully in the balance whether its object can be attained by peaceful methods; if not, whether it has the strength to secure the desired end; how it can best secure the necessary foreign assistance, or undermine the strength of its opponent, preparatory to attacking him. War according to these precepts is not an evil for the State, which enters upon it in pursuing a carefully matured plan; it is merely a manifestation of its will. A realist perception of the actual situation, a close union of will and intelligence, would serve to render man and the personalised Nation-State omnipotent.

Power was deemed the highest aim of the State and had even in common parlance become synonymous with the word "State." It was no longer conceived that the end of the State, the object of political practice, was the maintenance of peace, but rather the prevention of unpremeditated war. The unknown, untamed forces of the human will were to be relied upon to impose a conscious self-restraint upon the policy of statesmen, which was to be cast off at a favorable opportunity if the aims and need of State required it. Virtues were coming to be held attributes of the will; of a will which could manifest itself only as force. Right knows no other agency than might. Even the will of God rests solely on its own omnipotence; and similarly in reference to the State the right of might is the assertion of the national will.

Such in brief outline were the underlying factors of the new spirit of realism in politics, sharpened by the competitive spirit which was increasing among States. It marks the decline of rationalism and the coincident rise of the new volitional theories as yet only vaguely differentiated.

Whatever altruism remained in public affairs was set down as emotionalism, a debilitating influence which weakened the will. The discipline of patriotism, the fervor of a realist nationalism, the vigorous, assertive vitality of the Nation-State could, it was thought, best be heightened and strengthened by the close interplay of political and economic forces.

CHAPTER X

The Politico-Economic Theory of State

TERMS DEFINED—THE END OF THE STATE—RÔLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL—UNION OF THE STATE AND ITS MEMBERS—PHASES OF TRANSITION—CLASSIFICATION OF STATES—NEW FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE—EDUCATION—PUBLIC WELFARE—ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE—MOTIVES OF PUBLIC POLICY—THE NEW ABSOLUTISM—SURVEY OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS TO POLITICAL THEORY

I

In tracing the transition of the politico-juridic concept of the State and the formulation of the basis of the politico-economic [1] theory which has been developing since 1870 a change in the object of the State must first be noted.

The individualist basis of the politico-juridic theory of State under middle class control had led to the formulation of the thesis that the State exists merely as a means for promoting the welfare of the individual. "Societies and laws exist only for the object of increasing the sum of private happiness." [2] According to this typically middle class conception, the State was held to

[1] By the term "politico-economic," I would seek to define the fusion of the elemental components of the new theory of State which was to evolve during the ensuing half century, as expressing most concisely the close alliance between political practice and economic motive. It is not intended to infer that economic motive had in the past been absent, nor that the word "politico-economic" be understood in the sense usually attributed to political economy. It is rather my purpose to discern that the State had abandoned its strict juridic personality and was no longer to adhere so closely to its rational, middle class individualist ideal.

[2] Cf. Macaulay, *Essay on Machiavelli*, p. 47.

be a collection of individuals who had adopted certain rules and regulations and created an artificial institution for furthering their personal wellbeing. The State was not looked upon as an entity having a specific object and aim of its own.[1] This view was no longer tenable when the personalised Nation-State came to be endowed with its distinctive national characteristics, the development of which has been outlined. There now seemed to be a tendency, more especially in continental Europe, to return to the classical concept that the aim of the State is not to serve the individual, but that the individual must serve the State, and that individual freedom is merely a part of national freedom.

However, the classical theory of State left too little to the initiative of the individual, and did not make proper use of his energy and skill. While it came to be admitted that the State has an object of its own, a mission to fulfil, a civilising function to perform which at times requires the self-sacrifice of the individual for the common welfare, yet it was conceded that the individual should have a wide field left to him in which to develop his capacities, and to further his personal wellbeing. It was held that it was the duty of the State not merely to protect but to assist him.

There thus arose a dualism of function, both of the State and of the individual. The State was concerned with the assertion of national power—politics—the positive national will—the individual with the creation of

[1] Cf. Herbert Spencer, who declared that since the community has no corporate consciousness "this is an everlasting reason why the welfare of citizens cannot be rightly sacrificed to some supposed benefit of the State, but why on the other hand the State is to be maintained solely for the benefit of citizens," and again "the corporate life in society must be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life."—*Westminster Review*, January 1860.

national wealth—economics—the negative national will. The function of the State was primarily political; the function of the individual was primarily economic. The union of the two formed the complete Nation-State. The individual in his private capacity was concerned chiefly with his economic wellbeing; as a member of the State he was concerned with politics. Upon the introduction of universal suffrage it came to include the greater majority of the adult male population.

In return for the political part played by the individual in public affairs, in return for support of a party programme or a national policy, he came to demand not merely police protection and all that it implies, but economic assistance and benefits necessary to his material wellbeing. Thus the State, in addition to its political functions in affirming national power, no longer content to confine itself merely to the maintenance of juridic relations, was to seek to promote economic development.

Here we have the genesis of the politico-economic concept of the State. It was a coöperation on the part of the individual and of the State, conceived as separate entities, each having separate fields of activity but a common aim: the increase of the power of the State. Politics was something more than the maintenance of right; it was a weapon of national power. Economics was something more than the maintenance of wellbeing; it was a weapon of national strength. This harmonious union between the aims and capacities of the State and its members, this specialisation of function and coöperation in enterprise, endowed the State with a virility and energy which it had never possessed.

The rise of this new concept of the State which has hitherto not been so precisely formulated marks the final

phase of control of the body politic by the Middle Class.[1] During the ensuing sixty years the Middle Class was to enjoy the fruition of its long and tenacious struggle for political ascendancy, whose milestones in time can be so clearly marked—1689, 1776, 1789, 1830, 1848, 1870.

II

The Middle Class which had developed the politico-juridic concept of the State had raised the individual to a pinnacle of power to which he had never in the past attained. It had made possible a Cromwell and a Napoleon, had created the Nation-State in the image of man, had formulated new doctrines of liberty and made man believe that he might command his own destiny. With success in power came the inevitable arrogance which accompanies power. The middle class concept of the social mission of man rapidly passed through the phases of high idealism and cosmopolitanism, and when finally triumphant adopted the more immediate and tangible utilitarian doctrines of nationalism and capitalism. As a result the State was no longer believed to be fashioned in the image of man, but was looked upon as the weapon of man. No longer content to bear the restraints of the juridical basis which had made possible the growth of the State, the Middle Class sought for a fresh symbol. It had accepted progress and perfectibility as axiomatic and rejected all belief in the importance of regress or decay. The liberalism which was its distinctive mark had evolved a philosophy of history, based upon the concept of the gradual

[1] It is to be remarked that this new theory of State was forced upon the Middle Class by the rising Proletariat and was adopted more as an accommodation than as a result of inherent conviction.

and progressive improvement of mankind. But the only proofs of validity that could be adduced from this theory were to be found in the material world, in the realm of the production of the good things of life, in the storing up of wealth, in the building up of industry, in the expansion of commerce. In brief, the metaphysical elements of the politico-juridic theory of State were inevitably doomed to make way for a more materialistic interpretation of social life, which in its essence was alien to middle class dogma. In the process, moral law was lost sight of, moral courage had become debilitated, material wellbeing was deemed all important.

Those States which rested upon politically conscious, economically vigorous, numerically strong populations rose to power. The development of national power led to a further growth of world power and was accompanied by a transformation of nationalism into imperialism, which served to mould the practice and historical development of the politico-economic theory of State.

States were henceforth to be divided into distinct categories according to the sphere of their influence. World Powers were States which played a preponderant part in political affairs throughout the world, or at least far beyond their national borders and continent. Great Powers were those which had influence within a more restricted area and had not the strength to assert their will in distant lands, either owing to the absence of a strong offensive weapon such as a navy, or because their interests were more directly limited to their own continent.

These two categories of States were essentially aggressive in action and had the power to enforce their will. With them the policing and peace of the world rested.

Besides these there were the smaller States, Minor

Powers, which took no part in the broader policies or plans of aggrandisement and endeavored to maintain their independence rather than to increase their power. This independence was in some instances guaranteed by the Great Powers.[1]

While the World Powers were already engaged in protecting their members abroad, and this protection was by degrees extended to their industrial, commercial, and even social enterprises—and in uncivilised and semi-civilised countries was to have so far-reaching an influence on colonial development—all States were engaged in promoting national prosperity by a zealous interest in caring for, and developing the wellbeing of, their citizens at home.

In order to maintain internal peace, a broad-minded toleration no longer sufficed. The State, it was believed, must assist in creating the means of the prosperity of its members. It must promote their industry, not merely by insuring the maintenance of peaceful conditions, safeguarding private property and public order by the faithful administration of justice and general police functions, but by actively participating in the development of all resources afford every opportunity for increasing individual ability and wellbeing. This civilising function of the State, it was felt, would translate itself into economic expansion and national prestige, which would raise the status of the State by improving the condition of its members.

The State now earnestly concerned itself with public education and no longer left it to the option of the individual, but by offering opportunities for him to acquire

[1] Thus France, Great Britain, and Russia were held (*circa* 1875) World Powers; Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, the United States, Great Powers. Among the Minor Powers were Spain, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland.

an education at the expense of the State, compelled attendance at school as part of his duty in preparing himself to become a useful member of the community. In some countries this educational function was carried to great length.[1] The spirit of scientific research was stimulated by State aid; the general culture of the people was broadened by State subsidies to theatres, museums, etc. The State also contributed to the welfare of its members by affording practical assistance along other lines. It undertook to establish such new enterprises as seemed beyond the scope of individual initiative. The telegraph and postal service, the construction and administration of roads and railways, in which the twofold purpose of stimulating economic development and strategic requirements was kept in view, served to place at the disposal of the individual additional means for increasing the field of his business activity. In this same spirit the State granted subsidies to shipping companies, and, in certain instances, for the exploitation of natural resources, in which immediate profit was not apparent and private investors were unwilling to assume the risks. Henceforth the State was to become a principal promoter of national prosperity, either by direct aid in those States where economic development had been retarded, or by a judicious and benevolent policy to protect and further private initiative. Free trade and *laissez-faire* were being replaced by these newer methods of State aid and State supervision. But in every instance the State was careful to leave in the hands of the individual the profit which might accrue to the most vigorous and enterprising, and favored competition which would strengthen the strong and crush the weak. This could not fail to in-

[1] Denmark, Prussia, and France. England was the last Western State to adopt national compulsory education (1872).

fluence public policy, which came more and more to be concerned with furthering economic design, not merely for the sake of individual welfare but more especially as the foundation of national strength.

In theory the State remained the guardian of private prerogative and assured to the individual full liberty. But the closer identity of the individual with the State, the fusion of the image of the State with that of the individual, the growing conviction that the State was not merely a country, but much more an association of individuals of common national stock or bound by common economic interests, served to gloss over, and later even make it appear very desirable for the State gradually to take over many of the prerogatives which had hitherto been believed to belong exclusively to the individual. It is not to be overlooked that the system of reciprocity by which the State in a collective sense gave assistance to the individual in his private capacity, in return for the docile surrender by the latter of his personality, resulted in a great increase in power of the State and in the prosperity of the individual. The menace of the increasing strength of the State, which thus became in fact a world in itself, a law unto itself, that recognised no curb to its will save that of force, was, if ever consciously considered, lost sight of.

The State engaged in the pursuit of power, the individual in the pursuit of prosperity, had found a common ground of action, in which the interests of the individual became identified with those of the State. Thus arose the new motive of public policy, the protection and promotion of interests. What were these interests? Now that the State had assumed for itself the function of advancing the economic wellbeing of the individual, it was held that political motive not only must

not pretend solely to govern public policy, but that it was the duty of the State frankly and overtly to look to economic motives as well. It had come to be recognised that it was a primary duty of the State not merely to lend full protection to its members residing abroad, but also to secure for them the fullest advantages to trade in civilised as well as in uncivilised lands. This protection was by degrees extended to industrial and commercial enterprise. The State took it upon itself to look out for the interests of its members, or nationals, as they now come to be called in diplomatic language. By treaties and other agreements the various Western Powers sought to secure the most favorable treatment for the enterprise of their nationals. Diplomatic intercourse was henceforth largely concerned with adjusting commercial conflicts and advancing private economic interests, which were in many instances soon identified with those of the State. In extreme cases the State did not consider it beneath its dignity to make use of its full armed force to back up the claims of an individual, more particularly in uncivilised or semi-civilised regions, or in the Orient. It was deemed a curtailment of national prestige not to enforce full reparation for damage done to the interests of citizens resident abroad, and the State which could afford the fullest protection to its members was deemed entitled to the most respect. The function of the State had gradually evolved from the protection of rights to that of the protection of interests. Interest had come to be held the essential element of right. Interest created right. Interest required protection; right required enforcement, so protection of interest often required the use of coercive or compulsory measures.

The complete separation of morals from politics already referred to had resulted in the belief that the State

was concerned in the first instance solely with increasing its own power and with promoting the wellbeing of its members, and only indirectly with that of humanity in general. The question of the justice or morality of a policy came more and more to be disregarded.[1] The perversion of the moral sense, the benumbing of moral consciousness which the new politico-economic concept of the State had served to increase, was only possible without an immediate lapse into social anarchy, as a result of the stricter social discipline of the industrial system, and the tendency to entrust to the State the power to regulate the life and conduct of the individual.

There arose at this time in France a school of thinkers who sought to combat the encroachments of the State. A leader of this movement was Proudhon who has been called the founder of "anarchy." Though a confirmed opponent of Communism he looked upon the State and its increasing omnipotence as incongruous, as enslaving the individual and acting as potently as the Church had in fostering superstition and prejudice which tended, so he alleged, to thwart the moral development of man. He was among the first to declare himself in favor of the destruction of the State as the social authority, and showed himself to be an avowed enemy of the principle of nationality. "The boundary of States is to be sought in the consent of the people and never in the natural configuration of land or sea." [2] Another ardent champion of the anti-nationalist movement, though not an anarchist, as he did not seek to overthrow constituted authority in the State, advocated the theory that the further growth

[1] A good example, and by no means an exception to the general trend of policy followed by all World Powers in dealing with weaker States, is to be found in the attitude of the British Government in its dealings with China concerning the suppression of the opium trade.

[2] Cf. Proudhon, *Correspondence*, 1859-1862.

of the Nation-State should be checked by splitting it up into small provinces or basins. He predicted very sanguinely that within a century "from out of the ruins of United Britain the four kingdoms which composed it will be resurrected. . . . Italian unity will scarcely have time to establish itself firmly before it will disappear. . . . Russia—Great Russia, Little Russia, Red and White Russia will replace the Russian Empire. . . . Prussia will also be split up, and Austria will be crowded back into the archdukedom that was its cradle. . . . The unity of France will have to give way to the laws of history, which show us that great empires are monstrous exceptions to the life of mankind . . . the unity of France which dates from yesterday, from this morning, has no firm roots in the past and on its ruins we will see arising five States." [1]

III

The disciplinary influence of religion, with its code of moral laws, was giving way to the more ruthless economic discipline with its code of material interests. The increasing pressure of competition required a new sense of social discipline, which could, it was believed, be enforced by the State if exclusive authority was conferred upon it. The State was daily growing more absolute.

[1] Odysse-Barot, *Lettres sur la Philosophie de l'Histoire,* p. 150 *et seq.* (Paris, 1864). The author sets out to demonstrate that society is ruled by force, and in support of his contention he surveys the thirty-three centuries from the 15th century B.C. to date (1861) and declares as a result of his researches: "From the time when in 1496 B.C. the agreement was entered upon establishing between the twelve states of Greece the Amphictyonic League down to the treaty of January 23, 1861, between France and England, I have counted 8,397 treaties. In spite of these 8,397 solemn agreements of peace, alliance and friendship, in the long stretch of 3,357 years—1496 B.C. to 1861 A.D.—there were only 227 years of peace as against 3,130 years of war."—*Ibidem,* p. 20.

It arrogated to itself the right to decide all questions of whatever nature, whether political, economic, or social. It refused to countenance any other authority within its boundaries, any *imperium in imperio* such as the Church of Rome was inclined to set up, and jealously guarded its prerogative of sovereignty. In extending its sway over the individual, by serving to increase his material prosperity, the State now came to require the implicit as well as the explicit allegiance of its members, and viewed with distrust any influence, even that of the Church, when not enlisted in promoting national interests. While technically the State was concerned solely with the external life of the individual, and disclaimed any desire to interfere with his convictions or beliefs, to control his abilities, or to limit his capacities—in brief no rights over his mental or spiritual life—yet by taking charge of his education, by affording opportunities for self-development, by strengthening his sense of loyalty, the State had come to be looked upon by the individual as filling his whole horizon. In this way national patriotism afforded the sole stimulus to an otherwise spiritually barren life.

Politics as the dominant factor in social life had reached the high-water mark of its development. Liberalism had run its course. The State was again becoming absolute. This new absolutism was not unlike that fostered by the politico-theistic concept of the State, which identified the sovereign with the Godhead, and led to the formation of national States during the 16th century. Richelieu and Wolsey were to find their modern counterpart in Bismarck and Cavour. For though the politico-theistic concept was not revived, and sovereignty as the personal attribute of the Prince had given way to national sovereignty, the fundamental principle of arbitrary power

exercised over the life and conduct of the individual citizen or subject was strikingly similar. The modern State was, to be sure, no longer identified with the Godhead. As the theistic concept had been displaced to make way for the juridic concept of the State created in the image of man, so now the State was coming to be conceived of no longer as the image of man with his natural functions and articulations, but as an invention of man, a tool, a weapon, a machine,[1] the product of the collective will, man-made, and standing in the same relation to man, as man had stood in ages past to his God. The belief that God had made man for a definite purpose had, as we have seen, as a result of scientific biological investigation, been proved false, and had been replaced by the conviction that the only strongly purposeful creative impulse rested with man. By abandoning any analogy with natural law, by confining his efforts to considering the realist ends in view, man, it was believed, would be able to devise a political order which would satisfy the modern scientific temper.

The new politico-economic theory of State, which revived the rigid realism of the older absolutism, was born in an era of pessimism, and as such was a negative, inadequate concept, a groping for a new social formula, the result of a desire to formulate less distasteful, less wasteful social arrangements, rather than to seek for a consciously better form. In other words, no strong impulse to growth, no strong incentive to development had led to

[1] I have made use of the word "machine" merely to point to the tendency already beginning to be evident that the analogy of the organic nature of the State was no longer rigidly adhered to. The mutual dependence of parts distinguishes an organism from a machine; in the latter the parts concur for a common end, to which each contributes in its way, but in which each does not contribute to the support of all or any of the rest. The State retained outwardly many of its organic characteristics, but the trend towards a mechanical interpretation was increasing.

the formation of this new theory of State. Viewed from the standpoint of the Middle Class it must be looked upon as the completion and end, the final stage of its political evolution, which had its beginning after the Reformation. As religion had been displaced by politics as the moulding force in social life, as in secular affairs the Church had been definitely supplanted by the State, after a period of compromise, so the politically organised Nation-State was in due course to be replaced by a new social ordering. As religion had after the rise of national States become avocational, so now politics was to become an avocation.

The eminent services rendered by the Middle Class to Western civilisation must not, however, be overlooked. The Middle Class was the great liberalising force in the world. Its social function was primarily negative. It was as protestants that the Middle Class exerted its greatest influence. It was made up of men whose vigor was moral and material rather than spiritual and physical. The courage of the Crusader and the idealism of the ascetic were incomprehensible to them. The high-flown fantasy of chivalry and the pomp of Papal Rome were looked upon with distrust, principally because they were held useless and wasteful. The strength of the Middle Class lay in its liberalism and utilitarian viewpoint; in its moderation and moral courage. It stood for toleration, liberty of conscience, and individual freedom; self-determination, self-help, and self-government. Its mission in the Western World was to impose restraints [1] upon, to curb, the untamed passions of man, freed from a superstitious faith in a blind Providence and acting as a rational being.

[1] "All that makes existence valuable to any one depends on the enforcements of restraints upon the actions of other people."—J. S. Mill, *On Liberty,* Introductory.

The Middle Class which had clothed the egotism of individualism in a halo of virtue did much to raise the dignity of man. It sought to individualise the State and mark it off as man's domain. It was first empirical, then rational, then cosmopolitan, and finally national. Whatever guise it assumed, its strength lay chiefly in its negating force. It combatted a false creed or pernicious policy with tenacity; reformed, rebuilt, remodelled, but lacked the boldness to strike out along radically new paths, and preferred to make use of the materials at hand.

IV

If we look down the long vista of centuries and review the rise of the Middle Class to power we cannot fail to be impressed how far below our expectation are the positive results obtained. The Middle Class conferred upon the world an infinite number of small benefits: it restrained the rapacity of princes and placed the services of the practical man above the inspiration of the seer. As long as there were reforms to be undertaken, as long as there was work to be done in raising the status of the individual, in arousing political consciousness, in awakening national solidarity, in transforming the religiously controlled body politic into a secular organisation the Middle Class was equal to its task. Furthermore the Middle Class gave to the world a belief in liberty, a faith in toleration, and a hope in equality as expressed in constitutional government. But if we were to compare the achievement of the Middle Class with that of the last great proletarian movement, Christianity, or the aristocratic feudal régime evolved under the influence of the Holy Roman Empire and the Church

of Rome, we will find that the Middle Class was never able to realise a positive growth of its own, but was compelled to adapt old formulæ to new requirements. Even equalitarian democracy, which has always been pointed to as the especial contribution of the Middle Class to modern political practice, remained in point of fact little more than a phrase, as it presupposed a privileged electoral body, beneath which there remained a great mass of unenfranchised humanity, by whom the monotonous and tedious work of society was to be performed. The awakening of political consciousness among this lower or working class forced the Middle Class into a position of aggressive leadership which it was unfit to assume. Henceforth its leaders were compelled to undertake a policy of accommodation. Politics became a matter of compromise.

Class consciousness was never strongly developed by the Middle Class. Of all the elements which have gained control of the social order the Middle Class was the least jealous to retain the distinctive marks of its solidarity. This serves to explain the readiness with which universal suffrage was granted, in the hope of being able to assimilate the masses politically and substitute competition between States for competition between classes.

The rise of the Middle Class to power coincided with the rise of the Nation-State as the social unit. The State so conceived sought to impose its authority upon and to stamp as its own all of its members. This imprint was made to appear as emanating from the collective will of the people and not as class rule. Herein lay the strength of middle class policy. Its principal source of weakness is to be found in the fact that, while professing to exalt the individual, to secure for him the benefits of political liberty and the prerogatives of equality, to pro-

mote self-determination, self-assertion and self-development as expressed in the term "self-government," the Middle Class was never able to free itself from the conviction that it is by imposing restraints rather than by affirming indefeasible rights that the body politic must be governed.

John Stuart Mill, who embodied more completely than any other political philosopher the mentality of the Middle Class at the highest stage of its evolution, in defining the relation of the individual to society in civilised communities, sets forth the principle:

"That the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." [1]

While it was still admitted that social life, scientifically conceived, rested on purely utilitarian foundations, this older individualist concept was rapidly dying out. Public and private morals were coming to be systematised by State supervision, or in those countries such as England or the United States where self-help and self-determination were strongly developed, public opinion served the

[1] Cf. *op. cit.*, Introductory.

same purpose. The State was assuming the function of regulating and disciplining the moral as well as the physical life of the individual, in order to make possible a collective, cohesive discipline, by affirming the power of the State, and emphasising the weakness of the individual; in turn cajoling him by the mirage of the greatness of the State of which he was a member, if need be arousing his patriotism to the sacrifice even of his life for the professed need of the State, or coercing and compelling him if required. Whether these functions were assumed directly by the government, as was the case in continental Europe, or by public opinion, as was the case in English-speaking countries, the results were identical. Wherever we look we find an increasing debilitation of moral sense, an increasing stultification of spiritual motive. We find the same underlying tendency to consider sound credit above sound faith, and an empirical test the final arbitrament. It is not necessary to seek far for the causes of this change. The State was becoming professedly non-moral. That interest creates right, that right is weak and unreal unless backed by might, and that the State must be ready to defend its interests as it must be prepared to assert its strength, regardless of any question of actual right, had led to the creation of a group of national States whose rapacity was confined only by policy or weakness, and whose example remained the only norm of social life.

Such was the political creed of the Middle Class on the eve of its dissolution as the sole controlling factor in the State. We may here trace the origins of the new politico-economic theory of State which was to confer upon the State not merely the right but the duty to intervene in what had hitherto been considered the

domain of private affairs, and to identify the interests of the individual with those of the State. We may thus discover that the new politico-economic theory of State was not the handiwork of the Middle Class alone.

The middle class theory had expressed itself in individualism and nationalism. The Nation-State was the product of this theory. With its rise and firm establishment the cultural mission of the Middle Class had been accomplished.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

The First International Movement

THE DECLINE OF NATIONALISM—QUANTITATIVE VALUES—IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM—THE PART OF ENGLAND—ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT—ITS CHARACTER—RAPID GROWTH—THE CONGRESS OF BASEL—THE PARIS COMMUNE—THE ATTITUDE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

I

THE rise of Prussia had upset the balance of power in Europe. The defeat of France had left the newly-created German Empire in a dominant position on the Continent. The new Nation-States, Germany and Italy, whose unity had been won simultaneously, had attained their mature territorial delimitations. Austria-Hungary under the Dualist régime had secured for the time being internal peace. France though crippled had not been dismembered, and was left free to reorganise her government on the approved parliamentary model. The minor States had been protected by international guarantees or treaties. The extension of representative government had led to the strengthening of the hand of constituted authority and insured its stability.

While the government of Russia remained that of a military despotism, it had liberated the serfs, which seemed to portend an era of more liberal rule. Though this was not realised, the growth of political consciousness among the Russian people made great strides, and revolutionary propaganda was carried on with increasing

zeal and activity. The situation of the economically and politically backward peoples of the Balkans still remained obscure, and this region was to become a fertile field for intrigue and armed conflict. The Danubian Principalities, or Rumania as they were now called, under a German ruler assisted by foreign capital, were being rapidly developed. The other Balkan peoples dreamed of national independence, but the difficulties which beset the path of its realisation seemed insurmountable, more particularly to the Southern Slavs, a large section of whom would remain under Austrian rule, even if the yoke of Turkey could be cast off. On the American continent the United States, after the ordeal of the Civil War, was entering upon an era of unprecedented growth. Their successful intervention in Mexican affairs, their forceful assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in protecting the continent against European encroachments, had served to assist in reuniting the two parts of the country so lately at war, and affirmed the ascendancy of the United States in American affairs. In the Orient, Japan was already beginning to look to the West anxious to enter into the current of political and economic progress.

Looked at in its broader aspects, nationalism as an aggressive political principle seemed to be dying out. France, in establishing the Third Republic, had for the time rid herself of the incubus of the defence of the principle of nationality as a doctrine of political propaganda. Nationality in its German interpretation of racial supremacy had triumphed; even a section of French public opinion came to accept the argument that race is a distinctive mark of the Nation-State, though the French were no longer prepared to wage war in defending the national aspirations of other States.

In seeking for the causes of the decline of nationalism

it will be found that it was coming to be supplanted by a new and more all-embracing motive of policy, consonant with the growth of the power and interests of the State. Hitherto the strong States of Western Europe had been principally engaged in extending their national boundaries, in defining their national individuality, or in asserting their national personality. The hope which France entertained of succeeding to the hegemony of continental Europe in return for the assistance she had rendered to the various Nation-States then in the process of formation, had been frustrated by the rise of Germany. France not only was unable to assume the leadership among a group of relatively strong sister States, but had been forced into a position of isolation and inferiority in the new competition for power, which was to become the sole motive of foreign policy.

II

The new political creed may be briefly summarised as follows. The State is Power, and requires power, not merely to exert its authority at home, but to assure the respect of its nationals abroad. Power in its politico-economic sense is most readily expressed by size of national territory and population. The tendency to form great States; the impulse which drove men to urban life and resulted in great cities; the energy in organising great industrial enterprises were the result of the implicit trust placed in numbers as the principal element of power, in quantity as against quality, in aggressive progressive activity instead of cautious rational development, and above all in the conviction which had been borrowed from the sphere of economics, that weakness is akin to crime.

This new way of thinking, this dynamic interpretation of social phenomena and the transference of quantitative analysis to the realm of politico-social life was essentially alien to the ideals of the Middle Class, and its acceptance must be accounted for by acknowledging that the control of the State was passing out of the hands of this class. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the Middle Class now sought to identify itself completely with the State, and efface itself as a class by absorbing and uniting all classes in the personalised Nation-State.

History affords adequate confirmation of the fact that before a new social order becomes ascendant and new social arrangements are adopted, the new forces make themselves felt on the old, and produce a final flowering of the old order. In this way we may trace the rise of the Middle Class at the close of the mediæval period, which produced the Renaissance and the Reformation, both of which belong to the older order. In our own times the great economic expansion of the last quarter of the 19th century, and the cultural progress which was realised, were in a large measure the result of the rise of the Proletariat.

It is in this light that the new motives of political practice, imperialism and internationalism, must be looked upon as the first reaction against middle class ascendancy—the precursory manifestations of a more complete change in social organisation.

Imperialism and internationalism are directly related. They first arose simultaneously among the people whose political capacity had been most fully developed, and whose economic evolution was most advanced. Both are transition policies and have therefore remained hitherto ill-defined and even appeared as subversive factors of politico-social progress.

Imperialism may be designated as the expression of the Nation-State as Power, in the process of over-expansion; Internationalism, as a dissolvent of the Nation-State. Imperialism appeared as the logical sequence of national growth, and few of its middle class supporters realised that in supporting imperialism they were serving a political theory alien to their continuance in control, and perilous to the survival of the Nation-State. Internationalism was the first corporate expression of the Proletariat, which directed attention to the possibility of extra-national social organisation.[1]

It has already been pointed out that England had in modern times assumed the part of political tutor to the Western World. Here political liberty and economic independence, which led to the establishment of constitutional government and the development of the capitalist system, were first declared the imprescriptible rights of man. It is with no surprise, therefore, that we must again turn to England to discover the birthplace of the new imperialist and internationalist movements.[2]

[1] The various international movements which have arisen, and the large number of international agreements which have been entered upon by sovereign States, from the Geneva Convention (1864) to the Hague Arbitrations and the League of Nations (1919), must be looked upon as efforts to bolster up the old politico-juridic thesis of State, and are not to be considered a part of internationalism, which was more exclusively proletarian. However, these movements are symptomatic of the striving towards the breaking down of the rigid egoism of the Nation-State, and as such will be examined in the course of the discussion of the efforts of the State to meet the requirements of the changing social order.

[2] Numerous political writers have sought to demonstrate that it was in Germany that imperialism was first developed. Some even go so far as to account for the unification of Germany on imperialist grounds. This interpretation would appear erroneous, as German and for that matter Italian unity are the products of racial nationalism. Thus Boutmy in his careful analysis of the psychology of political development remarks: *"L'impérialisme est un état psychologique qui a commencé a paraître en Europe vers 1860. l'Allemagne l'a éprouvé la première; puis il a gagné l'Angleterre, la France, et a enfin traversé l'Atlantique pour s'épanouir aux Etats Unis."*—Cf. *Eléments d'une Psychologie Politique du Peuple Américain,* Chap. VII.

We might adduce much evidence to prove that whereas the theoretical

England, which had hitherto been in the vanguard of political development, had during the period of nationalist expansion and the growth of Nation-States on the Continent, fallen to a secondary position in European affairs. She was engaged in concentrating her energy on economic expansion, and had taken little or no part in assisting national groups in their efforts to constitute themselves as independent States.

The first organised expression of internationalism grew out of a visit which French workingmen paid to London to the "International Exhibition" held there in 1862. After a number of meetings with British workers, it was decided to organise an International Workingmen's Association, which became known as the First Internationale, with the view of securing international solidarity among workingmen to promote their economic betterment.

By 1864 the Internationale was duly organised, and Karl Marx was entrusted with the task of the drafting of its programme, which was adopted in 1866 by representatives of the Proletariat of the leading countries of the Western World. It soon recruited stanch adherents from the confines of Hungary to the coasts of California. The Internationale suddenly found itself in the front rank of the opposition to the existing social order. Its avowed purpose was to overthrow the capitalist system. To achieve this end it advocated the use of the most powerful weapon of coercion yet devised—the international strike.

basis of both imperialism and internationalism came from Germany their first practical application is to be sought in England. It is significant that the theory of imperialism and internationalism, or as we might call them the doctrines of Bismarck and Marx, had their first tryout at the hands of the English and French and only at a later date do we find Germany committed to an imperialist programme, while the principles of "German Socialism" dominated the international movement.

Such was the basis of the actual organisation of the first international movement. In spite of the energy of its organisers and its rapid spread it was not to be expected that the International could have any very great immediate political influence on the Nation-State. It is of importance more especially as indicating the new trend of social evolution.

Though the Internationale was professedly communist and accepted in principle communist theories as consonant with the aims of the Proletariat in its struggle against middle class individualism, it included no revolutionary programme to bring about the breakdown of national States, or even any plan to establish closer political relations between the members of various States. It was in point of fact principally a project for coördinating the labor movements in various States, and for securing the support of the stronger labor unions, regardless of national affiliations.[1]

It is significant of the character of this first international movement that in drawing up its programme Marx abandoned many of his radical doctrines of 1848, which had made of Communism so trenchant a denunciation of middle class political and economic control. Now we find written into the body of the declaration that the members of the Internationale "will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality as the basis of their conduct towards one another and towards all men, without regard to color, creed, or nationality," which reads much like a favorite political platitude of the Middle Class. It appears evident that national allegiance and national patriotism were still uppermost in the minds of the majority of the Proletariat, and that whatever

[1] The strike of the bronze workers in Paris (1867), and of the building trades in Geneva (1868) were successfully supported by funds contributed by British labor unions.

scope was given to the feelings of international solidarity was secondary to that of national obedience.

However, as an attempt to arouse class consciousness the Internationale is of no little political significance. The concept of an international union of the Proletariat as a class, regardless of national affiliations, cannot be said to have been clearly visualised. Yet there was sown the seed of the conviction that the social order might possibly exist without the need of national allegiance, without the adherence of the individual to a national State, as trade might be carried on without the intervention of the middleman.

III

The Nation-State was engaged in patterning its members on one model, in eliminating all class distinctions and removing regional or racial disabilities in a political sense, by introducing fullest political equality and stimulating racial unity and national allegiance. It promoted competition between States for power and between individuals for economic advantage. This competition was producing economic and social inequalities far more immediate and real than the political equality the State claimed to vouchsafe.

The international movement was a first feeble attempt to unite the Proletariat, ostensibly regardless of national allegiance, in its assault upon this system of middle class, anti-social organisation, and by pointing out the fallacies and injustice of the competitive system, it declared that, "the emancipation of labor is neither a local nor a national but a social problem." But nationalism was still too strong a force, the concept of the Nation-State still

too recent a dogma, to permit of the realisation of any programme in which these two factors were to be eliminated.

In examining into the tenets of the First Internationale with its vague profession of "no rights without duties, no duties without rights," we will find that it was a co-operative rather than a corporate movement. It conceived of the Proletariat as having certain interests in common in its struggle against capitalism, and sought to establish a system of international coöperation between labor unions, in the first instance to strengthen labor so as to be able to fight on something like equal terms with capital, and only as a far remoter objective, to overthrow the capitalistic system. None of the leaders of the Internationale appear consciously to have envisaged the corporate interests of the Proletariat as requiring a politico-economic as well as a social organisation altogether different from that which existed, or the intimate and inextricable affiliation of the capitalist system with that of the accepted tenets of government and the democratic organisation of the Nation-State. Even the most advanced sections of the Internationale sought to secure the control of power in the State by adopting the political methods then in vogue, which accounts for the temporising character of the charter of internationalism.

The growth of the international movement had been rapid. At the Fourth Congress, held at Basel in 1869, the delegate from the United States claimed to represent 800,000 workers, while in every European country groups had been established, journals founded, which carried on an active propaganda. Already various European governments had become alarmed at the rapid spread of internationalism. The professions of middle

class political philosophers, demanding fullest liberty of thought and amplest toleration of all social and political views, which had found widest acceptance as the foundation of political liberty, were for a time overlooked in order to stamp out the new movement. In France and Germany legal proceedings were instituted to dissolve the organisation.

The Internationale had from the beginning rallied to its support all the various types of political malcontents—Anarchists, Nihilists, Communists—though their extremist tendencies were tempered by their contact with the more level-headed labor leaders. However, the occasion offered by the defeat of France and the overthrow of the Empire was deemed by some too useful an opportunity to let pass, without making an effort to further the programme of social revolution. Though the Internationale as an organisation took no part in the Paris revolution (1871), yet many of its members joined the movement on their own responsibility, in spite of the fact that the "Commune" had little in common with internationalist aims.[1] The failure of the Commune led to the disruption of the First Internationale. The more moderate elements led by Marx endeavored to purge the party of its more subversive members, more especially of the Russian nihilist group and the Jura Federation. This led to the secession of the latter under Bakunin, who

[1] Though Marx himself was led to endorse the Commune, it was a strictly political movement, and is not to be confounded with Marxian principles of communism. The French Communal doctrine of 1871 was that every commune, or at least every important city-commune like Paris, Lyons, or Marseilles, should be recognised as independent, and France a federation of such small units. This doctrine of regionalism was a reaction against the increasing centralisation and the uniformity of the Nation-State, and as such a recognition of the abuses arising out of the suppression of regional individuality, but it was neither a deeply rooted conviction, nor a carefully thought-out system of political organisation. *See* p. 232 *et seq.*

established a rival Internationale which gained adherents chiefly in Italy and Spain, while the Marxists set up their headquarters in New York. Already the Internationale had lost whatever political power it had gained, and within less than a decade the whole movement had to all intents and purposes collapsed.

The only tangible result of this first effort of the Proletariat to free itself from economic bondage and assert its solidarity as a class against the Nation-State was the strengthening of the labor movements in the various States, their close association with socialism, and the laying of the foundation of trade-unionism as a political factor.

The first assault on nationalism had been launched. Though the progress of the concept of internationalism was of necessity slow, it portended changes in social organisation which had never hitherto been contemplated.

CHAPTER II

Imperialism

RELATION TO CAPITALISM—RÔLE OF THE PROLETARIAT—MEGALOMANIA OF THE EPOCH—PROCESSES OF DECAY —INFLUENCE OF PESSIMISM

I

WHILE the Proletariat was engaged in its struggle with capitalism, and sought economic advantages rather than political privileges, the State was outgrowing its national boundaries. Economic expansion was raising new political problems difficult of solution, which were to involve the Nation-State in the pursuit of a policy of foreign enterprise fundamentally hostile to its concept.

"Extension of the British Empire in directions where trading interests and investments require the protection of the flag" [1] is the definition of imperialism in its modern sense, as given by the Oxford Dictionary. This definition succinctly sets forth the purely economic origin of the new political practice. With the frank acceptance of imperialism, a new theory of State was required. The older politico-juridic theory no longer sufficed. The way had been prepared by the revival of Machiavellian

[1] *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles,* edited by James A. H. Murray, Oxford. A note adds: "In the United States imperialism is similarly applied to the new policy of extending the rule of the American people over foreign countries and of acquiring and holding distant dependencies in the way in which colonies and dependencies are held by European States."

theories of the complete divorce of morality from politics and the rise of realism, both precursors of absolutism in a new form.

In order to explain logically the newer thesis of imperialism it would be more consonant with a true historical spirit to abandon the politico-juridic concept which arose with middle class ascendancy in the State, and seek to interpret the new policy by new standards which accompanied the rise of a new class to power in the State. Before proceeding further with a careful inquiry into the historical evolution of imperialism, as illustrated by the imperialist epoch (1877-1917) it is necessary to note that the vigor of capitalism, the sudden superabundant energy which some of the great States of Western Europe displayed that made imperialism possible, rested upon the economic vigor of the Proletariat. It was the ability of the workingmen to adapt themselves to the new industrialism, their willingness to produce more than they could consume, which created not merely the increased store of wealth at home, but made possible the exportable surplus and the consequent demand for more raw materials, in the first instance the causes of imperialist expansion.

The exploitation of new machinery, the new methods of production, the new modes of industrial organisation, the new channels of distribution as applied to commerce and industry, had virtually eliminated the old Middle Class. A careful investigation and intelligent examination of imperialism reveals that the Middle Class as such had little or no share therein. As long as overseas trade was carried on purely for profit; as long as it retained its purely individualist character, and remained a privilege without obligations, having no other aim than to insure the wellbeing and increase the store of wealth of

the individual, the Middle Class enthusiastically entered into it. But when foreign trade assumed something more of a political function, when it came to entail obligations, the moderate, limited, middle class mind showed itself congenitally hostile to this new development of national power which was to launch the State into the vortex of international conflict. Attention need only to be called to the hostility of the Middle Class towards this new type of colonial enterprise. The ardor with which it was combatted by the Manchester school, so typically middle class, is well illustrated by a perusal of the speeches of John Bright on Canada, and John Stuart Mill's opposition to the annexation of India.

II

Though the filiation at first seems obscure, it is susceptible of proof that imperialism, like internationalism, was in the main a proletarian movement; not the positive programme of its leaders, but the first corporate manifestation of the political consciousness of the masses on their entrance into the orbit of history.

The megalomania of the new era; the substitution of quantitative for qualitative standards; the expansive energy of national power in pursuit of extra-national aims; the zeal displayed in acquiring new territory, often regardless of its practical value; the desire of the State to assert itself as omnipotent; the acceptance of the belief that nations have a civilising mission to perform, and that they are the appointed instruments of God to fulfil this destiny; the marking off of the various nations in their own estimation as the anointed of the Deity for this purpose, all indicate a mystical element alien to

the temper of the Middle Class, but which is to be found at the basis of all great popular movements.

Side by side with the intense realism which capitalism infused into imperial enterprise, the strict enforcement of the most ruthless and arbitrary demands which were made by European Governments in behalf of their nationals in distant lands to promote their private interests, we find the sentimental enthusiasm with which the Proletariat greeted the news of the conquest of remote regions. The masses were ready to support their respective governments in the prosecution of a vigorous foreign policy. This committed the State to a programme of foreign expansion and served to undermine the foundations of the narrow and limited Nation-State, and to prepare it to assume a super-national character.

Territorial expansion, which was the principal imperialist phenomenon, also had a practical aspect. It was an acknowledgment that the territorial basis of the State, as hitherto conceived, was too small. More elbow room was needed for the growing population—altogether a proletarian need—an expression of the desire to have a share of greater material wellbeing, if not at home at least over-seas. Thus arose the aim of the State to control exclusively for itself as great a part of the globe as possible; to develop its colonial territory, not merely as a source of raw materials, but as a place of settlement for the surplus population.

Historians of the future, in examining the political evolution of the epoch under review, will possibly be able to discern with greater acuteness the particular features of proletarian influence, and the diverse and recondite factors of proletarian impulse to imperial expansion, which to us are still obscured by the outward formal ascendancy of the Middle Class, and the survival

in form of the politico-juridic concept of the State. But we can already trace the symptoms of the decay of the older order, upon the humus of which imperialism was flowering.

The process of decay is one of insubordination. In order that an organism may function with smooth energy and produce the fullest fruits, all the component parts must perform their allotted tasks, not merely with vigor, but also in rhythmic unity. As soon as one cell or group of cells ceases to maintain this rhythmic relation—attempts, figuratively speaking, to assert its independence—the organism becomes diseased, and the process of decay sets in. Decay may thus be defined as the breaking down of the normal relation, the predetermined functioning of the cells of an organism. Hence arise those anarchical relations which tend to disrupt and ultimately destroy it.

Translated into terms for use in an historical analysis of political theory such as we are attempting to outline, decadence may be said to set in when in a social system there arise a preponderant number of individuals unfit to perform their allotted tasks as parts of the social order. Exaggerated individualism—the superman—is in this sense a symptom of decadence. It implies the tendency to decomposition of the complex social fabric into its unorganised, primary condition; the competition of parts replacing the harmony of the whole.

It is in this way that we may interpret the development of individualism, its gradual contamination of the body politic, and the rise of nationalism as factors of decadence. It may be averred that this process is continuous, as growth and decay succeed each other. It is beyond our purpose to deal with the imaginative aspects of such a problem. Nor is it of immediate concern

whether, as is no doubt susceptible of proof, a civilisation at its highest point of achievement has already entered upon the period of decadence, and that culture is a corollary of decay. Yet we may note that the social unrest which has prevailed during the last decade of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th, is symptomatic of the decay of the older middle class theory of State, and that the new order is already vigorously thrusting itself upward, so that the events of these years belong to the new era.

If it were necessary to emphasise at greater length the process of social decay referred to, we might recall again the negative pessimistic temper of the period under review. Let us listen to the words of a shrewd French analyst, who was a university student at Paris soon after 1871, and who in the early eighties interpreted the spirit of his age with singular precision:

"A universal nausea, due to the inadequacies of life, fills the heart of Slavs, Germans, and Latins, and shows itself in the first group as nihilism, in the second as pessimism, and in ourselves by solitary and bizarre neuroses. The murderous rage of the conspirators of St. Petersburg, the writings of Schopenhauer, the furious incendiarism of the Commune, the relentless misanthropy of realistic novelists—I choose on purpose the most disparate examples—all reveal the same negation of the value of life, which with every passing day is enshrouding Western civilisation. We are, to be sure, still far from cosmic suicide, the supreme desire of the theorists of misfortune, but slowly and surely the belief in the bankruptcy of nature is being elaborated, which promises to become the sinister faith of the 20th century, if science or a barbarian invasion does not rescue mankind which has thought too much, from weariness of its own thoughts." [1]

[1] Cf. Paul Bourget, *Psychologie Contemporaine,* Vol. I, p. 16.

This passage admirably reproduces the mood of the epoch, and may assist in the interpretation of the meaning of decadence, and throw light on the duality of purpose in the imperialist movement, wherein we may chart the ascendant proletarian, and the descendant middle class curve.

CHAPTER III

The Rise of the Proletariat

DUALISM IN POLITICS—PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC POLICY—DISRAELI —HIS PLACE IN HISTORY—LEADER OF IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT—HIS AFFINITY WITH THE PROLETARIAT—ARISTOCRACY, MIDDLE CLASS, AND PROLETARIAT—INTERPRETATION OF THEIR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORIES

I

CAPITALISM was seeking profitable fields for investment and exploitation; the Proletariat was ready to support imperial enterprise with a sentimental, ill-defined enthusiasm which could not be measured in terms of profit and loss. Whereas the middle class capitalist could in the early stages of imperial expansion perceive only personal profit from foreign enterprise, the Proletariat, by its support of imperial policy, by the applause with which it greeted the acquisition of new territory and the raising of the flag in distant lands, gave the encouragement needed to the leaders of governments in office to pursue their programmes of foreign expansion.

Thus on the one hand we have capitalism still outwardly under middle class control, with its narrow, anti-social, utilitarian motive urging imperial development on purely realist grounds, and the Proletariat supporting the same policy for idealist reasons. In other words, while imperialism appeared to the Middle Class in power as a mere extension of nationalism, a form of super-

nationalism, it was as supported by the Proletariat beginning to be interpreted as a social undertaking which engaged the State beyond its national boundaries, and might ultimately tend to break down the narrower individualist interpretation of nationalism, and supplant it by a broader social understanding.

It is not to be inferred that the leaders of imperial expansion were cognisant of this duality which we can now trace. On the contrary, they appear to have been confident that they had succeeded in uniting the two hitherto antagonistic elements in the State in a common aim, had eliminated class struggle and secured internal harmony for the execution of foreign policy.

Imperialism as the active principle of public policy is first to be met with in England, where it was inaugurated by Disraeli. Whatever estimate may be made of the new orientation he gave to political practice, it is necessary to note that by race and training he was incapable of adopting the individualist, middle class viewpoint, and that as the exponent of the greater England movement he led the attack on middle class liberalism.

It has often been attempted to portray Disraeli as the leader of an aristocratic party, to imply that imperialism was in the nature of a reaction against liberalism in a retrogressive sense, a revival of aristocratic absolutism. This one-sided interpretation has hitherto obscured the true character of the latter stages of the imperial movement. At the time that Disraeli became Prime Minister (1874) England, as has already been pointed out, had for nearly a decade been committed to an inconsequential foreign policy. She had neglected to take an active interest in continental European affairs, and had even abandoned colonial expansion, engrossed in furthering the development of individual enterprise at the ex-

pense of political leadership and social progress. The sudden development of Prussia, the growing strength of the proletarian movement, as expressed by the First Internationale, brought to the fore the defects of middle class policy of non-intervention both at home and abroad.

It has been argued that it was merely a fortuitous circumstance, a "mystery," that a man of the type of Disraeli should at this juncture have been entrusted with the government, and should have launched England and in her train all the other States of the Western World upon a course of policy altogether different from that which had hitherto prevailed. To accept such an hypothesis is merely covering in deeper obscurity the true causes of the trend of politico-social evolution which it is the object of historical research to uncover, and which a fuller interpretation of historical events may assist in revealing.

There are those who would see in Disraeli the leader of an aristocratic party, the representative of oligarchic interests. They point to the desperate struggle he engaged upon with the middle class liberals under the leadership of Gladstone—a typical representative of the best middle class mind—the frequent reversals of his policy, as confirming the reactionary nature of imperialism. But this conception is refuted, if such refutation be needed, by the transformation which middle class policy underwent even in England during the last decade of the 19th century in a final desperate attempt to adopt the major tenets of imperialism as a *sine qua non* of political survival. There are others who would see in Disraeli merely a party leader, and his struggle with Gladstone an example of political competition, a personal conflict for office and power.

It is uncontested that Disraeli engaged England upon

her course of imperial expansion, that he crowned Victoria as Empress of India, blocked Russia in Central Asia, entered upon treaty arrangements with foreign powers, called Indian troops to Malta for purposes of intimidation in Europe, or if need be for aggressive intervention, and was engaged upon other similar activities, solely on his own initiative, often without consulting Parliament. But it would be an error of historical judgment to infer that in acting in so arbitrary a manner, in carrying out his strong-handed policy, in introducing "jingoism" into political practice, he represented merely Tory England. We can on the contrary perceive that as a matter of fact in inaugurating imperialism, as in promoting social reform, he was acting unconsciously perhaps, but nevertheless potently, much more in sympathy with the Proletariat than as the representative of the Aristocracy. It may even be asserted that in the methods, aims, and motives of his policy much which has hitherto been hall-marked as appertaining to aristocratic impulse, on closer examination reveals its proletarian revolutionary origin.

It cannot be left out of account in an effort to estimate the importance of this new orientation, and incidentally to explain more satisfactorily Disraeli's place in history, that he was the first political leader to breach the old order, if we are to interpret imperialism aright as a destructive force undermining the politico-juridic concept of the exclusive Nation-State. An examination of the character and temperament of the man affords ample confirmation of this thesis. Disraeli in fact possessed many of the salient class characteristics of the Proletariat. For if we examine closely we will see that Disraeli embodied the eager intensity of the man of the people, rather than the social self-restraint of the aristocrat. Imagina-

tive, yet matter of fact, he combined passionate energy with a mystical charlatanism. Arbitrary without being dogmatic, vain without being vainglorious, he was endowed with a deep human sympathy and social sensibility.

II

It has been necessary to dwell upon the personal characteristics of Disraeli, to analyse in a measure his character, in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of the special position which he occupied in the history of political evolution, and to reconcile the apparent anomalies of his career. The party which actively supported him in Parliament, the press, and public opinion were directed by men who had come to look askance upon the unchecked development of individualism, the drifting trend of *laissez-faire* policy, the subservient position to which the State had sunk under middle class rule of non-intervention. They were men who by character and temperament placed national above individual interests, honor above profit, glory above scruple and thus represent what has been held to be an aristocratic temperament.

An examination of the distinctive marks of aristocratic and proletarian motives of action will reveal a close similarity between the two. Unlike that of the Middle Class, which partaking of both, tempering both, moderating both, includes neither, the proletarian and aristocratic temperaments have so many characteristics in common that, surprising though it may appear, it is difficult at the outset to differentiate between them.

Like the Aristocracy the Proletariat places might above right. Both believe in omnipotence; both understand obedience. Both are endowed with a capacity for spiritual

abnegation and mystical exaltation. The nicely balanced liberalism, typical of the middle class mind, its hypercritical, subjective mode of viewing life, are rejected alike by the Proletariat and the Aristocracy, who look upon life objectively as an implement of social organisation, not of egotistical, self-centred self-development.

It is this social as opposed to individual outlook, this objective as against subjective mode of viewing life, which marks the closest identity between the Aristocracy and the Proletariat, and differentiates them from the Middle Class.

But if we are able to trace so marked a similarity between certain salient characteristics of the Aristocracy and the Proletariat, there are other factors which distinguish the two groups from each other as clearly as those which mark them off from the Middle Class.

The basis of an aristocratic organisation of society is the family. Its fixity is based on hereditary principles. Being in theory the government and administration by the best, it perceives neither the possibility of improvement nor the probability of decay as long as the established order is maintained. Its hierarchy, which derives supreme authority from the Deity, and by fixed stages descends the social scale from lord to serf, bears a theistic imprint.

We have had occasion to point out in tracing the development of the middle class theory of State how in secular affairs the authority of God came to be replaced by the authority of man; how the individual came to be the important factor in the State as a human institution, man-made for men, and the consequent rise of equalitarian democracy, which strove to prove that political equality compensated for whatever social or economic inequality might exist.

The Middle Class had destroyed the fixity of the aristocratic social order and introduced the concept of perfectibility and progress, which gave rise to liberalism and toleration, and finally developed into social irresponsibility in all cases where "positive harm is not done thereby to another." With it arose individualism, nationalism, the Nation-State, and the capitalist system, which sought to destroy class solidarity, the last remaining vestige of the orders of the aristocratic régime, and to substitute therefor national unity or racial homogeneity as the basis of social organisation. In pursuit of these aims the Middle Class claimed to have discovered by scientific research as racial or national characteristics, factors which had in the past been interpreted as class distinctions. It was apparently oblivious of the fact that this same research was revealing the fundamental unity of mankind, proving that the Russian Mir, the Javanese Dessa, the Indian, Chinese, Peruvian village organisation, the German Mark, the Swiss Allemend and the French communal system or the Scotch clan organisation bore unmistakable marks of identity, and that economic development or class consciousness rather than race must be taken into consideration in order to discover distinguishing social characteristics of real validity.

In place of the fixity and immobility of the aristocratic social system in Western Europe, the Middle Class when it came to power introduced the restless mobility and irresponsibility of individualism, and the personalised Nation-State. Rejecting hierarchic responsibility, the Middle Class at the stage of its highest development had substituted a system of individual and international relations, based on politico-juridic checks, restraints, and balances which isolated the individual in the State, and the State among States.

The Middle Class in abolishing aristocratic control had, nevertheless, retained many of the symbols of aristocracy. While the family no longer remained dominant, individual worth was recognised, individual initiative deemed preëminent. The principle of the hereditary rights of political prerogative was rejected. Yet these hereditary rights were retained as the basis of the economic system which was built up along individualist, distinctly non-social lines. It is at this juncture, when middle class social irresponsibility had been carried to its extreme limits, that the proletarian movement arose with its social programme, rejecting alike the political immunities and privileges of the older aristocratic organisation, and the economic immunities, privileges, and social irresponsibility of the Middle Class.

It might be pointed out that the influence of the Aristocracy in the State had everywhere declined, and nowhere survived the middle of the 19th century. Yet the aversion of modern times to aristocratic political doctrines, due to the jealous ascendancy of the Middle Class, should not *a priori* exclude the possibility of their revival in a modified form on a broader social foundation. It is sufficient to note that the middle class organisation of the Nation-State, on a competitive non-social basis, had become an anomaly, and the only way out appeared to be by the disruption of the bonds of the State so conceived and the transformation of the existing system. As the Middle Class had destroyed aristocratic rule, and on the débris constructed the personalised Nation-State as a liberal democracy, so the Proletariat was bent upon the destruction of this middle class, politico-juridic structure, the Nation-State, in order to erect its own particular form of social organisation. As to the Middle Class at the close of the mediæval period the aristocratic form

of government had appeared rigid, isolated, and exclusive, now in turn to the rising Proletariat the middle class Nation-State appeared rigid, isolated, and exclusive. Hence the aim of the Proletariat to replace it by an inclusive, corporate collective union, in which the barriers of nations—as formerly the barriers of family—should be eliminated.

Such was the historical background of proletarian social theory. Its principal object, at first scarcely realised, was the destruction of the middle class Nation-State as power. How this object was pursued, how irrevocably the process of disintegration of the middle class theory of the Nation-State was carried on, the attempts made to strengthen the existing concept of the State, the illusion that the Middle Class was more securely entrenched than ever, and that the politico-juridic concept was if anything more vital than it had hitherto been, are illustrated by an examination of the events of the epoch which came to a close with the European War. Simultaneously we can trace the rise and spread of the influence of the Proletariat, and its sudden appearance in full control of the body politic among a people, dwelling upon the threshold of Europe and Asia, where no strong Middle Class existed, and where an enfeebled aristocratic despotism had survived, which unconsciously coöperated with the Proletariat by promoting imperial enterprise, and thus opened the pathway of its own destruction.

CHAPTER IV

The New Europe

RELATIVE POSITION OF THE POWERS—THE PREDOMINANCE OF GERMANY—THE *DREIKAISERBUND*—THE RAPID RECOVERY OF FRANCE—THE CRISIS OF 1875—THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS—BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY—ENGLAND AND TURKEY—PLANS FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE BALKANS—THE SUEZ CANAL INCIDENT

I

THE motives [1] of historical evolution lie deeply submerged in the social consciousness of mankind; the motive-force, the levers to accomplishment are placed in the hands of individuals. Those who are able to fathom this consciousness, to chart its currents and probable course in a measure procure a happy union between motive and action which may serve to accelerate this evolution. The world rewards them with plaudits, honors, and at certain epochs with hero-worship, unmindful of the fact that these so-called great men, the accelerators of history, often do no more than hasten maturity which leads in turn to a rapid decay. Such a man was Bismarck, the founder of the new German Empire. The history of Western civilisation during the last quarter of the 19th century bears the imprint of the impetus he gave to, the quickened tempo with which he directed, public affairs. During few periods in history do we find events so closely coördinated by a single will.

[1] *See* pp. 153-154.

Unlike Napoleon I, who was the servant of his destiny, who summed up an old epoch, who played a predominantly individualist, episodic, and non-social part in history, Bismarck's rôle, in spite of its outward anomalies, in spite of the numerous occasions in which a naturalist, egotistical individualism seemed to dominate, was that of a man of the new epoch, whose sensibility and political perception had in them the elements of a new objectivity fundamentally social. This social perception, this objective outlook on life, which we have already noted as a characteristic mark of the Proletariat, as well as of the Aristocracy, as opposed to the subjectivity of the middle class viewpoint, must be kept constantly in mind not merely in order to understand the social evolution of the new period, but to mark it off from what had gone before.

It will be of interest to review briefly certain salient events of Bismarck's later career—which entails a survey in some detail of the political history of the two decades which followed the war of 1870—in order to bring out clearly the well-defined nature of this objectivity and social sensibility.

II

The Franco-Prussian War had done more than deprive France of Alsace-Lorraine and extort from the French a large indemnity. It had left the country in the throes of civil commotion. The Commune at Paris had been repressed by the Middle Class with a brutality and energy rarely to be met with in history, except at times when it is consciously realised by the party in power that it is a struggle for survival in which no quarter will be asked or given. A republican form of govern-

ment, so long pressing for recognition in France, had again been organised, though it had not as yet gained sufficient strength to assert itself unconditionally. The partisans of the restoration of the monarchical régime were numerous. Bonapartists and Bourbons alike hoped for a restoration. But division in their ranks gave the young republic a respite, and the Middle Class, more anxious to continue in the control of authority, more jealous of its prerogatives than interested in the form of government, placed increasing trust in the republic as its stability became more assured. "While France was absent, the moment was propitious for Destiny to break with the past wherein she (France) had played so grand a part. It was the end of a Europe—the one which had seen the wars of Greece, Crimea, and Italy—the beginning of a new Europe. The quarrels over nationality or principles were appeased; wars of expansion and profit, of economic penetration, colonial conquest, imperialism, world politics were in preparation at the time when the internal struggles in France were drawing to a close." [1] Such is a usual French interpretation of the consequences of the war of 1870.

Historians are inclined to accept this view, even if they do not pay such homage to Destiny. But it was not so much the absence of France as the presence of Germany which was the characteristic feature of the new era. The centre of gravity of Europe had shifted. The new German Empire had become the preponderant power in the West. Berlin was to replace Paris as the political capital of the Western World. England for the time maintained her attitude of isolation. Italy had profited by the embarrassment of the Pope, upon the defeat of the eldest daughter of the Church, to seize Rome and complete her

[1] Hanotaux, *La France Contemporaine,* Vol. IV, p. 48.

national unity. Russia had taken advantage of the situation to force a revision of the treaty of Paris, and rid herself of its onerous clauses concerning the Black Sea (London, January-March 1871). Everyone seemed satisfied to have profited by the defeat of France, and the tables were cleared, ready for a new game.

After a war the vanquished remain for a time under the incubus of their disasters; the victor, on the other hand, must be prepared to exploit immediately the advantages he has gained. No one understood this more clearly than Bismarck. He looked upon war as a political short-cut, the advantages of which are of a provisional and temporary nature that must be supplemented by diplomatic guarantees. In this sense the war with France was merely a stage in the process of historical development of Prussia, concluding the series of wars begun in 1864, and carried through successfully in 1866 and 1870, whereby German unity had been realised under Prussian hegemony. But there is no halting in political development. No respite is given to the growing State, and during this critical adolescent period safeguards must be found. To assure such safeguards is the first duty of the true statesman. Germany was surrounded by powerful States, potential foes. Already before the end of the Franco-Prussian War, while Bismarck was sojourning at Meaux a few days after Sedan, he took advantage of the great victories won by German arms to broach the subject of an alliance with Russia and Austria. It was to be a revival of the Holy Alliance, "an alliance of the three Emperors, with the *arrière pensée* that Italy would join them later." The declared object of the alliance was to combat the revolutionary republican movement which was at the time spreading in France.

The Vienna Government, ready to forget the in-

juries it had suffered in 1866, took pains to recall that Bismarck had not pressed the advantages gained in the field to exact a humiliating peace, and willingly entered into the alliance. Russia was at first more reserved. Though most intimate relations existed between the courts of the two countries, and Russia had given Prussia a free hand in her plans of aggrandisement, the Tsar wished to take advantage of the opportunity offered to negotiate certain modifications to the treaty of Paris. In the meantime the defeat of France had been completed; the new imperial constitution had been adopted by the German States; the treaty of Frankfort had shackled France; Russia had gained her desired ends at the London Conference, and was ready to enter into the German scheme. The alliance of the three Emperors, the *Dreikaiserbund*, was agreed to. By the end of 1871 Berlin had become the political centre of Europe.

France had recovered from the effects of the war of 1870 with unexpected rapidity. Though torn by internal dissensions, she had been able to pay off the indemnity to Germany by 1873. Already in 1872 she was in a position to take in hand the question of her armaments, and lay down the plans for the reorganisation of the army. By 1875 she was preparing to increase her military establishment.

The Berlin Government watched with much concern the sudden revival of French military strength. The idea of crushing France before she had a chance to make a full recovery and entertain plans of revenge gained wide support in official circles in Germany. Here was an occasion to use force to prevent possible future conflict, by striking down a potential enemy. Such would have been a logical application of Bismarckian realism. That it was not carried out was due to various causes, among the more

potent being the intervention of Russia, supported by England, in favor of peace. Bismarck, who was not himself certain of the advantage of a war at this juncture, gave way under this new pressure. Hitherto he had had a free hand in European affairs; now he found himself confronted by concerted action on the part of Russia and England and, though he resented the interference, he was forced to acquiesce. The Berlin Government repudiated her alleged warlike intentions, and the incident was closed (May 1875). But the maintenance of the peace of Europe remained more precarious than ever.

III

The year 1875 marks the beginning of the struggle for world power among the European Nation-States which on the surface appeared merely a continuation of the time-honored struggle for ascendancy, to which the newly formulated doctrine of the survival of the fittest had given a fresh impetus. "Bismarck is really another old Bonaparte again, and he must be bridled," [1] was the opinion of Disraeli during this crucial year, and though England and Germany were to develop into the chief protagonists of imperialism, for the time being Russia appeared the more formidable foe of British imperial plans.

For a number of years Russia had by slow stages extended her domain in Central Asia, threatening British rule in India, and at the same time was enlarging her sphere of influence in the Balkans, menacing Turkish hold on Constantinople. The opening of the Suez Canal by the French (1869), in the construction of which the British had refused to participate, had altered the course

[1] Cf. G. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli,* Vol. V, p. 421.

of the lines of communication with the East, and made of the Mediterranean the highway of the British Empire, which it became of principal importance to England to protect.

During the course of the summer (1875) a revolt had broken out in Herzegovina, which was to have so far-reaching an effect on the subsequent course of European policy, and become the pretext of imperial expansion and the mad scramble for world influence and world power. A careful survey is required in order to arrive at a clear conception of the complex Near Eastern problem, which served as the pretext for foreign intrigue, and masked the real significance of imperialism as a new social, anti-national current of historical development.

In spite of the reverses suffered during the Crimean War, Russia had never abandoned her plans of driving the Turks out of Europe and planting the Russian cross on St. Sophia. The Pan-Slavic movement, which hitherto had been carried on in a desultory fashion, had been taken up officially, and soon after 1860 the programme of bringing all the Christian nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula under Russian influence, though never overtly acknowledged, was officially coördinated and directed from St. Petersburg. The increasing weakness and maladministration of the Porte, the chaotic conditions which prevailed among the various races of the Peninsula, who had become inflamed by the nationalist propaganda which had spread eastward and inspired them to demand national independence, offered ample opportunity for judicious intervention in furthering Russian designs.

England, contrary to her best political tradition, had under Gladstone, who was a fervent nationalist, seen no cause for alarm at Russian plans to drive the Turks from the Balkan Peninsula, and assist the Bulgars, Serbs, and

Rumanes in their national aspirations. France was after 1870 for some years not in a position to exert much influence; Italy, though a signatory of the Paris Treaty, had lost interest in eastern Balkan affairs, and was engaged with problems of internal organisation; Germany claimed to be wholy disinterested and, being bound by alliance to Russia and the Dual Monarchy, made it her principal concern to avert a struggle between her two allies, as the Dual Monarchy, being coterminous with the Turkish Empire, could not be indifferent to any change of the *status quo* and was ready to intervene should Russia show her hand and force the issue.

Such was the position of the chief States when Disraeli came into power. He reversed British policy. He was no sympathiser with the tenets of nationalism. He could not conceive of it as a sound basis of England's foreign policy. It seemed to him wholly sentimental and unsound. The consolidation of the British Empire, the safeguarding of its lines of communication, the protection of its distant frontiers, and the acquisition of new territory or fresh spheres of influence were far more important to British interests, according to his conception, than the championing of revolutionary patriots in their struggles for independence, which would contribute nothing to British power. On the contrary, he held that British interests would be menaced if Russia were to gain a firm foothold in the Balkans, which might lead to her acquiring the control of Constantinople, and this must be prevented even at the risk of war.

The revolt which broke out in Herzegovina in July 1875 might have readily been localised, yet the Porte seemed unable or unwilling to suppress it. Soon Bosnia was the centre of insurrection. The Serbs were by this time up in arms, ready to declare war on Turkey. Eng-

land was anxious that Turkey should be permitted to deal with the situation herself, but Russia, Germany, and Austria had other plans. They had taken upon themselves to decide the destiny of Turkey without consulting the rest of Europe, except to solicit its approval of the policy they might agree upon. Nor was agreement between these partners easy. Vienna was ready to forestall any move that the Russians might make, and Bismarck had on more than one occasion given proof that if he had to choose between Russia and Austria he would not hesitate to support the latter.

In the meantime the situation in Turkey had been rendered more difficult by the default on the payment of interest on the public debt (October 1875). The efforts of the foreign consuls to bring about a peaceful settlement in the area of revolt had failed. At St. Petersburg the question of the partition of Turkey was raised. The Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortchakov, outlined to the French Chargé d'Affaires a plan for a federal union of the Christian States of the Balkans with Constantinople, a free city on the German model, as its capital. The intervention of the European Powers appeared inevitable. Russia took the opportunity to reaffirm her alleged disinterestedness in Constantinople, but was firm in asserting that neither England nor any other Great Power, nor Greece, should be permitted to occupy the city upon its evacuation by the Turks.

While the cabinets of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin were endeavoring to reach an agreement concerning the terms of the reforms to be demanded of Turkey, and had not consulted England, Disraeli by a bold stroke showed that he wished it to be understood that no agreement respecting the Eastern Mediterranean could be entered upon without the consent of England, and that the

British Government was again to be reckoned with as an international factor of first importance.

Since its opening the Suez Canal had been operated as a private company, of which the Khedive of Egypt was the principal shareholder. The financial position of Egypt was precarious. To secure adequate funds to meet pressing obligations, the Khedive had proposed to arrange with a group of French financiers to mortgage his holdings in the Canal. While these negotiations were being carried on, Disraeli, learning of the proposal, promptly intervened on behalf of his Government and made a more advantageous offer to the Khedive, which after rapid negotiations was accepted, and England became owner of the latter's shares, and thus secured control of the Canal (November 20, 1875).

Europe was amazed at the suddenness with which the scheme was put through, which gained for England as the result of a financial operation all the advantages which because of the foresight and energy the French had shown in building the Canal they should have reaped. Russia was not slow to perceive that England was preparing to contest the Russian advance to the Ægean and maintained a significant silence, while Germany and Austria applauded the boldness of the operation. Bismarck could not refrain from expressing his approval of an undertaking which so successfully put into effect his own methods.

Thus while Russia and the Central Powers were talking about the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire, the integrity of which England was making ready to defend, England herself was laying the foundation of her plans for detaching Egypt from allegiance to the Porte, and, through the successive stages of dual control with France, intervention, and the assertion of her sole ascendancy —excluding France even from the hinterland—was

finally able to include Egypt in the number of her protectorates.

Disraeli was watching the international situation with close attention. In spite of the warning of the Suez Canal incident, the three Emperors drew up an elaborate programme for the reform of Turkey, which was to be imposed by the Powers and carried through under their supervision (December 30, 1875).

CHAPTER V

The Eastern Question

CONFLICTING INFLUENCES—REFORMS *A LA TURQUE* —THE PROGRAMME OF THE THREE EMPERORS—THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM—FIRM ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND—WAR IN THE BALKANS —THE REICHSTADT AGREEMENT—BULGARIAN ATROCITIES —ABDUL HAMID—THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE —THE PORTE PROCLAIMS A CONSTITUTION—EFFORTS TO KEEP THE PEACE—RUSSIA DECLARES WAR—BRITISH THREAT OF INTERVENTION TO PROTECT CONSTANTINOPLE—AUSTRIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS—PLEVNA—BISMARCK AND GERMAN INTEREST IN BALKAN AFFAIRS—RUSSIA VICTORIOUS—THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO

I

THE question of reform of the administration of the Balkans by Turkey had been repeatedly the subject of controversy and diplomatic wrangling. On the one hand there was the plan of those who favored permitting Turkey to undertake the reforms urged, at her own initiative, without infringing upon her sovereignty; on the other, the conviction that it was the duty of the Powers to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan and supervise these reforms.

The traditional policy of England—the policy she had pursued since the Battle of the Nile and Trafalgar had made her a Mediterranean Power, and her support of the Greeks in their struggle for independence had committed her to a more definite interest in the Eastern shores

of the Mediterranean—had been to assert the principle of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Turkey. England was ready to support reforms *à la Turque,* pending such a time as it might be opportune to push forward the claims of modern Greece as heir to the ancient Eastern Empire. Russia, on the other hand, since the days of Catherine the Great and the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) considered herself the champion of the independence of the Slav peoples of the Balkans, and had always pressed for active intervention and reforms under European supervision, as the pretext for her own progressive advance on the Sea of Marmora.

The joint note of the three Emperors, which was finally drafted, outlining a programme of reform under European supervision, met with little success. England at first held aloof, without refusing absolutely to participate. In the meanwhile the insurgents extended their incursions. By the spring of 1876 Bosnia and Herzegovina were in full insurrection; Serbia and Montenegro were making ready to declare war, and the Bulgars, the especial protégés of Russia, were being stirred to revolt.

Turkey on her part had now completed the mobilisation of her forces and prepared for a systematic repression of the outbreak. At this juncture the Tsar, accompanied by his Chancellor, arrived in Berlin, whither the Austrian Premier had been summoned by Bismarck. A fresh memorandum dealing with the Turkish situation was drafted. It rehearsed previous proposals, added new demands, and threatened that if the objects set forth were not attained, efficacious measures would be taken in the interests of peace to put a stop to the continuation of disorders and prevent their recurrence.

The Berlin Note (May 13, 1876) requested the immediate adherence of the Powers. It was now England's

turn to show her hand. She flatly refused to adhere to the proposals outlined on the ground that she did not see what they would lead to, and could not admit the right of the continental Powers to dispose of the Eastern Question without first consulting her. To impress the Powers with the seriousness with which she regarded the situation a British fleet was ordered to Besika Bay, close to the Dardanelles, to be ready for any eventuality. Disraeli, in defending his policy, maintained that the reforms proposed were not only impracticable, but inauspicious, preluding the partition of the Ottoman Empire. England had withdrawn from the concert of Powers and for the moment stood alone. The English Prime Minister, however, had no illusions about the situation. "Whatever happens," he wrote at the end of May, "we shall certainly not drift into war, but go to war, if we do, because we intend it, and have a purpose which we mean to accomplish." [1]

The Russian Chancellor, bent on carrying through the terms of the Berlin memorandum, on learning of the refusal of England to participate, declared that the Powers should proceed without English concurrence. With England no longer at hand to perform the unpleasant task of checking Russian ambitions, Bismarck was unwilling to proceed. He conceived it no more to the interest of Germany than it was to that of Austria or England to permit an undue expansion of Slav power in the Balkans, which would shut off the Austrian advance southward masking the pan-German, *Drang nach Osten,* which was now beginning to be considered.

At this perplexing moment a palace revolution at Constantinople dethroned the Sultan (May 29, 1876) and a new Sultan, the puppet of the reform party, the Young

[1] Cf. G. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli,* Vol. VI, p. 29.

Turks, believed to be favorable to England, was placed on the throne. It was a good excuse for reconsidering the whole question and was welcomed by Bismarck, who did not wish an open break with Russia. His position in Europe was now unique. He was playing the Powers off against one another, friendly towards England,[1] not openly antagonistic to Russia, while firmly supporting Austria.

To force the hand of the Powers, on June 30 Serbia declared war on Turkey, followed the next day by Montenegro, while Bulgaria was already in revolt, urged on by Russian assistance and volunteers in support of the Pan-Slav cause.

In the dilemma caused by the fresh crisis, Russia sought a way out, and in an interview between the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor, held at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, to which Germany was not formally a party, an understanding was reached. Russia agreed to abandon Serbian pretensions at the request of Austria, who already feared that the Serbs were aspiring to become "the Piedmontese of the Southern Slavs," which would disrupt the Dual Monarchy. Russia thus sacrificed her interests in the western Balkans, and countenanced the possibility of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. In return the Vienna Government undertook to remain neutral in case Russia should declare war on Turkey.

The *pourparlers* between the Powers, the jockeying for position, had not delayed the march of events. The news of the massacre of the unarmed Christian peasants, the famous "Bulgarian Atrocities," now began to spread

[1] "The great man at Berlin has completely realised my expectations. . . . He delights in the whole affair, and particularly praised 'Disraeli's speeches' to Odo Russell, 'and his sending the fleet to the Dardanelles!'" Extract from letter written by Disraeli June 13, 1876. *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 32.

over Europe. Public opinion was aroused. A large section of the British public denounced the pro-Turkish policy of the Government. Gladstone came out of his retirement and issued his passionate appeal to England to assist "in driving the Turk, bag and baggage, out of Europe." In the meantime the Serbs had been defeated and sought the intervention of the Powers. The Russian policy of direct action to avenge the sufferings of the Christian populations seemed fully justified. But Disraeli remained imperturbable. He maintained that the reports of the massacres spread through the press were exaggerated; that civil war prevailed in Bulgaria, which was inevitably accompanied by bloodshed; but that, even if the worst reports were true, England must first consider her interests and could not abandon a well-considered policy for sentimental reasons.

At Constantinople another revolt had brought the "old Turks" back into power, and they placed the resourceful, unscrupulous Abdul Hamid on the throne. The new Sultan was held to be pro-Austrian in his sympathies.

The menace of a general European war still subsisted. The policy of the various governments betrayed the nervousness and uncertainty which prevailed as to the probable alignment of the combatants. Russia had in July signed the agreement with Austria at Reichstadt. In October we find her (Russia) sounding Bismarck as to what the attitude of Germany would be in the event that Russia should declare war on Austria. Bismarck, in attempting to make an evasive answer, let Russia understand that Germany could not tolerate any material weakening of Austria which might imperil her position as a Great Power. It was now England's turn to take the initiative, and she proposed an armistice between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the

other, to be followed by a peace which would maintain the *status quo* and permit of certain administrative reforms. To secure this end it was suggested by London that a conference of the Powers be held at Constantinople to settle the whole question. But Russia was not in a mood to permit England to play a preponderant part in Balkan affairs, and added the suggestion that it was to be understood that if the Porte did not accept the peace proposed, a Russian army corps was to occupy Bulgaria, an Austrian corps, Bosnia, and a joint fleet of the Powers was to enter the Bosporus.

Early in November the Russians were able to compel the Sultan to sign a two months' armistice, while the Tsar declared in a speech at Moscow on November 10:

"I am very desirous that we shall arrive at a general understanding, but if such an agreement is not arrived at, and if it seems to me that we are not securing the necessary guarantees for the execution of what we have the right to demand of the Porte, I have the firm intention to act alone."

The day before Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, speaking at Guildhall, had declared:

"There is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. Peace is especially an English policy. She is not an aggressive Power, for there is nothing which she desires; she covets no cities, no provinces. What she wishes is to maintain and enjoy the unexampled empire which she has built up. . . . But although the policy of England is peace, there is no country so well prepared for war as our own. . . . She is not a country that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a second or a third campaign which she will not terminate till right is done."

Russia took up the challenge, and on November 13, mobilisation orders were issued, and Russia declared it her purpose not to desist in her plans until the "principles of humanity" had been vindicated.

II

The arrangements for the Constantinople Conference were, however, being put through; though England took the necessary military precaution. "We have a force of 40,000 men ready," Beaconsfield wrote in his secret instructions (December 1) to Lord Salisbury, who was to represent England at the Conference. "It is a most critical moment in European politics," he declared. "If Russia is not checked, the Holy Alliance will be revived in aggravated form and force. Germany will have Holland; and France, Belgium, and England will be in a position I trust I shall never live to witness." [1]

Bismarck, anxious to maintain his attitude of detachment in order to be in a position to play the part of arbiter when the proper moment should arrive, speaking in the Reichstag on December 7, 1876, in reply to his critics who complained that the government had taken no determined stand, declared: "The policy which we pursue must be dictated solely by our own interests, and we will not permit ourselves to be influenced by any proposal whatsoever to pursue any other policy. . . . I do not therefore advise any active participation on the part of Germany, as I do not see for Germany any interest which would warrant our sacrificing—excuse the harshness of the expression—the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier."

The Porte, which had remained a docile spectator dur-

[1] G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 104.

ing the wrangling among the Powers, now took a step which was to upset all calculations. On the day the Conference officially assembled at Constantinople, a constitution on the most approved European model was promulgated by the Sultan, affording very wide civil and political liberties to all the peoples of his Empire. It was evident that the Porte desired to demonstrate that the Conference was unnecessary, as all the reforms that could possibly be demanded and a great many more were included in the provisions of the new constitutional régime it was proposed to set up.

Nevertheless, the Conference proceeded with its labors and presented a list of demands which the Porte refused to accept (January 1877); whereupon the Conference broke up. War was now inevitable. Russia seemed to have the sanction of the Powers. Turkey was pushing the mobilisation of her forces with unwonted energy.

The Tsar thereupon entered into a definite treaty with Austria to insure the latter's neutrality, and the winter months were employed in preparations. England's plan of a conference had been tried and failed. There was no alternative left but to let events take their course. The efforts to keep peace were sedulously pursued, but they were all leading directly to war, which on April 24, 1877, was declared by Russia.

England maintained an expectant attitude, while the Russian forces steadily advanced upon Constantinople; though meeting with stubborn resistance in Armenia, they made better headway in the Balkans. When the prospect of a Russian entry into Constantinople became imminent, England warned Russia that: "Anxious, sincerely anxious to meet Russian views in other matters, the occupation of Constantinople, or attempt to occupy it, will be looked upon as an incident which frees us from all previous en-

gagements, and must lead to serious consequences." [1] On July 21, Beaconsfield telegraphed to Queen Victoria: "If Russia occupies Constantinople and does not arrange for her immediate retirement from it, to advise Your Majesty to declare war against that Power. Orders have been given to strengthen the Mediterranean garrisons." [2] A breathing space was afforded to England by the delay suffered by Russia in reducing Plevna, which held up her advance on Constantinople.

In the meantime Austria had made it plain that she would not tolerate the extension of an independent Serbia westward, or of Montenegro northward. "If the Turks are able to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina so much the better; if not we will take them for ourselves," outlined the Austrian viewpoint. Thus Russia was hemmed in on the south and west by the threats of the Powers, yet she pushed military operations with increased vigor. On December 10, Plevna fell. Kars had been captured and the Turks had fallen back on Erzerum. The roads to Constantinople lay open. The Slavs of the Balkans all took an active part in the campaign, and in January 1878 even Greece joined, and marched into Thessaly. On January 9 the Sultan had requested an armistice. Russia refused, except on the condition that peace should be discussed. On January 20, Adrianople fell into Russian hands. In the meantime the Turkish plenipotentiaries had left Constantinople to discuss peace. The situation had again become tense; the Russians were before Constantinople. England had committed herself to prevent its occupation. The British fleet was ordered into the Sea of Marmora, and credits were voted to increase the national armaments. The Russians still hesitated before

[1] G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 150.
[2] *Ibidem*, Vol. VI, p. 154.

occupying the city. England now maintained that, no matter what the terms of the peace between Russia and Turkey might be, they must be subject to revision by a European Congress. Austria, owing to her special position and her previous agreements with Russia, officially proposed that a conference of the six Powers be held at Vienna, to agree upon the necessary modifications to the terms of the treaty about to be negotiated between Russia and the Porte.

The opportunity Bismarck had long been waiting for had arrived. Germany was making ready to dominate the future destiny of Europe. "I am not of the opinion," he declared in the Reichstag on February 19, "that we should pursue a Napoleonic policy and that we should wish to be, I will not say the arbiter, or even the schoolmaster of Europe. Our rôle is more modest. I conceive it as that of an honest broker who wishes to put through a good deal." Henceforth it was evident that Berlin would be the scene of the Congress which was to arrange the affairs of Europe, launch the Powers into new paths, and lay the foundation of new schemes of aggrandisement and of world influence.

On March 3, in spite of the menacing attitude of England, the treaty of peace between Turkey and Russia was signed at San Stefano. It provided for an enlarged, independent Montenegro, with two harbors on the Adriatic; an independent Serbia, slightly enlarged; an independent Rumania, which received the Dobrudja but ceded Bessarabia to Russia; a vast Bulgarian State under the high protection of Russia, extending from the Danube to Thessaly, from the Ægean to the Black Sea. Russia secured Batum and important tracts in Armenia and, among other favorable stipulations, the opening of the Straits in peace and war to all merchant vessels proceed-

ing to Russian ports. The treaty was kept secret and only communicated to the Powers three weeks later.

On the receipt of the news of the terms England lost no time. The Slav menace had become a reality. Turkey in Europe had to all intents and purposes been wiped out. Though Constantinople had not been occupied, England considered the terms of the treaty unacceptable. The reserves were called out; Indian troops were ordered to Malta, and it was even planned according to the Prime Minister to "occupy two important posts in the Levant, which will command the Persian Gulf and all the country around Bagdad, and entirely neutralise the Russian conquests and influence in Armenia." On April 1, in a note to the Powers, England outlined the reasons why she deemed it essential that the treaty of San Stefano should be revised.

Austria, whose interests in the Balkans had been threatened by the terms of the treaty, was ready to coöperate with England, while Bismarck, maintaining his air of aloofness, pressed Russia to find out from England, not only what she did not want, but what she did. Accordingly negotiations were entered upon in view of a European Congress which might be held. A secret memorandum, embodying an agreement between Russia and England, was signed May 30. It included the acceptance in the main of the British thesis regarding the territorial distribution of the Balkans and eliminated the great Bulgar State, though it left Russia a free hand in Armenia, and confirmed the Russian occupation of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars. At the same time a secret convention was signed between England and the Porte (June 4) in the nature of an insurance treaty, which provided that if Russia retained Batum, Ardahan, or Kars, England would defend the integrity of Turkish territory in Asia against

any further encroachments by Russia. In return for this service England received the right to occupy Cyprus,[1] and a number of British military consulates were to be established in Asiatic Turkey, to protect the special rights and interests England had secured by the Convention.

[1] Disraeli had spent a day at Cyprus in 1831 and had been much impressed by its long, romantic history. In 1847 in one of his novels, "Tancred," he had written: "The English want Cyprus and they will take it as compensation. They will not take charge of Turkish affairs again for nothing. They need new markets for their cotton goods. England will never be satisfied until the people of Jerusalem wear cotton turbans."

CHAPTER VI

The Congress of Berlin

OBJECTS OF THE CONGRESS—TREATY OF SAN STEFANO REVISED—DISTRIBUTION OF TERRITORY—ERECTION OF INDEPENDENT BALKAN STATES—BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—CYPRUS—THE NEW ORIENTATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS—MATURITY OF NATION-STATES—PLANS OF EXPANSION—THE EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT

I

THUS after two years of repeated alarms England was not to go to war, and instead there was to be a Congress of the Powers, wherein the two principal protagonists had in advance secretly arrived at an understanding, and the other Powers were bound by interests, agreements, treaties, and conventions to pursue a predetermined policy. The intriguing skill of the negotiator alone could turn the scale; skill supported by ultimatums and threats of war.

On opening the Congress at Berlin on June 13, 1878, Bismarck, addressing the assembly which included the diplomatic luminaries of the principal Powers, stated that the object in calling together the representatives of the Powers was to submit the work done at San Stefano to the free discussion of the governments signatory of the treaties of 1856 and 1871.

Exactly one month later, July 13, the Congress finished its labors and closed its doors. Lord Beaconsfield returned to London, bringing back "peace with honor,"

which included the approval of the Powers of the occupation of Cyprus for good measure. The dismemberment of Turkey had been prevented. The authority of the Sultan in Europe still extended over 60,000 square miles and a population of 6,000,000 inhabitants, not including Bosnia and Bulgaria, which remained tributary to the Porte. Turkey remained the gate-keeper of the Straits, and thus the *status quo* was maintained. Russia, though she had to give up her plans for a great Bulgar State under her suzerainty, did not leave Berlin empty-handed. Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and adjoining territory were definitely ceded to her. Rumania was compelled to cede Bessarabia to Russia, and in return Rumanian independence was acknowledged and the Dobrudja added to the new kingdom. Serbia and Montenegro were declared independent, though the former was landlocked, and the latter only received one port on the Adriatic. A small, semi-independent Bulgar State was carved out of the territory in the heart of the Balkans; while Southern Bulgaria under the name of Eastern Roumelia remained under Turkish rule, with special administrative autonomy. Greece received merely incidental consideration. The question of Crete and the Greek Islands was not raised, and only a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus was conceded. Nor was Austria forgotten. It was Beaconsfield who proposed officially that Austria should occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bismarck at once seconded the proposal, and thus it was arranged without giving ear to Turkish protests. Throughout the proceedings France had played a secondary part, yet it seemed only natural that as favors were being distributed wholesale some token should be given to her as a mark of courteous or at least condescending approval of her self-effacing attitude. The protection of the Roman

Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and a recognition of France's especial interest in their welfare, principally in the "important region of Syria," was officially conceded, which earmarked that region in the minds of the French as their share when the real partition of Turkey should take place; while, as a balm for French indignation at the announcement made during the closing days of the Congress of the permanent occupation of Cyprus by England, Lord Beaconsfield suggested to France that she could have a free hand in Tunis.

Bismarck also urged France to take advantage of this opportunity to occupy Tunis, anxious to divert French interest from the Rhine and engage her reawakened vigor in colonial enterprise. For Germany he requested no material compensation. The Iron Chancellor took a broader view of the needs and aims of the Empire than could be measured by territorial compensation. Though outwardly disinterested in distant territorial aggrandisement, Germany had become the *deus ex machina* in world affairs. Russia had been humiliated, and her advance checked in the Balkans. Her attention was again directed towards Asia. Austria henceforth was to look south, and began the march on Salonika under the vigilant eye of Berlin, leaving Prussia the undisputed master in Germany. France was about to engage in an African enterprise which was to arouse the animosity of the Italians, who for a long period had been led to believe that Tunis was their special field of expansion. As the Italians were practically the only ones to come away empty-handed from the Berlin Congress, Bismarck rightly judged that they would feel a lasting resentment towards France, who was about to step in and seize their Tunisian prize. He further foresaw that an inevitable misunderstanding would arise between France and England over Egypt,

and he pressed England to pursue a bold policy there. Though at the time of the Congress England refrained, it was only a very brief period before French interests were overridden, and difficulties arose which served Germany by enfeebling and isolating France, and gave Bismarck the opportunity of again playing the part of arbiter in the dispute which he knew how to exploit to good advantage. England, though feeling herself strong and aggressive, looked to Berlin in a spirit of friendly coöperation and frankly acknowledged that a good understanding with Germany was the soundest policy for her to pursue.

Germany came out of the Congress of Berlin the ascendant State in Europe; Austria, and in her wake Italy, entered directly in her orbit. England was friendly, and France, though isolated, apparently not ungrateful. Russia alone had been alienated, but not only did Bismarck count on England to hold Russia at bay, as she had done so successfully during recent years, but he did not reject friendly overtures from the St. Petersburg Government, in spite of his avowed preference for an Austrian alliance.

II

At the time of the Berlin Congress the Nation-States of Europe had reached their maturity. Each of the Powers had outlined for itself a definite policy of expansion. Here we find the genesis of the historical development of the ensuing generation. Here the balance of power which had been upset by the rise of Germany was slowly coming into equilibrium. Here the Triple Alliance germinated. Here the seeds of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Triple Entente were sown. Here the future

conflict for world supremacy between England and Germany may be foreshadowed.

The European States had found themselves discussing the destiny of peoples, the distribution of territory, no longer with reference to nationality, but as spheres of influence, as areas for penetration. The principle of nationality upon which the Nation-State had been built was apparently henceforth to be abandoned, except in so far as it served as a rallying cry for the Powers to promote their internal unity, to strengthen the cohesive solidarity of the State for the purpose of expansion. Racial and national homogeneity expressed in terms of patriotism was made use of to combat the growing social objectivity of the rising Proletariat, who looked beyond national boundaries, and was breaking down the barriers which isolated the various States. Furthermore, the principle of a European policy [1] was enunciated and firmly established by the Congress, which bound the Great Powers to adopt a European viewpoint, and was to lead to the formation of two groups of States, within one of which at least only a relative freedom of action was retained by the minor partners.

The world had become a field for exploitation and conquest. England had led the way, and Beaconsfield had given to the European statesmen their first lessons in imperialism, had outlined how imperial enterprise may be pursued, how interests may be made use of and exploited, how a bold policy of intimidation and threats of war may be taken advantage of without actually going to war. The Congress had brought the Powers into close contact,

[1] See the reply made by Count Andrassy, the Austrian representative, to the Italian delegate, who had presumed to address an inquiry regarding the policy of Austria in occupying Bosnia: *"Monsieur le plenipotentiaire d'Italie, dit-il, l'Aurtiche en occupant la Bosnie se place au point de vue européen."*

and laid before them the fate of the world as clay for their moulding. The vast African continent was still relatively unoccupied. Great areas of Asia and Australasia, undefended by their inhabitants, who had not entered upon the stage of modern historical development or conceived of the State as Power, still remained to be occupied, or at least dominated. The State had broken through its narrow national limits. The State as Power was making ready to strive for world power. The German people were soon to feel themselves destined to become the leaders of this new imperialism.

CHAPTER VII

The State as Power

BISMARCKIAN DOCTRINES—RELATION TO MARXISM—THE INTERPRETATION OF TREITSCHKE—OBJECTIVE CONCEPT OF POWER—CHURCH AND STATE—BERLIN AND THE VATICAN—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE *KULTURKAMPF*—SOCIAL PROBLEMS—BISMARCK'S PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL WELFARE—DISRAELI'S ATTITUDE—ENGLAND AND GERMANY

I

At the beginning of a new phase of historical evolution, when a new ideology is struggling for recognition, an era of adulation of power, a *Gewaltsepoch,* often ushers in the new orientation of historical development. Force is relied upon during periods of uncertainty. Might is the only accepted basis of right when new ethical standards, new moral convictions, are in the early formative stages. The sword is held a more real source of strength at a time of spiritual decadence than any social code.[1] Man in this confused state loses his moral bearings, and relies on the weapon immediately at hand, a power of his own creating which it is hoped may afford tangible protection. This was especially true of the great transition from individualist to social standards, which began to define itself with much precision after 1878.

It was upon the foundation of middle class, subjective individualism that national States had arisen. By Bismarck national spirit had been moulded into a racial

[1] As Renan has so well remarked: *"On meurt pour des opinions non pour des certitudes; pour ce qu'on croit et non pour ce qu'on sait."*

egotism, fanatically cultivated as a source of social power, which had led to Prussian ascendancy in the new German Empire, and to German ascendancy in Europe. He had adopted the Hegelian principle of "blood and iron" and made skilful use of the Hegelian doctrine that historical development is the result of reaction against prevailing practice: the identical doctrine of growth by antagonism which Karl Marx had adopted in developing his theory of historical materialism.

If we examine closely the realism of Bismarck's policy, the ruthless contempt he displayed for accepted political practice, whether in home or foreign affairs, the avowed materialism of his philosophy, his distinct opportunism, his adulation of violence, we will find numerous points of contact and analogy with that of Marx. Though a superficial reading of history may apparently refute this thesis, yet a more profound examination will reveal that Bismarck and Marx, standing as they did at the antipodes of the new social movement, were endowed with the same characteristics of social objectivity of viewpoint, which affirms their relationship. Bismarck having in his possession the weapons of power was able to promote social development by the steadier methods of evolution. Marx having to forge his weapons could only preach revolution.

The Communist Manifesto of 1848, drawn up in a spirit of violent class interest, based on the dictatorship of the Proletariat, is in many respects identical with Bismarckian principles of the national interest of the State, enforced by the dictatorial power of government. According to Marx, the Proletariat—the class—could brook no opposition; according to Bismarck, the Nation-State—the government—could tolerate no competition of authority within its boundaries. No consideration, no matter

of what nature, whether ethically or morally sanctioned, could be permitted to stand in the path of the development of the State as power, could be allowed to divert the individual from his allegiance to the government of the State.[1] Here we may discern the basis of Bismarck's political practice, a radical breaking away from the old ideals of Statehood, and trace the influence of the resurrection of Machiavellian political theory, of *Machtpolitik,* which Treitschke openly glorified and proclaimed Bismarckian.

It is to Treitschke that we must turn in order to discover the difference between Bismarck's practice and Machiavellian theory: "Not that he (Machiavelli) is altogether indifferent to the means of power which are repugnant to us, but that to him everything depends upon how the greatest power may be acquired and retained, though this power in itself has no value; that power once acquired must justify itself, that it must be used for the greatest good to mankind—of this in his work we find no trace." [2]

To Bismarck the State was not an end in itself. It was power as an omnipotent social force, concentrated in the hands of Government: not irresponsible power, merely for power's sake, the Machiavellian concept, adapted by middle class practice purely subjectively, but rather unlimited power for the purpose of promoting public welfare. In the acquisition of power the State may be unscrupulous, but in its use of power it must promote

[1] In the words of Disraeli: "The divine right of kings has been properly discarded, but an intelligent age will never discard the divine right of government." And again, in the general preface to the edition of his novels in 1870: "The divine right of kings may have been a plea of feeble tyrants, but the divine right of government is the keystone of human progress."

[2] Treitschke, *Politics,* Book I, p. 91.

the cultural development of its people. Thus Bismarck in his Memoirs could with a feeling of self-righteousness set down:

"The duration of all treaties between great States is a conditional one as soon as the question of the 'struggle for survival' comes into question. No great State should ever be compelled to sacrifice its existence on the altar of faithful adherence to its treaty agreements, when it is compelled to choose between the two." [1]

Yet there is a wide gap between this distinctly social conception of the disregard of treaty obligations, and the favorite individualist maxim of Frederick the Great: *"S'il y a à gagner a être honnête, nous le serons, s'il faut duper soyons fourbes."* In Bismarck's interpretation we can perceive the objective concept of power which sacrifices not merely all ethical and moral practice, but its principles as well to a blind subservience to what it believes to be the good of the State. It never seems to have occurred to the advocates of the new political practice that the State is a limited portion of humanity, or that the policy of sole reliance on power, on might, on intimidation, would arouse a reaction, and lead to competition for power. The subservience of public policy to armed force, and the measuring of the ascendancy of a State in terms of armaments led to the neglect of all broader psychological and sociological considerations.

To Bismarck and to the leading statesmen in all of the great States in the West after him, the State as Power seemed its sole destiny. The materialist temper of the preceding epoch, the emphasis on scientific analysis, the pessimism which had gained so wide an acceptance, and above all the ruthless competitive methods of industrial

[1] *Gedanken und Errinerungen,* Vol. II, p. 49.

and commercial enterprise, had heightened man's reliance on naked power. To the individual engaged in economic enterprise, wealth and the power it afforded were essentially non-social and as such divested of all social obligations. To the State, power as a politico-economic factor was beginning to acquire certain still ill-defined social characteristics. But the State so conceived remained exclusive, and, flushed with the success it had achieved in moulding national consciousness, refused to tolerate any alien domination which might by diverting the individual from his allegiance to the State stand in the path of the fullest development of its power. This was the principle upon which Bismarck acted in his long struggle with the Church of Rome.[1]

II

To understand the true nature of the *Kulturkampf* it must be recalled that even the Papacy had not remained uninfluenced by the cult of power which had permeated the spiritual as well as the secular affairs of the epoch. Pius IX in his Encyclical and Syllabus issued December 8, 1864, had reasserted in unequivocal terms that the Church and the Pope are anointed by God with supreme power, which recognises no limits and no bounds, and is above all secular authority. In June 1868 he had convoked the Council which was to pronounce upon the question of Papal infallibility. The Council assembled at the Vatican in December 1869. It represented the entire Catholic world, and after concluding its session solemnly

[1] *Bismarck war der verkörperte Geist der vom Sittengesetz gelösten Staatsraison; er brachte ihr ganzes Wesen an den Tag, er nahm sich gründlich Ernst, wahrend die andern mit ihr nur spielten.*—Fr. W. Foerster, *Politische Ethik u. Politische Pädagogik*, p. 219.

proclaimed in the name of its 400,000,000 followers the infallibility of the Pope (July 18, 1870). The next day Catholic France declared war on Protestant Germany. Within three months German ascendancy in Europe was assured, and the temporal power of the Papacy came to an end (September 20, 1870).[1]

Bismarck was no narrow-minded evangelical sectarian. It has been said of him that his religious faith was at the service of his policy. At first he maintained a neutral attitude, which he abandoned only when he felt that the Church was encroaching upon the domain of the State. Throughout the struggle with Papal authority he kept constantly in view the immediate phases of the conflict,

[1] It is historically significant that at the time when the temporal power of the Papacy came to an end the Pope should have been able to affirm his ascendancy over Catholicism, and be accredited with "complete and supreme jurisdictionary authority over the whole Church, not simply in matters of faith and morality, but also in matters touching the discipline and governance of the Church; and this authority is a regular and immediate authority extending over each and every Church and over each and every Pastor and believer" and that "the Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex cathedra* . . . is endowed with that infallibility which according to the will of the Redeemer, is vouchsafed to the Church when she desires to fix a doctrine of faith or morality; and that consequently all such decisions of the Roman Pontiff are *per se* immutable and independent of the subsequent assent of the Church."—Cf. C. Mirbt, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papstums,* p. 370 *et seq.* Here we have the thesis of infallibility as set forth by the Vatican Council, defining the authority of the Pope and extending his jurisdiction over all Catholics to the ends of the earth. Its acceptance meant that the power was conceded to the Pope at any time, in any diocese, to exercise the functions of the regular bishop and that the clergy was shorn of its independent nationalist character which it had so long and tediously labored to build up. It meant that the Church Universal, according to the newly promulgated doctrine, was to supersede the older idea of diocesan independence which may be correlated to the idea of nationalism. As such the edicts of the Vatican council may be looked upon as one more indication of the decay of the nationalist principle and a confirmation of the thesis regarding the breakdown of the old order and the rise of the new super-national ideology. As was to be expected, the enunciation of the new doctrine was attended by important political results, not merely in Germany: Austria immediately (July 30, 1870) annulled the Concordat of 1855. France later revoked its Concordat of 1801, and finally carried through the complete separation of Church and State.

and their consequences on the political influence of the State.

A strong Catholic party had been formed in Germany, which was well represented in the Reichstag under the most forceful Parliamentary leader in the Empire, Windthorst. Bismarck was not to be deterred by obstacles. To him the Vatican, armed with its new dogma of infallibility, was in possession of a weapon which, if it were permitted to use it, would endow the Church with power infinitely greater than that of the State.

By 1872 the conflict between Berlin and Rome was openly declared. Bismarck took the first step and by the law of July 4, 1872, pronounced the dissolution of the Jesuit organisations in Prussia. Rome retaliated by refusing to receive a Prussian envoy to be accredited to the Vatican.

Bismarck emphasised the political nature of the struggle. "It is," he declared in the Prussian Herrenhaus in supporting his policy in a speech delivered on March 10, 1873, "the old struggle for power, as old as the human race, between priesthood and royalty. A struggle for power which was old when our Saviour came into this world. It is the struggle for power which Agamemnon had to wage against the prophets in Aulis which cost him the life of his daughter, and prevented the Greeks from setting sail; it is the struggle for power, which under the name of the war between the Popes and the Emperors, filled the pages of German history during the Middle Ages up to the time of the downfall of the German Empire."

The struggle with the Vatican was now carried on in the open. The laws by which Bismarck proposed to break the power of the Roman Church in Prussia were

enacted. They conferred upon the State the right to appoint and instruct the clergy; limited the number of their ministrants who, according to the new law, were to be of German nationality, dependent in the first instance directly upon the State and not upon Rome; and finally the right of all German subjects to change their religion at will was recognised.

Pope Pius IX protested against these rigorous measures, taken, he alleged, to "discredit the religion of Christ." But Bismarck was not satisfied. It was a struggle for power, and the State as representing sovereign power could brook no rival. The laws proposed were stringently enforced. Recalcitrant cardinals, bishops, and other high prelates were prevented from exercising their functions, and some even suffered imprisonment. Bismarck stigmatised their conduct as revolutionary and justified his harsh measures by the need of State. All Germany was in a turmoil. The *Kulturkampf* had enlisted its partisans and opponents among all classes.

The Pope in turn urged the German bishops to stouter resistance. Bismarck saw to it that new laws were enacted (1875) to control their revenues, in order to subject Catholic sees to more complete dependence upon the State. The situation remained unchanged. Bishops, priests, and laymen were imprisoned for violation of the new laws, but without effect. For five years the *Kulturkampf* dominated the internal policy of Prussia and the Empire. The Catholic sees of Prussia had been disrupted; their titulars were in exile or in prison. Four hundred parishes were without priests, and still Rome preached resistance. Bismarck seemed discouraged. He even appeared willing to temporise. But Pius IX refused to yield and his death (February 7, 1878) alone afforded an opportunity for compromise. Another decade was to

elapse before the conflict came to an end. Long before this Bismarck changed his attitude. He had feared the rise of the power of the Catholic Church in the new State. When he realised that his policy towards it did not afford the desired results, but stiffened its resistance and increased its prestige, he grasped at the first opportunity offered by the accession of a new Pope to effect a compromise, which led to a reconciliation and the repeal of the laws of 1874 and 1875. Bismarck did not enter upon the struggle with Rome for any high motives of freeing the German people from subservience to the Papacy. Nor is it to be believed that he foresaw the nature of the resistance which the Vatican would inspire. But once committed to the policy he persisted in it until the first favorable opportunity for its reversal was offered. It need excite no surprise that we find him soon thereafter compacting a close and friendly understanding with his bitter foes of yesterday.

Such was the opportunist nature of the realism of Bismarck in the throes of failure. It reveals that he had no far-sighted, permanent constructive policy; he contended for no ideals, whether political or social, but made their formulæ serve his practical programmes which he discarded when they no longer paid an immediate return.

III

It is more than mere coincidence that the two initiators of the imperialist movement who first definitely committed their governments to the policy of imperial enterprise should have been the first to give greatest consideration to questions of social reform. Bismarck, in spite

of his horror of socialism as an organism independent of the government, nevertheless realised that his imperial designs could only be carried out in close collaboration with the masses. As early as 1863 we find him organising a commission to inquire into labor problems, to report on working conditions and the relations between employers and employees. He himself had been in personal contact with Lasalle and other socialist leaders in an effort to arrive at a clear understanding of the exact needs of the working classes. Though the execution of his plans was delayed for nearly two decades, he had come to the conclusion that the State owes the same protection to the workers as it does to the capitalists. As for the benefit of the latter, the State undertakes to build railways and canals, and affords shipping facilities, protection of interests abroad and customs tariff regulations, so the former must be protected by affording them adequate wages, decrease in the burden of taxation, and, more important still, a complete system of State aid, insurance and pensions for their aged and sick must be arranged for. It was the duty of the State according to Bismarck to prevent the worker from worrying about his old age or from falling into distress as a result of unforeseen circumstances. Bismarck asserted that it was not only the duty, but the exclusive right of the State to protect and promote the welfare of its workers and succor its indigent. He energetically repudiated the efforts of the Socialists to intervene in behalf of the Proletariat. The Socialists were to him particularly opprobrious.[1] He seized every opportunity to suppress their organisation. For a time he

[1] "They are like the veiled prophet of Thomas More, who carefully hid his face, for as soon as the veil was lifted his face appeared to the people in all its terrible hideousness. If our laboring classes saw the face of Mokana they would shriek in horror as they would look upon the face of a corpse."—Cf. Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag October 9, 1878.

succeeded in driving them out of Germany, though he failed to check their rapid growth even by his extensive legislation of social reform, imposed by the Government and not in response to popular demand. Bismarck had embarked upon vast schemes of State Socialism, the execution of which extended over many years, and though they were in essence patterned on a paternalistic system in which the omnipotent State conferred benefits, yet they afford further proof of his social sensibility, which has already been referred to.

Disraeli undertook to attack the question of social reform in a more opportunist spirit. He believed that social improvement was desired by the people. The first two Labor members to be returned to Parliament in England took their seats in 1874. Disraeli had made it his especial care to feel the pulse of the nation, to keep a close watch for any symptoms which might give him a cue for a new policy, and then to strike out boldly, confident of support. "In legislation," he wrote in the autumn of 1874, "it is not merely reason and propriety which are to be considered but the temper of the time." [1] He now (1875) entered energetically upon plans for improving the condition of the people. Far less elaborate and complex in his schemes than Bismarck, Disraeli introduced very practical proposals for social legislation. He was ready to coöperate with labor representatives in regard to housing problems and savings banks, and above all the regulation of the vexed question of "master and man." The two laws passed in reference to this latter question were declared to be "the charter of the social and industrial liberty of the wage-earning classes." No branch of "social sanitation" as Disraeli was wont to call it was left unimproved, and the foundations were

[1] Cf. G. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli,* Vol. V, p. 359.

laid at this time upon which all subsequent programmes of social reform in England were carried out.

In Disraeli's attitude towards social problems we may discover, though from another viewpoint than that of Bismarck, this same new spirit of social sensibility which contrasts so sharply with the typical middle class individualist policy hitherto prevalent. This serves to explain the tenacious opposition of the Middle Class to his programme. It marks off the new departure in public policy which was to be extended beyond the realm of home affairs. The intuitive insight into the future rôle of the State which Disraeli conceived in a social sense, and which he impressed on his Government and the party which he led, has been strikingly summed up by one of his younger associates, Sir John Eldon Gorst:

"The principle of Tory democracy is that all government exists solely for the good of the governed; that Church and King, Lords and Commons, and all other public institutions are to be maintained so far, and so far only, as they promote the happiness and welfare of the common people; that all who are entrusted with any public function are trustees, not for their own class, but for the nation at large; and that the mass of the people may be trusted so to use electoral power, which should be freely conceded to them, as to support those who are promoting their interests. It is democratic because the welfare of the people is its supreme end; it is Tory because the institutions of the country are the means by which the end is to be attained." [1]

Disraeli had extended the basis of government and sought as Bismarck was doing to bring within the sphere of its influence the masses who had hitherto felt themselves not merely exploited by the Middle Class, but neglected by the State. He now proposed to affirm the

[1] Cf. G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 369.

claim of England to a major share in the regulation of world affairs which the wealth of the country, its vast colonial empire, its naval supremacy, and its awakening social solidarity seemed to justify. Disraeli has often been lauded for his imaginative grasp of imperial policy, his vision in appreciating the imperial needs of greater Britain. It would, however, appear useful in an effort to determine the more precise nature of his historical significance to reflect upon the close parallel between his and Bismarckian methods, his use of bellicose tactics in achieving in the international field, outside of Europe, what Bismarck had accomplished on the Continent. Disraeli up to the time of his fall from power (1879) in imitating Bismarck was influenced by similar social motives, carrying out on a much larger scale with infinitely more varied resources a very similar policy. As a process of historical evolution in creating a super-national point of view, and hastening the destruction of the Nation-State, German hegemony in Europe was to be correlated by English hegemony in other fields, until such a time as the Germans might feel strong enough to seek to supplant England and become masters of the world. The race for world supremacy had begun.

CHAPTER VIII

International Politics

RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN—CRISIS IN EGYPT—BRITISH OCCUPATION—A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER—THE AFGHAN WAR—RUSSO-GERMAN TENSION—THE BALKANS AGAIN—AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE—ENGLAND AND THE ALLIANCE—THE TEMPER OF THE TIMES—THE PASSING OF PESSIMISM—THE SUPER-MAN AND THE SUPER-STATE—TUNIS—FRANCO-ITALIAN RIVALRY—AN IMPERIALIST COMEDY—THE FRENCH IN TUNIS

I

THE Congress of Berlin had during the brief month of its labors undertaken to settle all pending questions which might be the cause of friction, to refashion the map of the Near East, and so put an end to the menace of a general European war. But in point of fact the settlement arrived at was unsatisfactory to all immediately concerned. None of the newly created Balkan States were satisfied with the treatment they had received. Rumania was irritated at having to cede Bessarabia to Russia. Bulgaria had been cut in two—"half slave and half free." The Greeks were up in arms at the shabby treatment they had received and were making ready to wage war to vindicate what they believed to be their rights. Montenegro was vociferously demanding that justice be done. In the Dual Monarchy the Hungarians viewed with suspicion the annexation of Slav territory which would increase the Slav element in the State. Russia felt that she had been deprived of the

fruits of her victory, and grudgingly carried out her share of the treaty clauses; while Turkey refused to help in the settlement of minor matters, which would have rendered peaceful solutions easier.

In Egypt a crisis had arisen. The Anglo-French system of dual control had become irksome to the Khedive, and he was anxious to be rid of it. The situation was difficult, as neither France nor England cared to take the initiative which might precipitate a conflict. Bismarck seized the opportunity to play the part of pacificator, and suggested as a way out that the Porte as overlord remove the Khedive from his throne. This measure was taken, and so matters were settled (June 1879). Here Berlin again played a principal part in the mediation.

At this time England alone of the Powers seemed ready to press her plans of imperial expansion. In order to forestall Russia, a vigorous aggressive policy to secure a "scientific frontier" for northwest India was brought to a "happy" conclusion. Though it led to a war with Afghanistan, in the end British suzerainty over the country was acknowledged. In South Africa England consolidated her hold over the recently annexed Transvaal, and found herself with a war against the Zulus on her hands, which after initial disasters led to pacification and penetration which were to become a usual method of imperial progress.

By the summer of 1879 the international situation had again become tense. During the Berlin Congress Bismarck had more than once displayed his anti-Russian sentiments. Nevertheless, Russia did not give up her attempts to bolster up the German alliance. While not refusing these advances, the Berlin Government had made it clear that in case of a conflict between her two allies, Germany would unhesitatingly support Austria. The

unsatisfactory progress in the settlement of pending questions in the Balkans, where Russia found herself isolated by the alleged solidarity of the representatives of the other Powers engaged in adjusting the various claims, had, according to Bismarck, led the Tsar in a letter to the German Emperor to threaten that "if Germany persists in the refusal to adopt (in the affairs in the Balkans) the Russian viewpoint, peace cannot continue between us."

The German Chancellor deemed the moment opportune to enter into a closer alliance with Austria. He also sounded the British Government with a view to securing its adherence, in order to be prepared for any eventuality. While the Chancellor was himself engaged in conducting negotiations with Austria and had brought them to a successful conclusion (September 1879), the German Ambassador at London was instructed to seek out Beaconsfield and present to him a survey of the European situation, and to emphasise the fact that the relations between "Russia and Germany are in their nature essentially unsatisfactory. . . . Russia is preparing to attack Austria; the peace of the world will be disturbed; it is in the nature of things that it will not be a localised war; it will be a great and general war. Peace is necessary to Germany; no country desires or requires peace more. To secure it she proposes an alliance between Germany, Austria, and Great Britain." Lord Beaconsfield said that he had always been and still was favorable in public affairs to the principle of an alliance or good understanding with Germany.[1]

Ten days later, on October 7, the Austro-German alliance was signed at Vienna. With England the nego-

[1] See memorandum by Lord Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, September 27, 1879.—Cf. G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 488.

tiations were carried no further. But on October 27, the Austrian Ambassador, under pledge of strictest secrecy, informed the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, that a defensive alliance, having as its object "the maintenance of the general peace and of the state of things established by the Berlin Treaty," had been entered upon with Germany. "The two Empires had agreed that for the minor matters which still remained to be executed by the Berlin Treaty (chiefly questions of delimitations), they would observe a most conciliatory attitude so long as Russia did the same, but if for any cause Russia were to attack either Empire, they have agreed to treat it as an attack on both of them." [1] Lord Salisbury expressed his approval of the arrangement and stated to the Austrian Ambassador that he hoped that "if in the lapse of years the Turkish Empire should fall, the difficult questions arising out of that result would be settled only after an intimate consultation between the three Powers."

England had apparently committed herself to a policy of coöperation with Austria and Germany, while retaining her liberty of action and reserving for herself a share of the spoils of Turkey in the future, at the same time championing its integrity for the present.

But the London Government had gone too far ahead of the public opinion of the nation. Beaconsfield's imperialism had developed too rapidly. He had lost touch with public sentiment. Middle class egotism was still too strong. Judged by middle class standards, Beaconsfield's policy had been morally wrong. The State as Power, divorced from morality, as expressed in the new orientation of foreign policy which had received its sanction at the Berlin Congress, found no justification in the eyes of

[1] Memorandum by Lord Salisbury to Queen Victoria, October 27, 1879. G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 491.

the strongly individualist majority to whom the breaking down of the barriers of national exclusiveness, even in the defence of national interests, seemed unjustifiable. In spite of the ascendant position in world affairs which Beaconsfield had secured for England, in spite of the acquisition of new territory and the security afforded to the lines of communications by the control of the Suez Canal, Cyprus, and the foothold in Egypt, his Government was badly defeated at the general elections (March 1880). The Liberals under Gladstone were returned to office. They attempted, though in vain, to reëstablish the old middle class policy of exclusiveness and disinterestedness in foreign affairs.

II

The passing of Lord Beaconsfield had no material influence on historical development. His picturesque figure disappeared, leaving no void. For his political philosophy, in so far as he had any, rested on a vaguely realised theory of State, arrived at with the intuitive vision of the artist rather than with the logic of the politician. This explains the part he played in loosing England from the bonds of the personalised State. By initiating the policy of imperialism and recognising the social obligations of the State, the way for the super-national, impersonal State was paved. "What wonderful things are events; the least are of greater importance than the most sublime and comprehensive speculation." [1] Here we have in Disraeli's own words an interpretation of the political conduct of the epoch. Detached from theory, oblivious

[1] Cf. *Coningsby*.

of principle, public policy was coming to be determined by events and the contingencies arising therefrom.

Such was the temper of the times. Bearing this in mind we may trace historically the course of events, and note the rise of the new politico-economic theory of State, veiled and incoherent though it appeared even to its chief exponents, except as traceable as a symptomatic, social sensibility to which attention has been called. Here we may find confirmation, if such confirmation is needed, that the old politico-juridic theory of State had definitively broken down, and that the new had not yet been formulated with sufficient precision to be comprehensible. It is thus in the interpretation of events that we must seek to discover the factors of the new political doctrine.

The impetus given to imperialism, the assaults upon particularism, the centralisation of authority, the mechanisation of government, appear as destructive agencies of the limited, personalised Nation-State. The era which opened was one of unconscious demolition manifested as conscious construction. The practice of the period was destroying the theory upon which the fabric of the State had been built. Whether we have here the secret of evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change is beyond our inquiry. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the men who directed public affairs had lost all contact with the philosophic background of politics, had detached themselves from principle, had abandoned theory, and were navigating the State by the stars of their destiny like a ship without a compass.

The days of pessimism were passing; a new expansive optimism was about to seize hold of mankind. The time of the Super-Man and the Super-State had arrived. During the decade (1870-1880) which had come to a close all of the great European States with the exception of France

had increased their prestige and power and acquired new territory. By 1880 even France had recovered sufficient strength to be in a position to reassert herself in European affairs. The mirage of a colonial empire was growing. England in more remote parts of the earth was daily increasing her holdings, staking out new claims, prospecting new fields of expansion. It was now the turn of France to put to profit the lessons of the new imperialism. At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had suggested Tunis as the field for this exploit. But even now the French Government was loth to commit itself to this undertaking. A case had to be made out to render the plan feasible. This was not difficult. There was Italy. She was known to have plans of her own in regard to Tunis. A large and prosperous Italian colony, the most important element in the city of Tunis, had insistently urged the annexation of the country to Italy. By the end of 1881 Italy seemed ready to take this step. France, though unwilling or unable to measure herself with England or Germany, was not averse to testing her new strength with some other State. Here we have a key factor in imperial expansion; the State as Power, in competition for power. It may be mentioned incidentally, though it had no particular bearing on the plans of either France or Italy, that Tunis was a vassal of the Porte, ruled by its own Bey, and considered semi-independent.

Unfamiliar with European financial methods, as was natural among a people who had remained outside the orbit of industrial expansion, Tunis in close intercourse with Europe had been compelled to accept foreign financial advisers, while the competition for railway and other concessions within the country offered ample opportunity for political intrigue, in which the Italians and French competed. First the nationals of one and then of the

other State would gain an advantage, as the Bey of Tunis endeavored to profit by the jealous competition of the two European States. Matters were brought to a head, according to French accounts, when the Italians secured control of the railway from La Goulette to Tunis (March 1881). France immediately protested and received concessions for her financiers to construct the line Tunis-Bizerte, and port privileges. The French Government deemed that the opportune moment had arrived to appear exasperated at the presumption of the Italians. Time for action had come. Italy must be forestalled; she must be confronted with a *fait accompli.*

Some details of the methods pursued are of interest as throwing light on the new theory and practice of imperial enterprise. It must be borne in mind that Italy was the competitor and Tunis the spoil. Yet historians of the period gravely inform us that on March 31, Paris learned that a band of semi-civilised Tunisian mountaineers, Krumirs, had crossed the frontier into the French province of Constantine in the Algerian hinterland. Five French soldiers were killed and five wounded. The records of history give no details of the fate of the Krumir raiders, and are silent as to the countless similar raids by tribesmen who had not crossed frontiers. But here was a useful incident. The French Government immediately made representations to the Bey of Tunis, who according to French accounts declined to accept French proposals to pacify the Krumirs. On April 4 the French Premier, Jules Ferry, told the Chamber that France would see to it that such incidents would not be repeated. Credits were voted for an expeditionary force to be despatched to the scene. The Porte came to the rescue of its vassal and protested. But the stage was set. The imperialist comedy was not to be delayed. The principal spectators,

Russia, Austria, Germany, had given repeated assurances of their approval, and promised not to stop the performance. England had likewise urged France to go to Tunis and, in spite of the change of the government, was bound by this agreement. London even went so far as to undertake to "discourage" the Sultan from any plan he might have formed to assist Tunis. Italy stood alone. The march of events had been too rapid. She had been dazed by the meteoric suddenness of the French *coup*. An army of 23,000 men was sent from France, while native Algerian troops were concentrated along the Tunis frontier, which was crossed on April 24. The Krumirs were attacked in their strongholds, and scattered. But Tunis and its Bey, Sidi Saddok, were not lost sight of. A French squadron entered the harbor of Bizerte, and a corps of 8,000 troops was landed. The Bey had no organised army. He was in no position to resist, even had he desired to do so. Flight or surrender was the alternative. Flight was unnecessary, surrender was easy, as the terms of the treaty proposed by the French left the Bey on his throne, under the ægis of France. So at 7 P.M. on the evening of May 12, 1881, "amid the tears and lamentations of the women of the seraglio, and the objurations of his entourage, who besought him to give in, Sidi Saddok, depressed, helpless, beaten without a fight, placed the Bey's seals on two copies of the treaty." [1]

[1] Cf. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine,* Vol. IV, p. 661.

CHAPTER IX

The Triple Alliance

THE CIVILISING MISSION OF THE STATE—THE NEW BASIS OF COMPETITION—TENDENCY TO COALITION—POSITION OF ITALY—FOUNDATION OF THE ALLIANCE—ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE—THE RÔLE OF AUSTRIA AND OF ITALY—ECONOMIC FACTORS—PEACEFUL PENETRATION—SUPERNATIONALISM—POLITICS SUBSERVIENT TO ECONOMICS—SOCIAL BENEFITS—THE THEORY OF EXPLOITATION

I

THUS France acquired Tunis. In the outline of its policy issued by the French Government it was set forth that, "for ourselves we gain absolute security for our great African colony. . . . Tunis gains all the blessings of our civilisation." Here is the new note of imperialism. The conquered peoples, the annexed territory, are to receive the blessings of the "true civilisation," if need be, at the sword's point.

The State has a civilising mission to perform, no longer merely within its own boundaries, in the form of social legislation and economic development of its own peoples; but these benefits, modified, attenuated, transformed to suit particular circumstances, are to be thrust upon alien peoples whose cultural background and philosophy of life might be and usually were altogether different. Here we find a first tentative application of the thesis that incompetent peoples—that is, those incompetent in an industrial and commercial sense when measured by Western standards—have no inalienable right to the possession of their

territory. Efficient exploitation was to be held a better test of right than mere possession. "The treasure of the lazy belongs to the active worker, capable of exploiting it; this is the law which rules our world."

Henceforth in the course of super-national expansion the State was to arrogate to itself the right of sitting in judgment upon the fitness of a given alien people to its independent existence and the possession of its territory; while in competition with other great States it was to remain to the strongest to assert for itself the right to confer the imprint of its own cultural development, the benefits of its own civilisation, upon the less competent peoples.

France in competition with Italy for Tunis had gained a facile triumph. The Italians had been outwitted; their diplomacy had been defective; their armed strength unready. The position of Italy in Europe was far from enviable. Bismarck had gone so far as to declare that he was delighted with the French occupation of Tunis and hoped that France "would annex Morocco." The Austro-German alliance had strengthened the bonds between these two countries, and the German Chancellor took pains to let it be known that if Austria should see fit to seek to regain its lost Italian provinces, Germany would not oppose such a plan, "as Italy is not among our friends."

The end of the *Kulturkampf* had brought about a reconcilation between Berlin and the Papacy, and the Roman question had again come to the fore. Bismarck appeared ready to support Papal pretensions, with the view to the reëstablishment of the temporal power, and offered an asylum to the Pope in Germany should His Holiness deem it necessary to leave Rome.

Beaten by France, threatened by Austria, with Germany apparently hostile, the Italians turned first to England, but received here but scant consideration. Gladstone had no desire to commit the country to any foreign entanglements, and England's position in the Mediterranean was at the time sufficiently secure not to require any support that Italy might be able to offer.

On examining more closely Bismarck's policy, the Italians found that in spite of his outward harshness towards them, the German Chancellor was not averse to including Italy among Germany's allies, or as he conceived it, her satellites. On the contrary, in point of fact, he ardently desired such a union, but he wished the request therefor to come from Italy. To Italy this seemed her only chance to consolidate her position in Europe. It would appear that the Italian Government had no clear conception of the ulterior motives of Germany. Furthermore, Italy was in no position to be exacting, and accepted with alacrity the suggestion made by Bismarck that any understanding with Germany must include a similar agreement with Austria. Within six months of the Tunis fiasco the King and Queen of Italy paid a visit of state to Vienna, and soon thereafter the representatives of Italy at Berlin and Vienna officially informed the Governments of the two Empires that Italy was anxious to enter upon a defensive alliance with them (December 1881). These proposals were not rejected, but the negotiations dragged on while Italy was repeatedly made to feel the inferiority of her position, and that her security and independence depended upon the will of Germany. Finally a secret treaty was drawn up and signed May 20, 1882, at Vienna between Germany, Italy, and the Dual Monarchy, which came to be known as the Triple Alliance.

II

To Bismarck, the founder of the Triple Alliance, it meant the revival of the Holy Roman Empire which, during its virile period from the 10th to the 14th century had made Germany not merely the geographical, but the historico-political centre of Europe. The Empire had during a long series of decades maintained the general peace of Europe, and its decline marked the beginning of turmoil and chaos in the West. "The origins of the Triple Alliance stretch back to mythical times. The ancient German imperial authority of the Holy Roman Empire extended from the North Sea to Apulia, and theoretically included all Italy. It is a peculiar dispensation of destiny and of divine Providence that this great and powerful realm of Central Europe, after it had been torn asunder by so many wars, should in our own day again have been reunited." [1] Nor is it so great an exaggeration to accept the view of Bismarck that the Triple Alliance under German leadership was in reality, as an historical factor, a restoration of the Holy Roman Empire. For it was more than a mere alliance. The great Central European allied State, stretching from the North Sea to the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, was in German eyes an extension of the boundaries of their Empire. For the policy of the Alliance, the Germans were confident, would in all cases be dictated by Berlin. The two Southern allies were from the outset made to feel that they occupied subsidiary positions. A broader and more loosely knit control was exercised over them by Germany than exercised by Prussia over the States of Germany proper, but their relation to Berlin was not dis-

[1] Cf. address delivered by Bismarck, April, 1895.

similar. The Austrian ally was to be of more service than merely to keep Russia in check, and the increase of armaments and military efficiency, imposed upon the Italians as a condition of alliance, was to mean more than a mere threat to France. For in serving to strengthen the defensive unity of the Central European group of States, the Alliance gave breadth, scope, and field for German economic expansion.

As during the Middle Ages the Church had in the first instance served as the bond of union of the Holy Roman Empire, so now the great socialising forces of modern life, industry and commerce, were to serve as the unifying bond of Central Europe. Here is the basic feature of the Triple Alliance, which if cogently appreciated presents but one more link in the chain of evidence which we may accumulate in noting the breakdown of the personalised Nation-State.

While England and France, acting under a similar impulse of economic expansion, were engaged in extending their dominions in Asia and Africa, Germany was preparing for a new type of imperial expansion nearer home. By the force of arms France had acquired Tunis, and England had occupied Egypt. These were the first of a long series of similar enterprises undertaken on the ground that the interest of the world demands the most efficient industrial and commercial exploitation of every part of the globe, and thus confers privileges and rights upon the exploiter, superior to those of mere possession. Now Germany, by methods which came to be designated as "peaceful penetration," was making ready to exploit Italy and the Dual Monarchy, and bind them inextricably to herself. Here was a new weapon of economic control, which was soon to prove the most powerful agency of political pressure which has been devised in

modern times. Its use in this instance was deemed essential not only for the consolidation of the Triple Alliance—as history afforded so many examples of the anti-Ghibelline attitude of the Italians, who it was anticipated might again become restive—but also to give Germany an opportunity of putting into effect the new politico-economic thesis of the Super-State.

The Triple Alliance, the vigorous revival, in fact if not in name, of the Holy Roman Empire, and the removal of its capital to Berlin, brought to a conclusion the process of German unity as Bismarck had conceived it. At the same time it marked the abandonment of the theory of nationalism as the basis of State building. Not that nationalism in the sense of race patriotism and race superiority had as yet died out. On the contrary, it was on the eve of bursting forth in a final flare of unparalleled intensity. But nationalism was no longer held a sound political theory. In this light the Triple Alliance as a super-national grouping is more easily understood. And though the Berlin Government never for a moment forgot what it held to be the economic, cultural, and racial superiority of the Germans over either of the polyglot peoples of Austria-Hungary or of Italy, for purposes of public policy, more especially in foreign affairs, it was to become customary to consider the Central Powers as a politically compact group of States—a Super-State.

In tracing the deeper currents of historical development we will find that the Triple Alliance marks a distinct epoch. It has been customary to interpret the Alliance as an artificial grouping of States, due merely to the diplomatic skill of a Bismarck in arraying Austria and Italy on the side of Germany to be prepared for an eventual war with Russia or France or both. This explanation is in no wise adequate. The true interpretation of the

Triple Alliance is to be sought not so much in the realm of higher politics, as in economics. The Triple Alliance was in the first instance—and this fact cannot be too insistently dwelt upon—an affair of "internal politics" to Germany. As the establishment of the *Zollverein* had marked the first definite step towards German unity, so now the Triple Alliance was to afford a foundation broad enough for the fuller development of the economic life of the new industrialised Germany, and prepare the way for the new imperial Super-State, the outlines of which were at the time only vaguely apprehended.

It was a phenomenon not confined to Germany that after 1880 politics had become definitely subservient to economics. The middle class theory of the Nation-State, with its more strictly interpreted politica-juridic code, based on compacts and contracts, was receiving blows under which it was staggering. The accepted doctrine of legal right of possession, of ownership, was being undermined by the new economic theories of the superior rights of exploitation which were being advanced in the form of political doctrine. The good of the world at large was constantly being invoked as conferring special privileges. The individualist viewpoint was being overridden by the appeal to general interest and general welfare. The rapacity of the methods used was to be atoned for by the social benefits gained. Thus England at this time occupied Egypt (July 1882), and the defenders of the British policy were careful to emphasise the fact that this step was motived by the general interest of the world at large, and of Egypt in particular, whether the Egyptians desired it or not. Here was a more precise enunciation of the theory of exploitation, which Germany by her superior economic development and technical skill was making ready to put into practice.

CHAPTER X

The Super-State

THE NEW ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE STATE—BISMARCK AS MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY—PROTECTIVE TARIFFS—MARKETS—COMMUNICATIONS—THE REINSURANCE TREATY OF 1884—ITS ECONOMIC MOTIVES—ARMED PEACE—COLONIAL EXPANSION—FRANCE—ENGLAND—ITALY—GERMANY—LEOPOLD II OF BELGIUM—THE CONGO—THE BERLIN CONFERENCE—FIRST PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN A EUROPEAN CONGRESS—THE PARTITION OF AFRICA—THE NEW ERA

I

In estimating the part played by Bismarck in the building up of the Central European Super-State by the ties of the Triple Alliance it must be recalled that the Chancellor had clearly in mind that economic factors were essential to its consolidation. Thus a few months after the conclusion of the alliance with Austria we find him taking over the portfolio of Minister of Commerce and Industry (1880). The man who had forged united Germany on the battlefield was now to forge upon the economic anvil the unity of greater Germany. The moment was propitious. The intense industrial development of Germany which had followed upon the influx of the French indemnity had been succeeded by a period of industrial depression. This depression was now beginning to abate. Trade and industry were reviving.

Production, transportation, markets are the primary factors of economic strength. Production must be stimu-

lated, transportation improved, new markets assured. These were the economic problems which Bismarck set himself to solve. These were the interests which preoccupied him during the last years of his control of public affairs. These were the factors ultimately associated with the greatness and stability of the new Super-State. Bismarck held that it was the duty of the State to protect industry and stimulate production; to develop transportation and to secure new markets and sources of raw materials. Though brought up as a free trader, he came to acknowledge the value of protective tariffs as the only adequate protection for infant industry, and saw to it that laws providing for customs duties were enacted to achieve his purpose. Bismarck found the railways in a chaotic condition, and as a first requisite of trade is to assure proper channels of communication, he compelled Prussia to buy and link up the various systems; supplementing them by canals and waterway improvements, and affording privileges to shippers. The question of new markets and sources of raw materials was more difficult.

Bismarck had on repeated occasions manifested his opposition to colonial enterprise. He was opposed to a dispersal of strength in distant undertakings. Germany at the time possessed no efficient navy, and would inevitably have found herself in competition with some other strong naval Power which might lead to a disastrous war. This must at all costs be avoided. Here we have the causes of Bismarck's apparent opposition to colonial enterprise. Industrial development requires peace. Though the preponderant strength of the Central Powers in European affairs and the friendly relations with England seemed to promise that peace would not be disturbed, yet he knew that even a threat of

war might dislocate the plans which he had matured for the economic development of Germany.

The anti-Russian policy which Bismarck had pursued and the unqualified support he had given to Austria had been interpreted by Russia as a distinct menace. He now set about to devise a plan to allay this impression, and taking his cue from the example in the business world, he devised a reinsurance treaty. On March 21, 1884, at Berlin, the representatives of Russia and Germany signed a secret agreement, to be valid for a period of three years, which bound the contracting parties to observe an attitude of friendly neutrality in case one of them should be attacked by another Power.[1] Here was an ideal arrangement from the German point of view. It did not commit Germany to anything definite, smoothed over possible causes for hostilities between Austria and Russia which would have compelled intervention, and at the same time excluded the possibility of an understanding between France and Russia which would have been a direct threat to Germany. With peace assured along her eastern frontier, the western could give little cause for concern.

The Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, viewed in proper perspective, thus appears to have been entered upon primarily to permit the most rapid and undisturbed economic development of Germany. As such it is of historical importance, as marking the acceptance by the State of the economic value of peace as a principal factor of public policy, though not excluding the political

[1] This agreement was ratified in September of the same year at a meeting of the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany held at Skiernevice, thus renewing the Three Emperors' League, *Dreikaiserbund,* which was to supplement the Triple Alliance. After 1887 Austria was no longer a party to the agreement, owing to the unwillingness of the Tsar to continue in any such arrangement with Vienna, though he renewed the treaty for another three years with Berlin.

value of war. Economics henceforth was to dictate to politics the aims of policy. The function of the State had become avowedly economic. Its principal and often sole concern was frankly the acquisition of power to protect and promote industry and commerce. As the State as Power had acquired national unity and political independence, so now this power was to assure economic prosperity as the stepping-stone to super-national expansion.

The long era of European peace which ensued was rendered possible by the wide acceptance of this new politico-economic doctrine that peace must be safeguarded by the full power of the State. It was to be an armed peace. The State was to be so well prepared for war that none would dare to venture to declare war; and thus peace would be assured. Such was the German thesis which, owing to Germany's preponderant position in Europe, was imposed upon all the great States. Peace by combination of power, rather than by balance of power, was Bismarck's doctrine, which he succeeded in enforcing. The economic prosperity of the country could henceforth be developed with full energy. The spectre of war had been removed, leaving Germany free to expand overseas. Nor could this expansion be long delayed if Germany was to have a share therein.

II

The territorial expansion of the European Powers in all parts of the globe had begun in earnest. France after Tunis had directed her attention to Indo-China, where a foothold had been gained under the Second Empire; she was now engaged in occupying Tonkin, outlining for herself a great colonial domain in that region and

at the same time making ready to seize Madagascar. England, after securing Egypt and penetrating the Sudan, was about to lay claim to Burma. Russia was spreading out across Eastern Asia to the Pacific. Italy had blocked out for herself a sphere for colonisation along the Red Sea, which at the time, the Italians hoped, might include the rich Abyssinian plateau. Even the minor States such as Belgium, Holland, and Portugal were embarking on colonial enterprise. It would seem as though the Germans would find the world, or at least its desirable portions, marked off by other States.

In the meantime private initiative in Germany had ventured upon colonial expansion. Hamburg and Bremen merchants had installed themselves in Togoland and the Cameroon, in East and Southwest Africa, and in some of the Australasian Islands. At home a colonial party was growing up. The German navy, though still in its infancy, was daily becoming more popular. Bismarck felt that he could no longer resist the demand that the State participate in colonial enterprise. His treaty with Russia gave him the security needed. Soon thereafter Germany entered into competition for overseas domains. The methods he adopted showed that the Chancellor still retained traces of his inherent opposition to such enterprise. Colonies acquired by force of arms, merely for the sake of territorial expansion, he stigmatised as artificial. For Bismarck made it plain that he looked upon colonial undertaking solely as an adjunct of economic expansion, and stood ready to protect and assist German traders who had established themselves overseas. His dominant aim was to avoid causes for friction or war with States who had previously entered the field, and were better equipped than Germany to protect their interests. This prudent policy did not prevent him now

from actively supporting colonial enterprise. Central Africa had up to that time been for the greater part unexplored and was still untenanted. Priority of occupation by a European State was held the sole title to sovereignty. A number of German merchants who were engaged in trade in Southwest Africa had received concessions in the vicinity of the Bay of Angra Pequena, from a local chief. Here was a foothold that was soon to be developed into the German colony of Southwest Africa. Simultaneously Germany was acquiring sovereign rights in Samoa and Northern New Guinea, and seized the Marshall Islands in the Pacific, where German merchants had for some time been established. Spain laid claim to these islands. But Bismarck desired no disturbance of the peace, and he submitted the question to the arbitration of the Pope, which Spain as a Catholic country could not refuse to agree to. By this tactful act he wiped out the last traces of the hostility he had aroused among the Catholics by the *Kulturkampf,* and even rallied them to his active support;[1] the more so that when the Pope decided the question under arbitration in favor of Spain the German Government was careful to observe very scrupulously the decision rendered. The Germans were permitted to retain a foothold in the Marshall group, which made it easier for Germany to secure the islands by purchase at a later date (1899).

Once ready to commit himself to a colonial policy, Bismarck aimed to give to colonial affairs a breadth and

[1] It is a significant example of the opportunism of Bismarck's policy that soon thereafter (1887) he besought the intervention of the Vatican in German internal affairs, and succeeded in inducing Leo XIII to bring pressure to bear on the members of the Centre party to support his military programme, to which they had hitherto been consistently opposed. The Papal Nuncio in a letter addressed to the German Catholic leaders stated that "the Holy Father desires that the Centre shall support in every possible manner the project of the military septennate."

scope suited to so potentially important a branch of international politics by formulating a European policy which, by regulating colonial enterprise on an international basis, would assure to Germany, though a late comer in the field, a prominent place consistent with her dignity and power. Mindful of the success achieved at the Congress of 1878, the German Chancellor was now anxious to find some suitable pretext for calling together the Powers in another congress to assemble at Berlin to regulate colonial undertakings, to systematise and if possible check the rapacious land-grabbing of the other principal Powers, and thus secure for Germany what he deemed her proper share.

A favorable opportunity soon presented itself. Leopold II, King of the Belgians, was a sovereign of a new type. He had absorbed to the full the economic spirit of the period. He seemed to realise that politics were daily becoming more subservient to economics, and that while parliamentary government had deprived the heads of States of much of their political authority, sovereigns might, if they wished to be something more than mere figureheads, by a frank acceptance of the preëminence of economic interests and by the exploitation of these interests, best promote their own prosperity and that of their country. Leopold II was a typical capitalist [1] of the new school, who in addition happened to be occupying a throne. He was ready for new enterprise, eager to open up new fields for industrial and commercial exploitation. He was among the very first to perceive the economic advantages which would accrue from

[1] Capitalism was outgrowing its middle class interpretation, and from this time we may note a tendency of the control of capital to become concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of international financiers who was ready to engage in distant enterprise, provided that the State was willing and able to support its claims.

colonial operations in Central Africa. With his shrewd sense for business, Leopold II had as early as 1876 called together a group of competent technical advisers, geographers and explorers, to formulate plans to carry on explorations in equatorial Africa. Soon thereafter the favorable reports of the English explorer, Stanley, the first white man to descend the Congo River, stimulated Leopold's plans. The African International Association was formed, composed of geographers, scientists, explorers, and capitalists representative of all the European States. The Association outlined a plan to establish exploring stations along the Congo River, and open up the great Congo Basin to European exploitation (1878). By 1883 considerable progress had been made. The Belgian King had invested large sums in the undertaking. Military and trading stations were established, the navigation of the Congo was well under way, and a number of steamers were regularly plying on the river; while the stations were garrisoned by a well-disciplined police force. In addition missionaries, chiefly English and French, were carrying on the fruitful work in spreading, not merely the Gospel, but also propaganda in favor of the nation to which they belonged.[1]

III

In the meantime various States—Portugal, Holland, France—advanced sovereign pretensions over parts of

[1] It is to be noted that no attempt to colonise in the strict sense of the word was made in Central Africa. Though the word "civilise" has been euphemistically used to give a humanitarian tinge to the work undertaken to bring Equatorial Africa under European control, colonisation aimed primarily merely at economic exploitation. The theory had gained wide credence that "the starving white man must be satisfied or he will become ugly." These words reflect the best public opinion of the time, which applauded land-grabbing by the Powers, in Africa and elsewhere, as of the highest benefit to all concerned.

the Congo territory. Portugal claimed priority as having sovereign rights over the Lower Congo, based on her discovery in 1484. The Dutch laid claims based on their trading posts, while French explorers had been active in their explorations and in the distribution of tricolor flags among the natives, as stakes of sovereignty. For her part England found it useful to recognise the Portuguese claims, and in February 1884 entered into an agreement which assured to Portugal the control of the mouth of the Congo, while England reserved for herself the hinterland.

The news of this agreement raised a storm of protest among the other European States. Here Bismarck saw his opportunity to call a congress which, while incidentally settling the Congo question, might be made the occasion for formulating a European policy concerning the territorial partition of Africa, as well as regarding all questions relating to the economic exploitation of that continent.

From November 1884 to the end of February 1885 the representatives of the six Great European Powers, and of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Turkey, Norway and Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and—for the first time in a European Conference—the United States,[1] labored to devise a suitable arrangement. Under the presidency of Bismarck a policy was formulated which was best suited to assure to Germany a good share of all territory distributed. The Congo Basin proper was put out of harm's way by being reorganised as a Free State with Leopold II as its sovereign. Arrangements were made to insure the free navigation of the Congo and the Niger, and rules were laid down regarding the future occupation of the coast of Africa, but the most im-

[1] The United States did not ratify the Act of the Conference.

portant clause of the Act of the Berlin Conference, signed February 26, 1885, was that in future any Power which was about to seize new territory in Africa should first notify the other Powers of its intention to do so, in order to avoid a conflict.[1] Here was an unparalleled opportunity to assert the armed power of the State to secure colonial possessions by the mere threat of war. Germany, as the head of the Triple Alliance, was already at this time the strongest military power in the world, and she had secured the right to protest against the colonial expansion of other States, which amounted to the assertion of her own preëminence.

Berlin suddenly found herself a central figure in the colonial policy of the world. Hitherto England and to a less degree France had been able to increase their colonial holdings at will. Henceforth Germany was not only to be consulted, but was herself to become a most serious competitor. Confident in the ascendant position acquired at the Berlin Conference, Germany launched headlong in the acquisition of colonies. Within the brief space of three years Germany acquired a colonial domain estimated at one and a half million square miles, populated by over sixteen million inhabitants.[2]

The attention of the people of Europe was henceforth to be fixed beyond the boundaries of the Continent. The world was in fact, as well as in speech, to become the field for their enterprise. A new gen-

[1] It is of importance to point out that here for the first time in an international document the matter of spheres of influence and obligations attaching thereto are dealt with.

[2] During the ensuing fifteen years the work of the partition of Africa was practically completed. France strove to carve out for herself an African empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, but this ambitious scheme was blocked by England after the Fashoda Incident (1896). England herself planned a colonial empire which was to stretch from the Cape to Cairo. This plan was blocked by Germany, who gained for herself the position of third largest colonial Power in Africa.

eration had grown to manhood to whom the Crimean War was but an historical memory, and even the struggles of Germany and Italy for national unity were epic events of romantic rather than practical interest. The gap left by the defeat of France had been filled by her revival as a World Power ready to pursue an energetic programme, which at bottom was inspired by dreams of a *revanche,* and the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. The State as Power had grown to full stature. It demanded wider fields for greater exploits. A new wave of politico-social enthusiasm, of opportunism, was swelling. The older realism of Bismarck, with its narrowed horizon, its repressive limitations, had grown intolerable to the younger men. Economic expansion, which appeared to have been developed to such a prodigious extent during the past two decades, seemed to the rising generation merely a feeble beginning. To be sure, the maps of the world had been splashed with the flaming red of British imperial expansion; French green marked off vast areas, and now the German yellow showed that the German flag was flying in the antipodes. But these colonies awaited organisation and exploitation. Much had been done, but infinitely more awaited doing. It was beginning to be realised that the work to be done could not be carried through merely by continuing the old policies. Social sensibility was crystallising into social consciousness. Capital, which was eager for new and vaster enterprise, was coming to realise that its power and potential expansive energy in industry and commerce rested on the skill and efficient co-operation of the working masses. Though Bismarck zealously promoted his programmes of paternal State social legislation, and carried through his extensive measures of social insurance, and protection to the wage-

earner, yet he repressed with unabated vigor every attempt made by the workers to promote their own interests, or develop their own class solidarity.

During his remaining years in office, Bismarck endeavored to put the last touches to his State. He realised more than ever that the orientation that he had given to German development could be maintained only by armed force. To increase the security and strength of the Empire he had founded he had employed years of skilful diplomacy, but he realised that in the last analysis it depended on the efficiency of the army. The necessity of preparing for war, the conviction that the armed strength of the State was the sole protection of its cultural and economic life, of its political liberty and position in the world, was dwelt upon more insistently than ever. The need to increase this strength, to develop the striking power of the State, to render it formidable above its competitors for power, was declared the paramount interest of the State. As a result increased armaments were voted by the German Reichstag, after an arduous struggle in which the Chancellor had to come forward in person to defend his policy. "His Majesty, the Emperor, cannot disavow the work to which he has devoted thirty years of his life: the creation of the German Army and the creation of the German Empire," the Chancellor declared in the Reichstag on January 11, 1887, and it is significant that he placed the army before the Empire.

Bismarck's work was done. He could go no further. Though he renewed the Triple Alliance as well as the Reinsurance Treaty in this same year, he added nothing. He was engaged in holding together what he had built; for already he saw fissures in the foundations.

CHAPTER XI

Salus Populi

ESTIMATE OF BISMARCK'S HISTORICAL MISSION—THE NEW ETHICS OF GOVERNMENT—THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE USE OF FORCE—CULTURAL SUPERIORITY

I

THE deeper one examines into the career of Bismarck and the part he played in furthering the breakdown of the control of the body politic by the Middle Class, the more distinctly are the limitations of his policy, where the use of force was of no avail, revealed. Though skilled in diplomatic architectonics, unhampered by any scruples of moral responsibility or the accepted code of political honor in so far as affairs of State were concerned, the Iron Chancellor bequeathed no sound precepts in the art of government, no practice in the science of politics, which might serve a later epoch. He distorted the moral standards, and perverted the ethical sense, not merely of the German people, but of the civilised world. Yet who shall say that his dual historical mission, which was to accelerate the destruction of the older concepts of statehood and prepare for a new form of social organisation, was not for these very reasons the more thoroughly performed, that he sowed a storm so that the succeeding generation might reap a whirlwind? It cannot be maintained that this was his conscious rôle, yet we can perceive in his conception of power as objective the awakening of a

new social consciousness, the manifestation of social sensibility to which attention has been called. His success and the ascendancy of Germany were based on a clear insight into the social nature of the State, in contrast with the middle class individualist theory which had hitherto prevailed. He was the first to make use of the idea of disciplined coöperation. But he apparently failed to recognise that man must not only obey, but he must believe; not only βιος but θεος is necessary to a complete development of social consciousness. The end cannot justify the means when the end has been attained and the means survive.

In asserting German claims to leadership in Europe, Bismarck had taken advantage of the nascent social consciousness of the German people, and by limiting it as an exclusively national discipline which required of the individual implicit as well as explicit loyalty to the State, forbade the latter to look beyond national boundaries except as to a field for predatory penetration. The ethics and art of government were directed to support the contention that the State as Power can alone assure survival; not power reinforced by moral considerations, implying inhibitions and ethical restraints, but power whose basis is disciplined violence which can be unleashed at will.

The Nation-State as Power, in the use of force had behind it psychical motives of a social character which had never been hitherto overtly accepted. The use of force was justified by the end in view. Not only do we find it reiterated with apparent finality that "the State is not physical power as an end in itself, but is the power to protect and promote the high interests of mankind. The lesson of power (*Machtlehre*) purely as an end in itself cannot be countenanced; it is immoral because it

can not justify itself," [1] but the conviction had gained credence that though "the end of justice is peace, the way to attain it is by war . . . all the justice that there is in the world was attained after a struggle . . . all rights, the rights of a nation, as the rights of an individual, presuppose that he who possesses them is always ready to affirm them by the use of force." [2] Here we find power endowed with a social sanctity that it had never hitherto possessed. The use of force was thus not only necessary but a highly desirable attribute of the State. War had in the long centuries of its evolution acquired social value.[3] The warrior instinct in man had by a slow process been transformed into a disciplined, socialised, combative sense, which found expression in the formation of armies organised to protect the civilian community from incursion, until at last we find a Nation-State with its young male population conscripted in time of peace to serve in the ranks, and in time of war the entire able-bodied population pledged for national service. War had become a social function; the State a heavily armed, disciplined weapon for war.[4]

The acceptance of the idea of the State as Power—

[1] Cf. Treitschke, *Politics*, Vol. II, p. 543.
[2] Cf. R. Ihering, *Der Kampf ums Recht.*
[3] Cf. William James, *"The Moral Equivalent of War."*
[4] An unarmed State incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit, is subject to one which wields the power of declaring war. . . . A defenceless State may still be termed a Kingdom for convention or polite reasons, but science whose first duty is accuracy must boldly declare that in point of fact such a country no longer takes rank as a State.

This, then, is the only criterion. The right of arms distinguishes the State from all other forms of corporate life, and those who cannot take up arms for themselves may not be regarded as States but only as members of a federated constellation of States. . . .

War is Politics *κατ' ἐξοχήν.*

The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the State and it brings out the full splendor of the sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another.—Cf. Treitschke, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chaps. I and II.

the confusion of identity between what had hitherto been considered a function of government (the protection of rights and interests) with that of the end of the State itself—had promoted the rise of an egocentric, racial nationalism, which excluded any sincere acceptance of a broader concept of humanity. Yet human intercourse was daily becoming more intensive. The communication between peoples, already accelerated during the preceding period, had increased an hundredfold, and was increasing in geometric progression. The interpenetration of ideas, the international character of trade and commerce, the first attempts to arrive at international solidarity among the working class, had built up a fabric of social relations which was hampered by national boundaries. Nevertheless the technique of government, the theory of politics retrenched itself more strongly than ever behind the barriers of the heavily armed Nation-State.

In theory, the State, an organisation for peace, was under the control of its civilian administrators; in practice, the State had in the militarised States of continental Europe come under direct, elsewhere under the indirect, control of its armed strength in order to be prepared for war. During the next forty years the threat of the drawn sword, the fear of a levelled rifle, their use against weaker States—in brief, the tactics of the highwayman, became the practice of States. The increase and improvement of armaments, the building of great navies, their use in affirming world interests and asserting world power with a ruthless disregard of moral law, were justified by the convenient plea of *salus populi.*

The treaties and alliances entered into, the increase of the potential offensive strength of the State, the assertion of privileges as rights, the safeguarding of in-

terests, became the principal concern of politics. With theatric effect the doctrines of the State as Power could be made to apply to foreign relations, and sincere men accepted the view that "morals must become more political before politics can become more moral." [1] None could deny in surveying the spoil accumulated by following the new precepts that "the statesman has no right to warm his hands on the smoking ruins of his country, and with comforting self-praise proclaim, 'I have never lied.' " [2]

II

The period of expansion which followed upon the frank acceptance of the new theory of the State as Power may be compared to that of the barbarian invasions. The centripetal physical factors which impelled the barbarians westward during the 5th century, and lured the Goths to Rome, the Huns to Chalons, and the Vandals to the African shores of the Mediterranean, effecting the dissolution of the Western Empire, were, during the last quarter of the 19th century and the opening years of the 20th, replaced by the centrifugal psychical factors which impelled the Western Powers, basing themselves on a politico-economic code wholly barbaric, to spread eastward, and by rapid stages to complete the conquest of Asia, Australasia, and Africa in what must appear in the light of history as an attempt to subjugate the globe. During the 5th century the barbarians in their march on Rome were armed only with their superior physical strength and fresh vigor. In the

[1] Treitschke, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 105.
[2] Treitschke, *Ibidem*, Vol. I, p. 110.

19th century, the European Powers felt themselves endowed with a cultural superiority which they wished to impose on the whole world.

This was not the task for an effete, worn-out civilisation such as we find reflected in sterile, middle class pessimism, with its decadent philosophy and its dilettante agnosticism, or the rapacious yet puny greed of Nation-States and the tortuous policy of the statesmen who directed the destiny of peoples prior to the last quarter of the 19th century. But looking beneath the surface we may uncover a vigorous, buoyant energy, an eagerness for action, such as the world had not witnessed. The new "barbarian" invasion by the European peoples, frankly undertaken after 1890, rested on broader foundations than those of the personalised Nation-State. Though in form it was directed by the Middle Class, and the methods of accomplishment of imperial design, the unmoral subterfuges resorted to in an attempt to reconcile the new policy with middle class standards are self-evident, yet at every turn we find traces of new influences, new elements, garbed in the old dress. It is for this reason that imperialism and internationalism with their attendant complexities and incongruities have hitherto been so difficult to analyse.

The State as Power was at one and the same time breaking down the old middle class politico-juridic theories, rendering obsolete the older forms of limited nationalism, and carrying forward with the old methods the new super-nationalism. The State had become the shell, it was no longer the kernel, of social life.

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